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限制竞争保证下高速公路BOT项目投资规模研究

发布时间:2018-08-25 15:09
【摘要】:作为重要基础设施的高速公路需求快速增长与供应不足的矛盾催生了各种融资方式的产生,BOT (Built-Operate-Transfer)模式作为地方政府一种行之有效的融资途径和方法被各地政府广泛应用到高速公路建设运营中。高速公路BOT项目自立项建设、运营至移交,一般会经历一个比较长的特许权期,在此期间随着经济的高速发展和消费者出行需求不断扩大,随之高速公路的通行车流量也会逐年增多,所以政府在规划设计和建设高速公路时,对高速公路的建设规格和投资规模应具有一定的超前意识。高速公路在建设完成开始运营后,由于高速公路的超前性的投资建设,运营前期高速通行车流量处于较低水平,BOT项目公司收取的总高速通行费用也较低;但随着社会经济的增长和人民出行需求的扩大,高速公路的通行车流量会逐年增加,如果高速公路等级标准和建设规格过低,最大通行能力达不到消费者快速出行的要求,政府和项目公司出于社会效益和项目收益的提高,不得不对高速公路进行改扩建或修建另一条高速公路,而这些建设费用远远高于一次建设到位的费用,并且在短时间内不可能修建好一条高速公路,导致在此期间社会效益受损。并且项目公司进行投资建设前普遍会向政府取得一个限制竞争保证,保证在其一定时期内政府在同一区域内不会修建另一条高速公路,以避免其他高速公路的竞争,以此比较准确预测车流量,降低项目风险,进行投资规模的决策,并增强项目公司的信心。在现实中许多高速公路都存在投资规模过大或过小的问题。投资规模过大,导致项目公司的维护成本过高和社会资源闲置;投资规模过小,导致项目公司运营后期不能满足通行要求,使项目公司利润降低,使得社会效益受损。本研究在相关研究基础之上,采用数学模型确定了在限制竞争保证下高速公路BOT项目的合理的投资规模,得出在政府在项目收支平衡下给予的特许权期是最优特许权期,这时的高速公路投资规模可以使项目社会总福利最大化这一结论。确定了最优政府限制竞争保证时间、高速公路达到最大通行能力时间点、达到最小单位效用时的时间点、高速公路经济寿命、高速公路社会寿命,并对其高速公路的项目公司的经济效益、政府经济利益、项目社会效益等进行了进一步的分析。
[Abstract]:The contradiction between the rapid growth of highway demand and the shortage of supply, as an important infrastructure, has given birth to various financing methods. As an effective way and method of financing for local governments, bot (Built-Operate-Transfer) model has been widely used by local governments. Applied to highway construction and operation. Highway BOT project construction, operation to transfer, will generally go through a relatively long concession period, during this period with the rapid development of the economy and consumer travel needs continue to expand, The traffic volume of expressway will also increase year by year, so the government should have a certain sense of ahead of the highway construction specification and investment scale when planning and designing and constructing expressway. After the completion of the expressway construction and operation, due to the ahead of the highway investment construction, the high speed traffic flow in the early stage of operation is at a lower level and the total high speed transportation cost charged by the bot project company is also relatively low. However, with the growth of the social economy and the expansion of the people's travel demand, the traffic flow of the expressway will increase year by year. If the highway grade standard and construction specifications are too low, the maximum traffic capacity will not reach the requirement of rapid travel by consumers. The government and project companies have had to rebuild or expand highways or build another highway because of increased social benefits and project revenues, and these costs are much higher than the cost of once in place. And it is impossible to build a good highway in a short period of time, resulting in the damage of social benefits during this period. And before the project companies invest in construction, they generally obtain from the government a restrictive competition guarantee that the government will not build another highway in the same area for a certain period of time, in order to avoid competition on other highways. It can accurately predict vehicle flow, reduce project risk, make investment scale decision, and enhance the confidence of project company. In reality, many expressways have the problem of too large or too small investment scale. The investment scale is too large, the maintenance cost of the project company is too high and the social resources are idle, the investment scale is too small, the project company can not meet the prevailing requirements in the later period of operation, the profit of the project company is reduced, and the social benefit is damaged. On the basis of relevant research, this paper uses mathematical model to determine the reasonable investment scale of expressway BOT project under the guarantee of restricted competition, and draws the conclusion that the concession period given by the government under the condition of the balance of income and expenditure of the project is the optimal concession period. At this time, the scale of highway investment can maximize the total social welfare of the project. Determined the optimal government limit competition guarantee time, the expressway reaches the maximum traffic capacity time point, reaches the minimum unit utility time point, the highway economic life, the highway society life span, The economic benefit, government economic benefit and project social benefit of the project company of its expressway are further analyzed.
【学位授予单位】:西南交通大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F283;F542.3

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