基于博弈论的客运通道市场竞争策略选择研究

发布时间：2018-09-17 20:28

【摘要】：随着我国经济的快速发展,城镇一体化进程加速,城市间交通出行需求日趋旺盛,尤其是城市群内部的客运交通需求。客运通道市场作为城市群内部客运出行的最主要运输消费市场,市场内客源较为稳定和消费需求旺盛,一直是客运经营者的经营重点和主要利润来源。如何最大程度的获得最大的市场份额,如何在市场中获得最大的市场收益,是客运经营者最为关注的焦点。而对于客运通道市场管理者来说,旺盛的市场需求和激烈的市场竞争容易造成客运经营者唯利是图,采用不正当手段获得更多的超额利润,如何规范市场竞争、管理好市场竞争并维持市场的稳定发展,是市场管理者的目前面临的最大难题。本文在分析和总结国内、外相关研究成果的基础上,对客运通道市场的特点和存在的博弈关系经行了分析,并重点就其中的“管理——竞争”博弈和“市场竞争”博弈进行了较为深入的分析,构建了相关的博弈模型： 1.以博弈论中“二人有限非零和对策”(亦称“双矩阵对策”)相关理论为基础,结合对管理方和竞争参与者的策略和得益分析,建立了“管理——竞争”博弈模型,并给出了求解思路； 2.以博弈论中经典的贝特兰德模型为理论基础,依托非集计模型相关理论和对运输企业经营成本的简单分析,针对竞争参与者市场竞争策略的选择问题构建了“市场竞争”博弈模型,并给出了主要求解思路。上述模型建立的基础上,就客运通道长度的变化、市场物价和消费水平的变化以及国家政策的倾斜三个方面对博弈结果的影响进行了灵敏度分析,并在此基础上对客运通道市场竞争管理方和参与方就如何规范管理和参与市场竞争提出了相关建议、对策。最后,本文以成渝客运通道为背景,构建了成渝客运通道市场竞争策略选择博弈模型,对文章研究的基本理论进行验证性计算,给出了竞争参与方竞争策略选择结果,取得了较好的结果。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of our economy and the acceleration of the process of urban integration, the demand for intercity transportation is becoming more and more vigorous, especially the demand for passenger transport within the urban agglomeration. As the main transportation consumption market in urban agglomeration, the passenger channel market is stable and the consumption demand is exuberant, which is always the key point and the main profit source of the passenger transport operators. How to obtain the largest market share and how to obtain the largest market income in the market is the focus of the passenger transport operators. However, for the market managers of passenger transport channels, the exuberant market demand and fierce market competition are apt to cause the passenger transport operators to be profit-oriented, to obtain more excess profits by improper means, and how to regulate the market competition. It is the biggest problem for market managers to manage the market competition and maintain the stable development of the market. On the basis of analyzing and summarizing the domestic and foreign related research results, this paper analyzes the characteristics of the passenger transport channel market and the existing game relations. The paper also analyzes the "management-competition" game and the "market competition" game, and constructs the relevant game model: 1. Based on the theory of "two-person finite non-zero sum game" (also called "two-matrix game") in game theory, combining with the strategy and benefit analysis of management and competition participants, a "management-competition" game model is established. The idea of solving the problem is also given. 2. Based on the classic Bertrand model in game theory, the paper relies on the disaggregate model theory and the simple analysis of transportation enterprises' operating cost. In this paper, a game model of "market competition" is constructed for the choice of market competition strategy of competition participants, and the main solutions are given. On the basis of the above model, the influence of the length of passenger passage, the market price and consumption level and the inclination of national policy on the game result is analyzed. On the basis of this, the author puts forward some suggestions and countermeasures on how to regulate the management and participate in the market competition. Finally, based on the background of Chengdu-Chongqing passenger transport channel, this paper constructs a game model of competitive strategy selection for Chengdu-Chongqing passenger transport channel, verifies the basic theory studied in this paper, and gives the result of competitive strategy selection for competitive participants. Good results have been obtained.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F542;F224.32

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