网约车冲击下打车公司策略选择与社会福利分析
发布时间：2018-10-08 07:34
【摘要】：在互联网技术日新月异发展的今天,随着智能手机的普及,如“滴滴出行”、“易到用车”等新兴网约车软件也顺应科技潮流迅速兴起。随着网约车的飞速发展,传统出租车公司的运营及政府对打车公司的监管也受到了巨大的冲击,本文主要研究在网约车的冲击下所引起的打车公司的策略选择及相应的社会福利分析,并使用规范的经济学分析方法探寻其背后蕴含的逻辑。分析的主要结果为:(1)在网约车未进入打车市场时,传统出租车公司形成垄断,出租车公司将打车价格定为消费者搭车的固定效用,攫取了全部的消费者剩余,并收取司机的全部收入,从而使自身利润最大化;(2)网约车进入市场初期,采取低价格、高补贴的策略来抢夺打车市场,吸引了大量的客户及司机进入网约车市场。在这一阶段,由于网约车公司制定的打车价格低于出租车公司,且对司机的抽成比例也较低,使乘坐网约车的消费者福利与网约车司机的收入得到增加;(3)当网约车公司已经吸引到足够多的客户群体后,采取涨价的混同价格策略,比进入市场时直接采用混同价格策略的利润要大,故而网约车公司进入市场的首要目标就是要掠夺市场;(4)网约车公司实施涨价的混同价格策略后,与出租车原始的垄断定价相等,市场中的利润也与传统出租车公司垄断市场时相等,只是在网约车公司与出租车公司之间进行瓜分而己。打车价格回复到垄断市场时的价格,网约车公司对司机进行完全抽成,出租车公司也将司机的收入全部攫取,消费者福利与司机利润受到损害;(5)在面对网约车的冲击时,出租车公司长久以来的垄断已经不能再继续,客户群体的流失,使得继续定制垄断价格无利可图,出租车公司有降低打车价格跟随网约车公司定价的激励。本文的创新点:(1)研究视角上的改进:本文从传统出租车公司与网约车公司两者之间互相竞争的关系着手,探讨了新进入市场的网约车对传统出租车公司的冲击及它们之间博弈的经济逻辑;(2)分析工具上的改进:本文运用了规范的经济学博弈模型,试图寻找网约车与传统出租车公司之间的竞争均衡点。根据上述研究结果,提出主要建议:(1)逐步放开传统出租车的总量和价格管控,将由政府管控逐步向市场自主调节过渡;(2)各地对网约车的限制过多,应放松管制,从而让网约车与出租车之间能更好的竞争。随着市场经济的深化发展,政府更多是应该放权于市场,让市场能够自由竞争,从而进一步实现资源的有效配置。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of Internet technology, with the popularity of smart phones, such as "DiDi", "easy to get cars" and other new network ride-sharing software is also in line with the rapid rise of science and technology. With the rapid development of Internet ride-sharing, the operation of traditional taxi companies and the government's regulation of taxi hailing companies have also been greatly impacted. This paper mainly studies the strategy choice and the corresponding social welfare analysis of the ride-hailing company caused by the impact of the network ride-hailing, and uses the normative economic analysis method to explore the logic behind the ride-hailing company. The main results are as follows: (1) when ride-hailing is not in the market, the traditional taxi companies form a monopoly, and the taxi companies determine the fixed utility of ride-hailing, and grab all the rest of the consumers. And collect all the income of drivers, so as to maximize their own profits; (2) the early stage of the market, take low prices, high subsidy strategy to seize the taxi market, attracted a large number of customers and drivers into the market. At this stage, because the ride-hailing company set a lower price than the taxi company, and the proportion of drivers is also lower, Increased consumer welfare and income for ride-sharing drivers; (3) when ride-hailing companies have attracted enough customers, they have adopted a mix of price increases. It is more profitable than when entering the market by adopting the mixed price strategy directly. Therefore, the primary goal of the net car-hailing company to enter the market is to plunder the market. (4) after the implementation of the mixed pricing strategy of the net car-hailing company, The profit in the market is equal to that of the traditional taxi company when the taxi company monopolizes the market. It is only shared between the taxi company and the taxi company. The taxi price returned to the price at which the market was monopolized. The ride-hailing company completely pumped out the driver, and the taxi company also grabbed the driver's income completely. Consumer welfare and the driver's profit were damaged. (5) in the face of the impact of the ride-sharing network, The long monopoly of taxi companies can no longer continue, the loss of customers, making it unprofitable to continue to customize monopoly prices, taxi companies have the incentive to reduce the price of ride-hailing companies. The innovations of this paper are as follows: (1) the improvement of the research perspective: this paper starts with the competitive relationship between the traditional taxi companies and the ride-sharing companies. This paper discusses the impact of the new entering market on the traditional taxi companies and the economic logic of the game between them. (2) the improvement of the analysis tools: this paper uses the normative economic game model, This paper tries to find a competitive equilibrium point between ride-sharing and traditional taxi companies. Based on the results of the above study, the following suggestions are put forward: (1) gradually liberalizing the total amount and price control of traditional taxis will be gradually transferred from government control to market autonomy; (2) there are too many restrictions on ride-sharing in various places, so the regulations should be relaxed. So that the network can be better competition between car and taxi. With the deepening development of the market economy, the government should devolve more power to the market so that the market can compete freely, so as to realize the effective allocation of resources.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F572.6;F724.6
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of Internet technology, with the popularity of smart phones, such as "DiDi", "easy to get cars" and other new network ride-sharing software is also in line with the rapid rise of science and technology. With the rapid development of Internet ride-sharing, the operation of traditional taxi companies and the government's regulation of taxi hailing companies have also been greatly impacted. This paper mainly studies the strategy choice and the corresponding social welfare analysis of the ride-hailing company caused by the impact of the network ride-hailing, and uses the normative economic analysis method to explore the logic behind the ride-hailing company. The main results are as follows: (1) when ride-hailing is not in the market, the traditional taxi companies form a monopoly, and the taxi companies determine the fixed utility of ride-hailing, and grab all the rest of the consumers. And collect all the income of drivers, so as to maximize their own profits; (2) the early stage of the market, take low prices, high subsidy strategy to seize the taxi market, attracted a large number of customers and drivers into the market. At this stage, because the ride-hailing company set a lower price than the taxi company, and the proportion of drivers is also lower, Increased consumer welfare and income for ride-sharing drivers; (3) when ride-hailing companies have attracted enough customers, they have adopted a mix of price increases. It is more profitable than when entering the market by adopting the mixed price strategy directly. Therefore, the primary goal of the net car-hailing company to enter the market is to plunder the market. (4) after the implementation of the mixed pricing strategy of the net car-hailing company, The profit in the market is equal to that of the traditional taxi company when the taxi company monopolizes the market. It is only shared between the taxi company and the taxi company. The taxi price returned to the price at which the market was monopolized. The ride-hailing company completely pumped out the driver, and the taxi company also grabbed the driver's income completely. Consumer welfare and the driver's profit were damaged. (5) in the face of the impact of the ride-sharing network, The long monopoly of taxi companies can no longer continue, the loss of customers, making it unprofitable to continue to customize monopoly prices, taxi companies have the incentive to reduce the price of ride-hailing companies. The innovations of this paper are as follows: (1) the improvement of the research perspective: this paper starts with the competitive relationship between the traditional taxi companies and the ride-sharing companies. This paper discusses the impact of the new entering market on the traditional taxi companies and the economic logic of the game between them. (2) the improvement of the analysis tools: this paper uses the normative economic game model, This paper tries to find a competitive equilibrium point between ride-sharing and traditional taxi companies. Based on the results of the above study, the following suggestions are put forward: (1) gradually liberalizing the total amount and price control of traditional taxis will be gradually transferred from government control to market autonomy; (2) there are too many restrictions on ride-sharing in various places, so the regulations should be relaxed. So that the network can be better competition between car and taxi. With the deepening development of the market economy, the government should devolve more power to the market so that the market can compete freely, so as to realize the effective allocation of resources.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F572.6;F724.6
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