基于供需的移动打车平台定价研究
发布时间：2018-10-15 13:27
【摘要】：改革开放以来,中国展现了惊人的发展速度,打破了之前由日本、韩国等保持的战后高速发展记录。随之而来的是人口老龄化、创新不足等诸多问题,经济发展面临下行风险。我国政府制定出调整经济结构,转变发展方式的政策进行应对,加大对高附加值的服务业的扶持和发展,近年来第三产业占比不断加重,对GDP增加贡献过半。随着高新技术的不断发展和应用,服务业与互联网技术结合催生的共享经济平台迅速崛起,其中国外以Uber和Airbnb为代表,国内以滴滴等为代表。这些新的共享经济平台在合理利用闲置资源,提高配置效率方面带来了巨大的改变,给人们的生活带来了便利,同时其先进的定价方式也引起一定的争议。文章首先分析了移动打车平台的参与者及运行机制和平台的定价策略,为后续模型的建立进行铺垫。建立模型研究垄断平台在统一定价和可变定价两种定价策略下的最优价格,对垄断平台的支付情况和对消费者福利影响进行了深入的研究,为政府等监管机构提供管理建议,也为后续模型的拓展和对整个打车市场的进一步研究打下基础。其次,以Bertrand博弈模型为基础,对新兴打车平台企业和传统出租车企业之间的竞争定价决策进行研究,分析新兴打车平台企业采用不同的定价策略时对传统企业利润和市场份额的冲击和影响。对现存打车市场的平台和"司机"之间以及"司机"和消费者之间存在的一些问题和现象进行讨论,并给出了合理的解释,同时为传统出租车企业在面对新兴企业的巨大挑战时提供一定的应对建议。最后,以国内两大打车平台寡头滴滴和快的为背景,采用多维博弈模型研究同时提供快车和出租车两种服务的双寡头平台之间的博弈,得出平台采用不同定价策略时的均衡定价。分析发现平台对快车服务采用可变定价时,不仅能提高快车服务的利润,同时也提高采用统一定价的出租车服务的利润,为目前主流平台企业所采用的定价方式找到理论支撑。此外,还讨论了出租车和快车两种服务之间的替代性对平台定价和利润的影响,以及用户粘性对平台的影响,为之前滴滴和快的之间的补贴大战给出了合理解释。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, China has shown an amazing pace of development, breaking the post-war record of rapid development maintained by Japan and South Korea. Followed by the aging population, insufficient innovation and many other problems, economic development is facing downside risks. The government of our country has formulated the policy of adjusting the economic structure, changing the mode of development and increasing the support and development of the service industry with high added value. In recent years, the proportion of the tertiary industry has been increasing continuously, and it has contributed more than half to the increase of GDP. With the continuous development and application of high and new technology, the shared economy platform, which is produced by the combination of service industry and Internet technology, is rising rapidly, including Uber and Airbnb in foreign countries and Didi in China. These new shared economic platforms have brought great changes in the rational use of idle resources and improved allocation efficiency, which has brought convenience to people's lives. At the same time, their advanced pricing methods have also caused some controversy. Firstly, this paper analyzes the participants of the mobile ride-hailing platform, its running mechanism and the pricing strategy of the platform so as to pave the way for the subsequent establishment of the model. This paper establishes a model to study the optimal price of monopoly platform under two pricing strategies of uniform pricing and variable pricing, and makes a deep study on the payment situation of monopoly platform and its impact on consumer welfare, and provides management advice for the government and other regulatory bodies. It also lays a foundation for the further research of the following model and the whole market of ride-hailing. Secondly, on the basis of Bertrand game model, this paper studies the competitive pricing decision between the emerging ride-hailing platform enterprises and the traditional taxi enterprises. This paper analyzes the impact of different pricing strategies on the profit and market share of the new ride-hailing platform. This paper discusses some problems and phenomena existing between the existing ride-hailing market and "drivers" and between "drivers" and consumers, and gives a reasonable explanation. At the same time, it provides some suggestions for the traditional taxi enterprises in the face of the huge challenges of emerging enterprises. Finally, based on the background of two domestic taxi hailing platforms: oligarch Didi and Kuaidi, the multi-dimensional game model is used to study the game between the duopoly platforms which provide both express and taxi services. The equilibrium pricing of the platform with different pricing strategies is obtained. It is found that when the platform adopts variable pricing for express service, it can not only increase the profit of express service, but also increase the profit of taxi service with uniform pricing, which provides theoretical support for the pricing methods adopted by mainstream platform enterprises. In addition, the influence of the substitution between taxi and express services on the pricing and profit of the platform and the impact of user stickiness on the platform are also discussed, which provides a reasonable explanation for the previous subsidy war between Didi and Kuaidi.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F724.6;F572
，
本文编号：2272689
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, China has shown an amazing pace of development, breaking the post-war record of rapid development maintained by Japan and South Korea. Followed by the aging population, insufficient innovation and many other problems, economic development is facing downside risks. The government of our country has formulated the policy of adjusting the economic structure, changing the mode of development and increasing the support and development of the service industry with high added value. In recent years, the proportion of the tertiary industry has been increasing continuously, and it has contributed more than half to the increase of GDP. With the continuous development and application of high and new technology, the shared economy platform, which is produced by the combination of service industry and Internet technology, is rising rapidly, including Uber and Airbnb in foreign countries and Didi in China. These new shared economic platforms have brought great changes in the rational use of idle resources and improved allocation efficiency, which has brought convenience to people's lives. At the same time, their advanced pricing methods have also caused some controversy. Firstly, this paper analyzes the participants of the mobile ride-hailing platform, its running mechanism and the pricing strategy of the platform so as to pave the way for the subsequent establishment of the model. This paper establishes a model to study the optimal price of monopoly platform under two pricing strategies of uniform pricing and variable pricing, and makes a deep study on the payment situation of monopoly platform and its impact on consumer welfare, and provides management advice for the government and other regulatory bodies. It also lays a foundation for the further research of the following model and the whole market of ride-hailing. Secondly, on the basis of Bertrand game model, this paper studies the competitive pricing decision between the emerging ride-hailing platform enterprises and the traditional taxi enterprises. This paper analyzes the impact of different pricing strategies on the profit and market share of the new ride-hailing platform. This paper discusses some problems and phenomena existing between the existing ride-hailing market and "drivers" and between "drivers" and consumers, and gives a reasonable explanation. At the same time, it provides some suggestions for the traditional taxi enterprises in the face of the huge challenges of emerging enterprises. Finally, based on the background of two domestic taxi hailing platforms: oligarch Didi and Kuaidi, the multi-dimensional game model is used to study the game between the duopoly platforms which provide both express and taxi services. The equilibrium pricing of the platform with different pricing strategies is obtained. It is found that when the platform adopts variable pricing for express service, it can not only increase the profit of express service, but also increase the profit of taxi service with uniform pricing, which provides theoretical support for the pricing methods adopted by mainstream platform enterprises. In addition, the influence of the substitution between taxi and express services on the pricing and profit of the platform and the impact of user stickiness on the platform are also discussed, which provides a reasonable explanation for the previous subsidy war between Didi and Kuaidi.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F724.6;F572
，
本文编号：2272689
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