京津冀机场协作机制构建

发布时间：2018-12-12 21:26

【摘要】：民航“十二五”规划提出，十二五期间，京津冀地区将兴建首都第二机场、衡水机场、张家口机场以及承德机场，地区内机场的密度将大大增加。通过数据分析可知，虽然首都机场目前已趋于饱和，但是，地区内其他机场普遍业务不足，无法实现机场规模经济，导致区域内机场持续亏损。同时，由于京津冀地区内机场距离较近，业务趋同度大，导致机场间低水平竞争激烈，不利于地区内整个民航运输业的良性发展。如果进一步增加机场密度，上述情况将进一步恶化，因此建立京津冀机场间的协作机制，实现错位经营，尤为重要。本文在分析京津冀机场运营环境和运营现状以及机场运营特征的基础之上，设计了机场收益函数和博弈的策略组合，建立了完全信息静态博弈结构及其重复博弈模型，求解了重复博弈纳什均衡及其均衡条件，提出了实现机场协作的变量取值范围，，并设计相应的政策机制。研究发现，京津冀机场业务分布不均，航线重叠率较高；业务饱和度较高的首都机场经营业绩不佳，实现京津冀机场的业务整合尤为必要。然而，当前机场所在当地政府出台了许多机场扩建规划，依据博弈模型分析可知，这将加剧机场间的恶性竞争，将机场发展推向“囚徒困境”。本文所建立的重复博弈模型及其分析结果显示出，地方政府对机场的负补贴导致协作的概率下降，旅客对舒适度的敏感性越强，单位航线边际收益越高，协作概率越大。由此可见，减少地方政府对机场运营的行政干预，减少区域的机场密度有利于三地机场协作。
[Abstract]:According to the 12th Five-Year Plan of Civil Aviation, the Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei regions will build the capital second airport, Hengshui airport, Zhangjiakou airport and Chengde airport during the 12th Five-Year Plan period. The density of airports in the region will increase greatly. Through the data analysis, although the capital airport has been saturated, but other airports in the region are generally inadequate business, unable to realize the airport economies of scale, resulting in regional airports continue to lose money. At the same time, due to the proximity of the airports in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and the large degree of business convergence, the low level competition among the airports is fierce, which is not conducive to the healthy development of the entire civil aviation transportation industry in the region. If the airport density is further increased, the above situation will be further aggravated, so it is particularly important to establish a cooperative mechanism between Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei airports and to realize dislocation management. Based on the analysis of the operating environment and operation status of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei airport and the characteristics of airport operation, this paper designs the airport income function and the strategy combination of the game, and establishes the static game structure of complete information and its repeated game model. The Nash equilibrium and its equilibrium conditions of repeated game are solved, and the range of variables to realize airport cooperation is proposed, and the corresponding policy mechanism is designed. It is found that the business distribution of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei airport is uneven, the overlap rate of routes is high, and the business performance of the capital airport with high business saturation is not good, so it is necessary to realize the business integration of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei airport. However, the local government has issued a lot of airport expansion plans. According to the game model analysis, this will aggravate the vicious competition among airports and push the airport development to the "prisoner's dilemma". The repeated game model established in this paper and its analysis results show that the negative subsidy of the local government to the airport leads to the decrease of the probability of cooperation. The stronger the sensitivity of passengers to comfort, the higher the marginal income per unit route and the greater the probability of cooperation. It can be seen that reducing the administrative intervention of the local government to the airport operation and reducing the regional airport density are beneficial to the cooperation of the three airports.
【学位授予单位】：河北工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F562.6;F224

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