基于博弈论的高速公路BOT项目风险分担研究

发布时间：2019-01-03 21:05

【摘要】：高速公路BOT项目具有投资大、回收期长、风险复杂等方面的特征,因此,为了使项目能够顺利进行,应当对项目的风险分担进行深入研究。目前对于高速公路BOT项目风险分担的研究,大多是在政府和投资者之间进行的,随着高速公路BOT项目在我国的实践,运营商逐步从投资者中分离出来,本文主要是研究高速公路BOT项目中投资者和运营商之间的风险分担问题,并在此基础上设立相应的制度。本文在以往政府和投资者之间风险分担的基础上,采用博弈论中的委托代理模型对高速公路BOT项目的投资者和运营商的风险分担进行研究,并在此基础上设立了相应的激励制度和约束制度。首先,在相关研究的基础上,对BOT的概念进行界定,并对高速公路BOT项目的风险进行识别和分析,在对一般风险分析的基础上,结合高速公路BOT项目的风险分担主体,对基于主体的风险因素进行进一步研究,从而确定了当运营商从投资者中分离出来以后,高速公路BOT项目中风险分担的主体与客体,并研究了不同主体之间的相互关系,从而为模型的建立奠定基础。其次,在政府和投资者之间风险分担的基础上,对这两者的委托代理模型进行改进,分析了高速公路BOT项目中投资者和运营商之间的风险分担模型,模型结果表明高速公路BOT项目风险分担和委托人和代理人的风险规避程度有关,并据此设立相关的风险分担制度,包括激励制度和约束制度。最后,选取了YM高速公路BOT项目作为案例进行分析。在这个案例分析中,运用高速公路BOT项目投资者和运营商之间的博弈模型进行分析,并确定在不对称信息的情况下,激励制度和约束制度的设立和风险分担密切相关。
[Abstract]:Expressway BOT project has the characteristics of large investment, long payback period, complex risk and so on. Therefore, in order to make the project carry on smoothly, the risk sharing of the project should be deeply studied. At present, the research on risk sharing of expressway BOT projects is mostly carried out between the government and investors. With the practice of expressway BOT projects in China, operators are gradually separated from investors. This paper mainly studies the problem of risk sharing between investors and operators in expressway BOT project, and establishes the corresponding system on this basis. Based on the previous risk sharing between the government and investors, this paper uses the principal-agent model in game theory to study the risk sharing between the investors and operators of expressway BOT project. And on this basis, set up the corresponding incentive system and restraint system. First of all, on the basis of relevant research, the concept of BOT is defined, and the risk of expressway BOT project is identified and analyzed. On the basis of general risk analysis, the main body of risk sharing of expressway BOT project is combined. The risk factors based on subject are further studied, so as to determine the subject and object of risk sharing in expressway BOT project after the operator is separated from investors, and the relationship between different subjects is also studied. Thus, it lays the foundation for the establishment of the model. Secondly, on the basis of risk sharing between government and investor, this paper improves the principal-agent model of these two models, and analyzes the risk sharing model between investor and operator in expressway BOT project. The model results show that the risk sharing of expressway BOT project is related to the degree of risk aversion of the principal and agent, and the related risk sharing system, including incentive system and restraint system, is established accordingly. Finally, the YM expressway BOT project is selected as a case study. In this case study, the game model between investors and operators of expressway BOT project is used to analyze, and it is determined that the establishment of incentive system and constraint system is closely related to risk sharing in the case of asymmetric information.
【学位授予单位】：北方工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F542;F283;F224

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