基于利益博弈的出租车管理费测算
发布时间：2019-04-01 23:32
【摘要】：出租车行业已经成为城市交通的重要组成部分，但随着出租车行业的快速发展，也出现了各种难以解决的问题。其中以出租车运营主体之间利益诉求难以协调的问题最为突出。目前解决该问题的主要思路是政府规制措施本身是否合理，缺少在既定规制措施下各利益主体之间矛盾协调问题的研究。无论从理论上还是现实中看，在既定管制措施下各主体利益矛盾的核心问题就是管理费的取值大小。因此，论文基于出租车运营主体的利益博弈对管理费的合理范围进行测算，为解决相关主体之间利益矛盾提供决策依据。 目前的管理费测算通常是按照出租车公司的成本时间分摊加以确定。该方法无法直接体现各主体的利益博弈关系。为此，本文从博弈角度，在明晰各主体利益博弈关系的基础上进行管理费的测算。为体现各主体的利益均衡博弈，论文以管理费为主变量，通过博弈次序、博弈主体的策略集合以及各策略选择的收益函数共同建立起完全信息动态博弈模型。根据该模型的求解可以得到管理费与博弈均衡解的相互关系，并以此关系为基础，，通过对均衡解的分析可知，若该均衡不是最优均衡则参与主体之间会因管理费设置不合理而产生矛盾，所以论文将该均衡变为子博弈纳什均衡确定出管理费合理范围的表达式。同时，为丰富博弈过程的策略选择，管理费变量设定包含理想值与非理想值，所以要想最终测算出管理费的合理范围就需要知道管理费的理想值。论文通过合作博弈的Shapley值得出关于单车收入的理想分配比例，进而求得管理费的理想值，并将该理想值带入管理费合理范围表达式明确的测算出管理费的合理范围。 论文最后通过西安市出租车管理费合理范围的实证测算，对模型加以验证，表明模型可信。研究结论为更深入、合理确定出租车管理费提供了方法依据，对缓解出租车运营各利益主体的矛盾有积极作用。
[Abstract]:Taxi industry has become an important part of urban transportation, but with the rapid development of taxi industry, a variety of difficult problems have emerged. Among them, the interest demand between taxi operators is difficult to coordinate the most prominent problem. At present, the main idea to solve this problem is whether the government regulation measures are reasonable or not, and there is no research on the contradiction and coordination among the various stakeholders under the established regulation measures. Whether in theory or in reality, the core problem of interest contradiction of each subject under the established control measures is the value of management fee. Therefore, the paper calculates the reasonable scope of management fee based on the interest game of taxi operators, and provides the decision-making basis for solving the interest contradiction between the relevant subjects. Current management cost estimates are usually determined according to the taxi company's cost-time sharing. This method can not directly reflect the interest game relationship of each subject. Therefore, this article from the game point of view, on the basis of clarifying the relationship between the interests of each main body, the management costs are calculated. In order to reflect the interest equilibrium game of each subject, this paper sets up the complete information dynamic game model through the game order, the strategy set of the game main body and the profit function of each strategy choice by taking the management fee as the main variable. According to the solution of the model, the relationship between the management fee and the equilibrium solution of the game can be obtained, and on the basis of this relation, the analysis of the equilibrium solution can be seen. If the equilibrium is not the optimal one, there will be contradiction between the participants because of the unreasonable setting of the management fee. Therefore, the equilibrium will be transformed into the Nash equilibrium of sub-game to determine the expression of reasonable range of management fee. At the same time, in order to enrich the strategy choice of the game process, the management fee variable includes ideal value and non-ideal value, so it is necessary to know the ideal value of the management fee in order to finally calculate the reasonable range of the management fee. In this paper, the Shapley of cooperative game is worthy of the ideal distribution ratio of bicycle income, and then the ideal value of management fee is obtained, and the ideal value is brought into the reasonable range of management fee to calculate the reasonable range of management fee clearly. Finally, through the empirical calculation of the reasonable range of taxi management fee in Xi'an, the model is verified, which shows that the model is credible. The research conclusion provides a method basis for further and reasonable determination of taxi management fee, and plays a positive role in alleviating the contradiction among various stakeholders in taxi operation.
【学位授予单位】：长安大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F572;F224.32
本文编号：2452011
[Abstract]:Taxi industry has become an important part of urban transportation, but with the rapid development of taxi industry, a variety of difficult problems have emerged. Among them, the interest demand between taxi operators is difficult to coordinate the most prominent problem. At present, the main idea to solve this problem is whether the government regulation measures are reasonable or not, and there is no research on the contradiction and coordination among the various stakeholders under the established regulation measures. Whether in theory or in reality, the core problem of interest contradiction of each subject under the established control measures is the value of management fee. Therefore, the paper calculates the reasonable scope of management fee based on the interest game of taxi operators, and provides the decision-making basis for solving the interest contradiction between the relevant subjects. Current management cost estimates are usually determined according to the taxi company's cost-time sharing. This method can not directly reflect the interest game relationship of each subject. Therefore, this article from the game point of view, on the basis of clarifying the relationship between the interests of each main body, the management costs are calculated. In order to reflect the interest equilibrium game of each subject, this paper sets up the complete information dynamic game model through the game order, the strategy set of the game main body and the profit function of each strategy choice by taking the management fee as the main variable. According to the solution of the model, the relationship between the management fee and the equilibrium solution of the game can be obtained, and on the basis of this relation, the analysis of the equilibrium solution can be seen. If the equilibrium is not the optimal one, there will be contradiction between the participants because of the unreasonable setting of the management fee. Therefore, the equilibrium will be transformed into the Nash equilibrium of sub-game to determine the expression of reasonable range of management fee. At the same time, in order to enrich the strategy choice of the game process, the management fee variable includes ideal value and non-ideal value, so it is necessary to know the ideal value of the management fee in order to finally calculate the reasonable range of the management fee. In this paper, the Shapley of cooperative game is worthy of the ideal distribution ratio of bicycle income, and then the ideal value of management fee is obtained, and the ideal value is brought into the reasonable range of management fee to calculate the reasonable range of management fee clearly. Finally, through the empirical calculation of the reasonable range of taxi management fee in Xi'an, the model is verified, which shows that the model is credible. The research conclusion provides a method basis for further and reasonable determination of taxi management fee, and plays a positive role in alleviating the contradiction among various stakeholders in taxi operation.
【学位授予单位】：长安大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F572;F224.32
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