基于合作治理的公交服务控制权配置及其对效益的影响:以上海市公交服务为例
发布时间：2019-08-05 19:47
【摘要】：公交服务效益不佳而引发了国有化回潮的现象,其关键在于政府、公交企业和社会群体三方主体在合作中控制权配置不合理。针对此问题,基于合作治理的背景,运用非对称信息条件下的委托代理理论构建公交服务合作的效益模型,探讨公交服务各主体控制权配置及其对效益的影响,并以上海市公交服务的数据进行实证检验。结果表明:公交企业控制权配置受其自身产出水平的影响,产出水平越高的企业,其获得的控制权也就更大;公交企业控制权与效益是"倒U型"关系,只有控制权在合理范围内时才有利于效益的增加;各方主体在自身控制权范围内,其努力水平与效益是"倒U型"关系,表明政府过度干预、社会群体无效参与均不利于效益的提高。据此提出在合作中的战略、战术和执行层级中合理安排各主体控制权。
[Abstract]:The poor benefit of public transport service has led to the phenomenon of nationalization, the key of which lies in the unreasonable allocation of control rights among the three main bodies of the government, public transport enterprises and social groups in the cooperation. In order to solve this problem, based on the background of cooperative governance, the benefit model of public transport service cooperation is constructed by using the principal-agent theory under the condition of asymmetric information, and the allocation of control rights of each subject of public transport service and its influence on the benefit are discussed, and the empirical test is carried out with the data of Shanghai public transport service. The results show that the allocation of control rights of public transport enterprises is affected by their own output level, and the higher the output level is, the greater the control rights are, and the control rights and benefits of public transport enterprises are "inverted U" relationship, which is beneficial to the increase of benefits only when the control rights are within a reasonable range. Within the scope of their own control, the level of efforts and benefits of all parties are "inverted U", which indicates that excessive government intervention and ineffective participation of social groups are not conducive to the improvement of benefits. Based on this, it is put forward that the control rights of each subject should be arranged reasonably in the strategic, tactical and executive levels of cooperation.
【作者单位】： 大连理工大学公共管理与法学学院;江西财经大学旅游与城市管理学院;同济大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科重点资助项目(12AGL010) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173157) 辽宁社科基金资助项目(L12BGL007)
【分类号】：F572.88;F224
[Abstract]:The poor benefit of public transport service has led to the phenomenon of nationalization, the key of which lies in the unreasonable allocation of control rights among the three main bodies of the government, public transport enterprises and social groups in the cooperation. In order to solve this problem, based on the background of cooperative governance, the benefit model of public transport service cooperation is constructed by using the principal-agent theory under the condition of asymmetric information, and the allocation of control rights of each subject of public transport service and its influence on the benefit are discussed, and the empirical test is carried out with the data of Shanghai public transport service. The results show that the allocation of control rights of public transport enterprises is affected by their own output level, and the higher the output level is, the greater the control rights are, and the control rights and benefits of public transport enterprises are "inverted U" relationship, which is beneficial to the increase of benefits only when the control rights are within a reasonable range. Within the scope of their own control, the level of efforts and benefits of all parties are "inverted U", which indicates that excessive government intervention and ineffective participation of social groups are not conducive to the improvement of benefits. Based on this, it is put forward that the control rights of each subject should be arranged reasonably in the strategic, tactical and executive levels of cooperation.
【作者单位】： 大连理工大学公共管理与法学学院;江西财经大学旅游与城市管理学院;同济大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科重点资助项目(12AGL010) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173157) 辽宁社科基金资助项目(L12BGL007)
【分类号】：F572.88;F224
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前6条
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