上市公司董事会特征对会计稳健性的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-01 03:09

本文关键词：上市公司董事会特征对会计稳健性的影响研究　出处：《西南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：董事会是公司内部治理机制的核心部分,是一个重要的决策和监督机构。董事会作为联结股东和经理层的纽带,对股东负责,对会计信息的提供主体—经理层的经营行为负有监督和控制责任。一直以来,会计稳健性是会计确认与计量的传统和原则,是会计信息质量要求的一个重要特征。倘若董事会能够充分有效地发挥其监督控制职能,就能减少经理层违背股东目标而进行的会计盈余操纵行为,增加经理层提供不稳健会计信息的成本,改善公司治理效果,从而提高会计稳健性。因此,董事会与会计稳健性有着密不可分的关系。我国上市公司董事会特征对会计稳健性的影响值得深入研究,并且这种影响是否会因为上市公司股权性质的不同而产生差异,这是本文希望解决的问题。在规范分析方面,本文在文献回顾的基础上,对董事会特征和会计稳健性分别进行了理论分析,并且综合运用委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、契约理论阐述了董事会与会计稳健性之间的关系。在实证分析方面,本文以2007—2011年我国A股共6793家上市公司为样本,选取了董事会规模、董事长与总经理两职设置状态、独立董事比例、审计委员会设置情况、董事会持股比例、董事会会议次数这六个董事会特征作为解释变量,运用SPSS17.0软件,首先对董事会特征变量进行描述性统计和相关性分析,然后借鉴Basu基本模型构建本文的回归模型,实证检验了董事会特征对会计稳健性的影响,并且将上市公司按照股权性质分为国有控股公司和非国有控股公司,分别比较了这种影响的差异性。本文得出研究结论：(1)整体上我国上市公司董事会规模、董事长与总经理两职分离、审计委员会的设立、董事会持股比例、董事会会议次数对会计稳健性具有正向显著影响,而独立董事比例对会计稳健性没有显著影响。(2)在不同股权性质下,董事会特征对会计稳健性的影响存在一定的差异性：①国有控股公司董事会规模对会计稳健性具有正向显著影响,而非国有控股公司董事会规模对会计稳健性没有显著影响；②无论是在国有控股公司还是在非国有控股公司,独立董事比例都对会计稳健性没有显著影响；③与国有控股公司相比,非国有控股公司董事长与总经理两职分离、审计委员会的设立、董事会持股比例对会计稳健性的影响更为显著；④国有控股公司董事会会议次数对会计稳健性的影响程度大于非国有控股公司董事会会议次数对会计稳健性的影响程度。针对实证研究结果,本文提出了一些改善董事会治理效果、提高会计稳健性的政策建议以供参考：①根据上市公司实际情况选择合适的董事会规模；②改进和完善上市公司独立董事制度；③大力推进审计委员会的设立和完善；④适当提高董事会持股比例；⑤合理安排董事会会议次数并改善会议质量。
[Abstract]:The board of directors is the core part of the corporate governance mechanism and an important decision-making and supervision body. As a link between shareholders and managers, the board of directors is responsible to shareholders. Accounting conservatism is the tradition and principle of accounting recognition and measurement. It is an important characteristic of accounting information quality requirement. If the board of directors can give full play to its function of supervision and control, it can reduce the behavior of accounting earnings manipulation by managers against shareholders' objectives. Increase the cost of managers to provide unsound accounting information, improve the effectiveness of corporate governance, thereby improving accounting conservatism. The board of directors is closely related to accounting conservatism. The influence of the characteristics of the board of directors of listed companies on accounting conservatism is worthy of further study. And whether this kind of influence will have the difference because of the listed company's equity nature, this is the question which this article hopes to solve. In the normative analysis, based on the literature review, this paper makes theoretical analysis on the characteristics of the board of directors and accounting conservatism, and synthetically applies the principal-agent theory and the information asymmetry theory. Contract theory illustrates the relationship between the board of directors and accounting conservatism. In the empirical analysis, this paper selects the size of the board of directors as a sample of 6793 A-share listed companies in China from 2007-2011. The two positions of chairman and general manager, the proportion of independent directors, the setting of audit committee, the proportion of board holding shares, the number of board meetings are the six characteristics of the board of directors as explanatory variables. By using SPSS17.0 software, the paper firstly carries on descriptive statistics and correlation analysis to the characteristic variables of the board of directors, and then uses the basic model of Basu to construct the regression model of this paper. This paper empirically tests the influence of board characteristics on accounting conservatism and divides listed companies into state-owned holding companies and non-state-owned holding companies according to the nature of equity. The conclusion of this paper is: (1) on the whole, the size of the board of directors of listed companies in China, the separation of the two positions of chairman and general manager, the establishment of audit committee, and the proportion of board holding shares. The number of board meetings has a significant positive impact on accounting conservatism, while the proportion of independent directors has no significant impact on accounting conservatism. There are some differences between the characteristics of the board of directors and the accounting conservatism. The size of the board of directors of the state-owned holding company has a positive and significant effect on the accounting conservatism. However, the size of the board of directors of non-state-owned holding companies has no significant effect on accounting conservatism. (2) whether in state-owned holding companies or non-state-owned holding companies, the proportion of independent directors has no significant influence on accounting conservatism; 3Compared with the state-owned holding company, the non-state-owned holding company chairman and general manager are separated, the establishment of audit committee and the proportion of board of directors have more significant influence on accounting conservatism; 4the influence of the number of board meetings of state-owned holding company on accounting conservatism is greater than that of non-state-owned holding company board meeting on accounting conservatism. According to the empirical research results, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to improve the governance effect of the board of directors and improve the accounting conservatism for reference: 1 to select the appropriate board size according to the actual situation of the listed company; (2) improving and perfecting the system of independent directors of listed companies; (3) vigorously promoting the establishment and perfection of the audit committee; (4) to increase the proportion of the board of directors; Arrange the number of board meetings and improve the quality of meetings.
【学位授予单位】：西南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F233;F271;F276.6

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