高管薪酬与股权结构、上市金融企业业绩的相关性研究

发布时间：2018-04-02 20:21

本文选题：金融企业　切入点：高管薪酬　出处：《贵州财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：过去的十多年里经济学家们对高管薪酬的关注逐渐增多，但这些经济学家的研究大部分来自于像美国和英国这样的发达国家，而且发达国家数据的可用性是关注高管薪酬的另一个重要原因。考虑到公司治理会在经济发展中发挥重要的作用，所以关于高管薪酬方面的研究在不断地增加。然而，既然高管薪酬在发达国家的研究如此重要，那么对于发展中国家的企业来说，关注高管薪酬也同样是不可或缺的。特别是，对于转型经济体，通过各种改革措施，努力把他们的国有企业转变成为有利可图的现代化企业，有效的管理者激励条款是经济成功转型的关键因素。由于高管绩效薪酬代表着最高管理层的激励体系，仔细研究现代化企业的业绩是否对高管薪酬有一定的影响是有意义的，它为当前的努力改革和未来的改革措施的设计评价提供了必要的信息。国外学者关于企业业绩对高管薪酬是否有一定影响的研究很早就开始了，研究的比较透彻，也明显领先于我国学者的研究。但是考虑到我国的基本国情，许多国外的研究并不一定同样适用于我国，所以我们应该在国外研究的基础上，取其精华，，去其糟粕，结合我国的具体国情进行研究。所以，本文在国内外学者研究的基础上，具体结合中国上市金融企业高管薪酬、股权结构与企业业绩之间的关系做了研究。本文采用文献与实证相结合的研究方法进行研究，检验了从2001年到2012年之间中国金融企业高管薪酬、股权结构与企业业绩之间的关系。研究结论表明，中国金融行业首席执行官薪酬已经在过去的十年中显著增加，而且金融和非金融企业之间的管理层薪酬的相对差异也显著增加。中国金融业高管薪酬是基于政治关系的，而不是一个以市场为基础的契约。与发达国家的以机构为基础的理论和以前的研究结果相反，很少有证据支持首席执行官薪酬与公司的股票收益率（RET）或资产回报率（ROA）的指标呈正相关关系。目前中国的高管薪酬在设定绩效工资方面只有很少的证据支持点。当公司规模在高管薪酬中有显著的正面影响时，股权集中度有显著的负面影响。此外，薪酬委员会很友好地提高高管薪酬，但是国家所有权的参与往往会限制高管薪酬。结果表明，当公司治理薄弱时，政府或者监管可以在业务活动领域确保有效的公司治理。研究结果对管理者和董事会成员对薪酬管理和激励水平测量有着重要的意义，而且在金融业的风险控制中也有着重要的意义。
[Abstract]:Over the past decade or so, economists have been paying more and more attention to executive compensation, but most of their research has come from developed countries like the United States and the United Kingdom.And the availability of data in developed countries is another important reason to focus on executive compensation.Considering that corporate governance plays an important role in economic development, the research on executive compensation is increasing.However, given the importance of executive pay research in developed countries, it is also essential for companies in developing countries to focus on executive pay.In particular, for transition economies, through various reform measures, efforts to transform their state-owned enterprises into profitable modern enterprises, effective management incentives are key factors for successful economic transformation.Since executive performance pay represents the incentive system of top management, it is meaningful to carefully study whether the performance of modern enterprises has a certain impact on executive compensation.It provides the necessary information for the current reform and the design evaluation of the future reform measures.Foreign scholars on whether corporate performance has a certain impact on executive compensation has started a long time ago, the research is more thorough, but also obviously ahead of the study of Chinese scholars.However, considering the basic situation of our country, many foreign studies are not necessarily applicable to our country, so we should take the essence of the study, discard the dross, and combine with the specific conditions of our country.Therefore, based on the research of scholars at home and abroad, this paper makes a study on the relationship between executive compensation, equity structure and corporate performance of listed financial enterprises in China.This paper examines the relationship between executive compensation, equity structure and corporate performance of Chinese financial enterprises from 2001 to 2012 by using the method of combining literature and empirical research.The findings show that the compensation of chief executives in China's financial sector has increased significantly over the past decade, and the relative differences in executive compensation between financial and non-financial companies have also increased significantly.Executive compensation in China's financial sector is based on political relations, not a market-based contract.Contrary to the institution-based theory in developed countries and previous research results, there is little evidence to support a positive correlation between CEO compensation and the indicators of the firm's return on equity or return on assets.At present, executive compensation in China has little evidence to support performance pay.When firm size has a significant positive impact on executive compensation, equity concentration has a significant negative impact.In addition, compensation committees are friendly in raising executive pay, but state-owned participation tends to limit executive pay.The results show that when corporate governance is weak, government or regulation can ensure effective corporate governance in the field of business activities.The results are of great significance to managers and board members in the measurement of salary management and incentive level, as well as in the risk control of the financial industry.
【学位授予单位】：贵州财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.3;F830.42

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