创业板上市公司内部治理对自愿披露影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-04-28 15:02

本文选题：公司内部治理 + 自愿信息披露　；参考：《东华大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：信息披露可以分为强制信息披露与自愿信息披露。自愿信息披露是指除强制披露之外,上市公司基于公司形象、投资者关系、回避诉讼风险等动机主动对外披露公司信息。公司内部治理与自愿披露之间存在密切关系,国内外学者对此也有实证研究,但却忽略了公司治理制度不甚健全的创业板市场。因此,文章以我国创业板上市公司为样本,对其公司内部治理对自愿披露水平的影响进行了研究。论文首先从公司治理和信息披露的概念和分类入手,重点阐述了在实证研究中使用的自愿披露评价体系的建立过程。然后从理论上分析了公司内部治理中的股权结构、董事会制度、监事会制度以及管理层激励对自愿信息披露的影响并做出了假设。接着选取了188家创业板上市公司作为研究样本,就股权结构、董事会制度、监事会制度和管理层激励对自愿信息披露的影响进行了实证研究。实证结果显示：创业板上市公司的自愿信息披露意愿较低,并且各公司之间的自愿披露水平差异不大；大部分创业板上市公司都披露了公司产品信息、人力资源信息、销售增长率、新产品新技术、公司分部报告、销售与管理费用、利息支出与利息收益、存货、应收账款、资本支出或研发费用等方面的信息；在自变量与因变量相关性方面,管理层持股比例、董事会规模与自愿披露水平显著负相关,董事会会议次数、监事会会议次数、独立董事比例以及总资产收益率与自愿披露水平显著正相关。国有股比例、机构持股比例、股权集中度、董事长与总经理两职合一、专门委员会的设立、监事会规模以及控制变量中的公司规模、资产负债率、公司成长性与自愿披露水平不显著相关。最后在论文实证研究结论的基础上,结合我国创业板市场的实际情况,从公司内部治理和自愿披露两个角度提出了建议：(1)引入机构投资者,优化、分散股权结构；(2)完善独立董事制度,强化其独立性并建立独立董事的考核制度和薪酬制度；(3)完善监事会制度,强化监事会成员的监督能力；(4)保护上市公司自愿披露行为,制定中国的《安全港》规则。
[Abstract]:Information disclosure can be divided into compulsory information disclosure and voluntary information disclosure. Voluntary disclosure refers to the disclosure of corporate information on the basis of corporate image, investor relations, and avoidance of litigation risk. There is a close relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. There is an empirical study, but it neglects the imperfect corporate governance system. Therefore, the article takes the GEM listed companies in China as a sample to study the influence of corporate governance on the voluntary disclosure level.
Starting with the concept and classification of corporate governance and information disclosure, the paper focuses on the establishment process of voluntary disclosure evaluation system used in empirical research, and then theoretically analyzes the influence of the ownership structure, board system, board of supervisors system and management incentive on voluntary information disclosure in the internal governance of the company. The hypothesis is made. Then 188 GEM listed companies are selected as research samples, and the impact of equity structure, board system, supervisory board system and management incentive on voluntary information disclosure is empirically studied.
The empirical results show that the willingness disclosure willingness of the GEM listed companies is low, and there is little difference in the level of voluntary disclosure among the companies; most of the GEM listed companies have disclosed the company's product information, human resources information, sales growth rate, new product and new technology, company branch report, sales and management costs, interest branch. Information on interest income, inventory, accounts receivable, capital expenditure or R & D costs; in the correlation of independent variables and dependent variables, the proportion of managerial ownership, the size of the board of directors and the level of voluntary disclosure, the number of board meetings, the number of meetings of the board of supervisors, the proportion of independent directors, the total asset returns and voluntary draping. The proportion of the state-owned shares, the proportion of the institutional stock, the concentration of equity, the two position of the chairman and the general manager, the establishment of the special committee, the scale of the board of supervisors, the size of the company in the control variables, the ratio of assets and liabilities, the growth of the company and the level of voluntary disclosure.
Finally, on the basis of the conclusion of the empirical research, and combining with the actual situation of the GEM market in China, it puts forward some suggestions from two angles of internal governance and voluntary disclosure: (1) introducing institutional investors, optimizing and dispersing the ownership structure; (2) improving the independent director system, strengthening its independence and establishing the assessment system and salary of independent directors. System; (3) improving the supervisory board system and strengthening the supervisory capability of the board of supervisors; (4) protecting the voluntary disclosure of listed companies and formulating the "safe harbor" rules in China.

【学位授予单位】：东华大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F276.6;F233;F275

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