国有制造业上市公司高管薪酬粘性研究

发布时间：2018-05-09 05:03

本文选题：国企高管薪酬 + 薪酬粘性　；参考：《东北农业大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：中国经济的快速发展伴随着个人薪酬的不断增长,薪酬水平的评定也逐渐与其工作绩效相关,趋于合理化公开化,但国有企业高管薪酬的“居高不下”却一直备受热议。鉴于理论界研究,将这种薪酬随着业绩变化而变化的相关性称之为业绩敏感性。而后研究进一步发现上述业绩敏感性呈现一定的非对称性,具体表现为国有企业高管业绩上升时薪酬变化幅度与比例与业绩下降时薪酬变化幅度与比例不一致,并总结这种现象为薪酬粘性特征。针对于高管薪酬粘性的衍生推理学术界已有较多研究,而对于薪酬粘性具备怎样的特征规律,对高管起到怎样的作用,对公司绩效又产生何种影响等内容却少有涉及。本文希冀通过对国企高管薪酬业绩敏感性、粘性特征及薪酬粘性影响的实证研究,总结规律并提出相关建议以指导于实践。为了对薪酬粘性问题有一个较为清晰的认识,通过引言阐述论题的重要性和必要性,并罗列相关薪酬粘性的国内外前沿研究,再加上第二章节的相关概述构建对薪酬粘性问题的直观理解与理性认识,为文章接下来的论证奠定基础。在第三章节由表及里的先对国有制造业上市公司薪酬粘性的外化表现形式进行描述,再深入挖掘薪酬粘性产生的原由。而后在对国内外制造业上市公司高管薪酬粘性研究为铺垫,利用面板数据,确立回归方程。本文在实证环节选用净利润和Tobin's Q值作为业绩变量,将高管薪酬定义为货币薪酬,从粘性系数、年度变化与薪酬差距三方面验证了粘性的规律特征,并研究了薪酬粘性反作用于未来业绩的影响。研究发现业绩变化对高管薪酬变化影响较为显著,且呈现不稳定的粘性特征,并得出以下结论:(1)高管薪酬与企业规模正相关;高管薪酬与企业负债水平负相关;高管薪酬与企业控股持股比例负相关;董事长与总经理职位是否分离与高管薪酬关系不显著。(2)当选用内部指标净利润作为业绩指标时,薪酬粘性较大;而选用市场化指标Tobin's Q值时,粘性较小甚至不具备粘性特征。(3)薪酬粘性随时间推演成不规律增大,未随时间而消失。(4)相对于高管薪酬,同企业的普通职工薪酬业绩敏感性较低,基本不具有薪酬粘性。这种高管与普通员工薪酬粘性存在的不统一可能是导致薪酬差距拉大的原因之一。(5)相对于未来的业绩情况,薪酬粘性的存在对未来业绩产生不利影响,同时削弱了业绩敏感性。所以薪酬粘性的合理化势在必行。文章通过提出提升薪酬业绩敏感性、弱化粘性形成的薪酬差距、抑制薪酬粘性对未来业绩的不利影响以及加强对高管薪酬及业绩管理的监督等建议使高管薪酬粘性问题能够扬长避短。
[Abstract]:The rapid development of Chinese economy is accompanied by the continuous increase of individual compensation, and the evaluation of salary level is gradually related to its work performance and tends to be rationalized and open. However, the "high level" of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises has always been the subject of heated discussion. In view of the theoretical research, the correlation of this kind of compensation with the change of performance is called performance sensitivity. Then it is found that the above performance sensitivity shows certain asymmetry, which is reflected in the inconsistency between the range and proportion of salary change when the performance of state-owned enterprise executives rises and the range and proportion of salary change when the performance drops. And summarizes this kind of phenomenon is the salary stickiness characteristic. There has been more research on the derivative reasoning of executive pay stickiness, but there is little research on the characteristics of salary stickiness, how to play a role on executives, and what impact on corporate performance. This paper hopes to sum up the rules and put forward some suggestions to guide the practice through the empirical research on the performance sensitivity, stickiness and the effect of salary viscosity on the executive compensation performance of SOEs. In order to have a clear understanding of the problem of salary stickiness, the importance and necessity of the topic are expounded through the introduction, and the relevant domestic and international frontier research on salary stickiness is listed. In addition, the second chapter of the related overview to build the intuitive understanding and rational understanding of the issue of pay viscosity, for the next article to lay the foundation for the argument. In the third chapter, we describe the externalized form of salary stickiness of state-owned manufacturing listed companies, and then dig into the original reasons of salary stickiness. Then, the paper establishes the regression equation by using panel data in the research of executive compensation stickiness of domestic and foreign manufacturing listed companies. This paper selects net profit and Tobin's Q as performance variables, defines executive compensation as monetary compensation, verifies the characteristics of stickiness in terms of viscosity coefficient, annual change and pay gap. The paper also studies the effect of salary viscosity reaction on future performance. The study found that the change of performance had a significant impact on the change of executive compensation and showed the characteristics of instability and viscosity, and reached the following conclusions: 1) the executive compensation is positively correlated with the scale of the enterprise, and the executive compensation is negatively correlated with the level of corporate debt; Executive compensation is negatively related to the proportion of holding shares in enterprises; whether the position of chairman and general manager is separated is not significantly related to executive compensation.) when the net profit of internal index is chosen as the performance indicator, the salary is more viscous; However, when the market-oriented index Tobin's Q value is selected, the viscosity is small or even does not have the viscosity characteristic. 3) the salary viscosity increases irregularly with time and does not disappear with time. 4) compared with the executive compensation, the performance sensitivity of the ordinary employees in the same enterprise is lower. Basically no pay stickiness. One of the reasons for the widening pay gap may be the inconsistency between the pay stickiness of executives and ordinary employees.) compared with the future performance, the existence of salary stickiness has a negative impact on future performance and weakens the performance sensitivity. So the rationalization of pay stickiness is imperative. By raising the sensitivity of salary performance and weakening the pay gap formed by stickiness, the paper puts forward that, Suggestions such as curbing the adverse impact of pay stickiness on future performance and strengthening supervision of executive compensation and performance management make the issue of executive pay stickiness take advantage of strengths and circumvent weaknesses.
【学位授予单位】：东北农业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F406.7;F272.92

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