政府规制、内部人控制与煤炭资源整合产权配置契约

发布时间：2018-05-15 13:55

本文选题：煤炭资源整合 + 政府规制　；参考：《经济评论》2013年02期

【摘要】：从我国煤炭资源整合中"国进民退"的产权契约设置现状出发,借鉴Schmidt、Shleifer和Vishny的研究思路,以不完全契约理论和控制权理论为基础,构建我国煤炭资源整合过程中基于政府规制和内部人控制双重视角的产权配置契约模型。发现对煤炭行业保持着较高规制程度的政府以自身效用最大化决定产权契约边界设置。政府和国有企业内部控制人专有性关系越强,内部控制人越倾向于积极扩张国有企业规模,其对政府的"绑架效应"越强,进而降低政府的政治效益和增加代理成本。因此政府宏观经济规制要以必要程度为限,减少对内部控制人专有性投资的过度依赖。
[Abstract]:Based on the present situation of property rights contract setting in the process of coal resources integration in China, the author draws lessons from Schmidtney Shleifer and Vishny, and bases on incomplete contract theory and control rights theory. This paper constructs a property rights allocation contract model based on government regulation and insider control in the process of coal resources integration in China. It is found that the government which maintains a high degree of regulation on the coal industry determines the boundary of the property rights contract by maximizing its own utility. The stronger the exclusive relationship between the government and the internal controller of the state-owned enterprise, the more inclined the internal controller to expand the scale of the state-owned enterprise, and the stronger its "kidnapping effect" to the government, and then reduce the government's political benefit and increase the agency cost. Therefore, government macroeconomic regulation should be limited to the necessary degree to reduce excessive dependence on proprietary investment by internal controllers.
【作者单位】：中国矿业大学管理学院;中国矿业大学测绘科学与技术博士后科研流动站;北京大学软件与微电子学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目“煤炭资源整合中的政府与企业关系研究”(项目编号:12BGL044) 国家社科基金重大项目“我国矿产资源跨期优化配置机制研究”(项目编号:11&ZD163) 中国博士后基金“煤炭资源整合战略路径选择及价值效应研究”(项目编号:20110491491) 教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目“政府规制下煤炭资源整合路径选择及其经济效果研究”(项目编号:11YJA790137) 中央高校基本科研业务费的资助
【分类号】：F426.21;F406.72

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