会计稳健性与超额高管薪酬

发布时间：2018-06-06 21:25

本文选题：超额高管薪酬 + 会计稳健性　；参考：《西南财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,高管薪酬问题引起了社会各界的高度重视。作为公司高管们工作的回报,高管薪酬的多少应该能反映高管们的努力程度及其为公司做出的贡献。而现实生活中,一些公司的高管拿着高额薪酬,公司的业绩却不尽如人意,这不免让人们对高管薪酬的合理性产生了质疑。因此,为了激励高管们努力工作又避免其通过机会主义行为获得超额薪酬,越来越多的公司开始将高管们的薪酬与公司的业绩表现相挂钩。此时,反映公司业绩的会计信息的质量高低就显得尤为重要。目前,很多研究都证实了会计稳健性可以避免公司业绩的高估,进而提高公司会计信息的质量。公司越注重稳健性,其会计确认越谨慎,反映公司业绩的会计信息就越不容易被高估,根据公司业绩支付给高管们的薪酬可能就越趋于合理,高管们获得的超额薪酬可能就越少。换句话说,公司越注重会计稳健性,高管们通过夸大公司业绩获得超额薪酬的可能性就越小。本文正是通过研究会计稳健性与超额高管薪酬的关系,以期验证公司注重会计稳健性是否可以抑制高管获得超额薪酬。依据委托代理理论和最优契约理论的观点,高管薪酬激励契约中将高管薪酬与业绩挂钩的薪酬设计有利于对高管实施有效的激励与约束,使得其决策行为最大程度地与股东财富最大化的目标趋于一致,从而有利于缓解股东和管理层之间的代理冲突,并保护股东和公司的长期利益不受损失；但依据管理层权力理论的观点,在高管薪酬与业绩挂钩的背景下,公司高管考虑到自身具有有限任期和承担有限责任的客观实际,可能更会利用手中权力实施机会主义行为,通过操纵业绩获得超额薪酬等途径增加自身的额外收入,这是以公司和股东的长期利益遭受损失为代价的。因此,为了保护自身的长期利益不受损失,股东和债权人一方面要将公司高管的薪酬与业绩相挂钩,以激励高管努力工作;另一方面,他们也会要求管理层在会计确认时要更注重会计稳健性,进而提高反映公司业绩的信息质量,这就在一定程度上抑制了高管基于夸大公司业绩获得超额薪酬的可能性。依据上述理论分析,首先,本文对会计稳健性的加强是否有助于减少超额高管薪酬的问题进行了实证检验；其次,如果公司注重会计稳健性可以抑制高管获得超额薪酬,那么当公司业绩对高管的激励强度不同(即高管薪酬与公司业绩的相关性不同)时,会计稳健性的加强对超额高管薪酬的抑制作用是否会有差异,本文对此进行了分析；最后,考虑到我国的特殊国情,即国有企业的内部治理机制与非国有企业之间有很多差异,在这种情况下,会计稳健性的加强对超额高管薪酬的抑制作用在两类企业中是否会有不同的效果,这是本文研究的第三个问题。在会计稳健性和超额高管薪酬两个主要变量的度量方面,本文首先借鉴Iwasaki et al.(2012)对超额高管薪酬的度量方法,运用样本公司高管前三名薪酬总额的数据对超额高管薪酬进行估计；然后,本文借鉴Basu模型度量会计稳健性的方法对样本公司的稳健性进行度量和判断；在此基础上,引入相关控制变量构建本文的主要回归模型。本文的研究结论分为以下三点：第一,全样本下会计稳健性的加强对超额高管薪酬具有显著的抑制作用,即公司越注重会计稳健性,高管们基于夸大公司业绩获得的超额薪酬越少,会计稳健性与超额高管薪酬之间是显著的负相关关系。第二,当公司业绩对高管的激励强度越强时,会计稳健性的加强对超额高管薪酬的抑制作用更明显,会计稳健性与超额高管薪酬之间的负相关关系更显著,即高管薪酬与公司业绩的相关性越高时,公司更要注重会计稳健性,以避免高管通过夸大公司业绩获得超额薪酬。第三,与非国有企业相比,国有企业中会计稳健性的加强对超额高管薪酬的抑制作用更明显,会计稳健性与超额高管薪酬之间的负相关关系更显著,即国有企业更应注重会计稳健性,以减少高管基于夸大公司业绩获得的超额薪酬。本文的研究贡献主要有以下两个方面：第一,本文首次运用中国上市公司的数据,对会计稳健性与超额高管薪酬之间的关系进行了实证研究,丰富了我国对于会计稳健性的经济后果的研究内容,拓展了我国对于超额高管薪酬的抑制措施的研究视角。近年来,对于超额高管薪酬的研究中,国内学者提取高管薪酬中的超额部分多是借鉴Core et al.(1999,2008)的估计方法,如吴育辉和吴世农(2010)就将ROA纳入到预期高管薪酬的估计之中,然后再根据实际薪酬提取出“超额部分”。然而这样提取出的超额高管薪酬不能直接与会计稳健性进行研究,因为ROA等业绩指标的确认已受到会计稳健性的影响。本文通过借鉴Iwasaki et al.(2012)对超额高管薪酬的度量方法,从上一年度的高管薪酬和当年行业的高管平均薪酬的角度估计当年预期的高管薪酬,并根据当年实际取得的高管薪酬提取出高管薪酬的“超额部分”。这种度量方式克服了国内以往研究的弊端,为直接研究会计稳健性与超额高管薪酬之间的关系提供了一种新的实现方法。第二,本文深入分析了公司业绩对高管的激励强度不同(即高管薪酬与公司业绩的相关性不同)时,会计稳健性与超额高管薪酬的相关关系以及公司产权背景不同时,会计稳健性与超额高管薪酬的相关关系,从多个角度为我国政府监管机构不断强调企业的会计确认要注重稳健性原则的运用提供了实证支持,证明了会计稳健性在我国企业(尤其是国企)的管理层薪酬契约中扮演的角色不容忽视。本文的研究局限主要有以下三个方面：第一,样本选择方面的局限。受客观条件的制约以及本文特定的研究条件所限,本文的样本仅限于沪深两市A股主板上市公司中的512家,共计4597个观察值,样本中公司的数量并不多。因此,本文的研究结论对于在其它特殊版块上市的公司以及本文筛选样本中删除的公司是否适用,还需要进一步地探讨。第二,超额高管薪酬的度量方式的局限。本文对于超额高管薪酬的度量仅是以现金薪酬为基础进行估计的。但近年来,股权激励等长期薪酬激励机制的逐渐建立会对会计稳健性与超额高管薪酬的关系产生怎样的影响,企业关注会计稳健性是否有助于提高长期激励薪酬的有效性,仍需要深入探讨,本文的研究并没有涉及。第三,控制变量设置的局限。由于超额高管薪酬受到多种因素的影响,本文在研究过程中考虑的控制变量很可能不够全面,导致本文的控制变量设置中存在一定的局限性,但限于本人的时间和能力,对于控制变量设置的完善,还需要以后进行深入探讨。
[Abstract]:In recent years , the problem of executive pay raises the great importance of the various sectors of society . As the return of the executives ' work , the executive pay should be able to reflect the level of their efforts and their contribution to the company . In real life , the executives of some companies hold high salaries , and the company ' s performance is not satisfactory . Therefore , in order to motivate the executives to work and avoid excessive pay through opportunism behavior , more and more companies have begun to link the salaries of executives to the performance of the company . At this time , the quality of accounting information reflecting the company ' s performance is particularly important .

At present , many researches have confirmed that accounting conservatism can avoid overvaluation of company ' s performance and further improve the quality of accounting information . The more careful the company pays attention to , the more cautious the accounting information reflects the company ' s performance , the less likely it is to reflect the company ' s performance . In other words , the more the company pays more attention to the robustness of the accounting , the less likely the executives can obtain excess pay by exaggerating the company ' s performance .

This article is to study the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive pay , with a view to verifying that the company pays attention to whether the accounting conservatism can restrain the executives from getting overcompensation .

According to the theory of principal agent and the theory of optimal contract , the compensation design of executive compensation incentive contract will benefit the effective encouragement and restriction of executive compensation , so that its decision - making behavior will be consistent with the goal of maximizing shareholder ' s wealth , which will help to alleviate the agency conflict between shareholders and management , and protect the long - term interests of shareholders and companies from loss ;
On the other hand , in order to protect its long - term interests from loss , shareholders and creditors should pay more attention to accounting robustness and improve the quality of information reflecting the company ' s performance .

According to the above - mentioned theoretical analysis , firstly , this paper makes an empirical test on whether the strengthening of accounting conservatism contributes to the reduction of excess executive pay .
Secondly , if the company pays attention to the accounting conservatism , it can restrain the executives from getting overcompensation , then , when the company ' s performance is different from the incentive intensity of the executives ( that is , the correlation between the executive pay and the company ' s performance is different ) , there is a difference in the effect of accounting robustness on the excessive executive compensation .
Finally , considering the special situation of our country , that is , there are many differences between the internal governance mechanism of the state - owned enterprise and the non - state - owned enterprise . In this case , it is the third problem to study whether the effect of accounting conservatism on excess executive compensation will have different effects in the two types of enterprises .

In terms of accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation , this paper first draws on the measure method of excess executive compensation by IYANG et al . ( 2012 ) , and estimates the excess executive pay by using the data of the top three remuneration of sample company .
Then , we measure and judge the robustness of sample company by using the method of Basu model to measure the robustness of accounting ;
On this basis , the main regression model of this paper is constructed by introducing relevant control variables .

The conclusions of this paper are as follows :

First , the strengthening of accounting robustness under the whole sample has a significant effect on excess executive pay , that is , the more the company pays more attention to the robustness of accounting , the less the excess pay obtained by the executives on the basis of exaggerating the company ' s performance , the more significant negative correlation between the accounting conservatism and the excess executive pay .

Second , when the higher the incentive intensity of the executives , the stronger the accounting robustness , the negative correlation between the accounting robustness and the excess executive pay , that is , the higher the correlation between the executive pay and the company ' s performance , the higher the accounting robustness , so as to avoid the overcompensation of executives by exaggerating the company ' s performance .

Third , compared with non - state - owned enterprises , the strengthening of accounting conservatism in the state - owned enterprises is more obvious to the excessive executive compensation , and the negative correlation between accounting conservatism and excess executive pay is more significant , that is , the state - owned enterprises should pay more attention to the robustness of the accounting , so as to reduce the overcompensation paid by the executives on the basis of exaggerating the company ' s performance .

The research contributions of this paper mainly include the following two aspects :

First , this article makes an empirical study on the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive pay for the first time in China , enriches our country ' s research content on the economic consequences of accounting conservatism , and expands the research perspective of our country ' s restraining measures for excess executive pay .

In recent years , in the study of excess executive compensation , the excess of senior executive compensation is drawn from Core et al . ( 1999 , 2008 ) .

Secondly , this paper deeply analyzes the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive pay , and the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive pay when the company ' s performance is different from the incentive intensity of the executives ( i.e . , the correlation between executive pay and corporate performance ) .

The limitations of this paper mainly include the following three aspects :

First , the limitation of sample selection is limited by objective conditions and the research conditions specified in this paper . The samples in this paper are limited to 512 of listed companies in Shanghai - Shenzhen A - share board listed companies , and there are not many companies in the sample . Therefore , the conclusion of this paper is not only applicable to companies listed in other special blocks and whether the companies deleted in the screening samples are applicable , but also need to be further explored .

In recent years , the gradual establishment of incentive mechanism such as equity incentive has influenced the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation , and it is still necessary to probe into whether the accounting conservatism contributes to the improvement of the effectiveness of long - term incentive pay . The research in this paper is not involved .

Third , the limitation of control variable setting . Because of the influence of many factors , the control variable considered in this paper may not be comprehensive enough , which leads to some limitation in the control variable setting , but it is limited to my time and ability .
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F233;F272.92

【参考文献】