非财务信息与企业投资效率关系研究

发布时间：2018-07-10 18:14

本文选题：自愿披露 + 非财务信息　；参考：《南开大学》2013年博士论文

【摘要】：针对实践中公司投资总是偏离最优投资水平的现象,大量学者分别从不同角度进行了研究。其中,自Bushman and Smith(2001)以来,财务信息能否以及如何影响企业投资效率成为人们关注的热点问题。理论上讲,高质量的财务信息可以降低道德风险、缓解逆向选择以及帮助管理者和投资者甄别更好的投资项目,消除各种“噪音”对企业投资效率产生的不利影响,因此能够抑制公司的非效率投资行为,从而提高企业投资效率。大量的经验证据也表明高质量的财务信息有助于提高企业投资效率、增加公司价值。然而,财务信息只是对企业历史经营情况的“图像反映”,由于受到会计确认、计量等因索制约,很多重要信息无法传递给投资者,所以随着投资者对企业信息需求的不断增长,传统的财务信息越来越难以满足其投资决策的需求,因此鼓励上市公司自愿披露更多的非财务信息尤其是有关未来发展前景的信息以增强财务报告的有用性已经得到了理论界和实务界地广泛认同,并被各国政府和相关机构所采纳。然而,虽然此类非财务信息在相关性和及时性方面优于财务信息,但很难被立即审计或证实,可鉴证性较差。那么在这种情况下,其能否影响投资者决策并进而对公司投资效率产生作用呢?本文以非财务信息披露动机为切入点,结合我国新兴市场的特殊制度背景,通过理论分析与实证检验的方法,探讨了上市公司自愿披露的有关未来发展前景的非财务信息对企业投资效率的影响以及作用机理和发展趋势,并进一步考察了这种影响是否具有“状态依存性”的特点。本文共分为六章。第一章是绪论,介绍了本文的研究动机、研究意义、研究思路、框架、方法、技术路线图以及创新点。第二章是文献综述,分别从公司投资效率和非财务信息披露两个方面对国内外相关文献进行了梳理,并根据已有研究文献的不足和我国新兴市场的特殊环境,阐述了本文进一步的研究方向。第三章在上市公司非财务信息披露动机的基础上,研究了非财务信息与企业投资效率二者之间的关系、内在机理以及发展,趋势。第四章和第五章分别从公司治理和深交所信息披露考评的视角研究了非财务信息、对企业投资效率的影响是否具有“状态依存性”的特点并提供了相应的经验证据。第六章总结了本文的主要发现并据此提出了相应的政策建议,并指出了论文的研究局限和未来研究方向。通过理论分析和实证检验,本文主要得到以下结论：第一,对于总样本,上市公司自愿披露的低质量的非财务信息也可以获得投资者的信任,从而扭曲了市场资源配置,使得那些披露了较多数量但低质量的公司获得了更多资源,在建立“商业帝国”等自身利益驱动以及外部政府干预的压力下,管理者趋向于扩大非效率投资规模,导致了过度投资,最终损害了企业投资效率。本文还发现也有一部分公司虽然利用获取的超额市场资源投资了一些高收益项目,缓解了投资不足,但同时也还会通过资金占用的方式转移外部融资以享受控制权私有收益。通过进一步分年度的子样本回归发现,由于近年来爆发的一系列虚假陈述案以及随着投资者能力的不断增长,低质量的非财务信息已经越来越难以赢得投资者信任,所以即使公司披露更多的非财务信息也不能起到缓解融资约束的作用,因此也就无法进一步影响企业投资效率。第二,当公司治理比较完善时,管理者披露动机的机会主义观被抑制,而信息观得到增强,所以这类公司披露的非财务信息质量较高。然而,在2004-2008年的子样本中,本文并未发现质量较高的非财务信息可信性也随之增强,所以与其他公司相比,治理更加完善的公司披露的非财务信息并没有更加显著地缓解融资约束。而在2009-2010年的子样本中,治理更加完善的公司披露的非财务信息更能获取投资者信任,所以与其他公司相比,更能显著地缓解融资约束,从而使得公司可以投资于那些高收益项目,避免了投资不足,提高了企业投资效率。第三,对于信息披露考评结果为优秀或良好的公司,无论是总样本还是各个时间段的子样本,非财务信息都与过度投资显著负相关,并且以前年度一直被评为优秀或良好的公司披露的非财务信息更能抑制过度投资,但这种差异并不具有统计上的显著性。本文同时还发现与信息披露考评为合格或不合格的公司相比,信息披露考评为优秀或良好的公司披露的非财务信息更能够显著降低融资约束,有助于公司获得更多的市场资源,从而可以避免投资不足,并且对于以前年度一直被评为优秀或良好的公司而言,披露的非财务信息相比于仅上一年度被评为优秀或良好的公司,更能赢得投资者信任,并且这种差异通过了统计上的显著性检验。
[Abstract]:In practice, a large number of scholars have studied the phenomenon that corporate investment always deviates from the optimal investment level, and a large number of scholars have studied from different angles. Among them, since Bushman and Smith (2001), whether financial information can and how to affect the efficiency of enterprise investment has become a hot issue. In theory, high quality financial information can reduce morality. Risk, mitigate adverse selection and help managers and investors identify better investment projects, eliminate the adverse effects of "noise" on the efficiency of enterprise investment, so it can inhibit the inefficiency investment behavior of the company and improve the efficiency of the enterprise investment. The efficiency of high enterprise investment increases the value of the company. However, the financial information is only a "image reflection" of the business history. Because of the accounting confirmation, measurement and other factors, many important information can not be transferred to the investor. Therefore, the traditional financial information is becoming more and more difficult with the increasing demand of the investors for the enterprise information. To meet the needs of its investment decisions, it has been widely accepted by both governments and relevant institutions to encourage listed companies to voluntarily disclose more non-financial information, especially information about future development prospects, to enhance the usefulness of financial reports and to be adopted by governments and related institutions. The relevance and timeliness are superior to financial information, but it is difficult to be audited or confirmed immediately, but the identification is poor. In this case, can it affect the investor's decision-making and then have a effect on the efficiency of the company's investment? This article is based on the motivation of non financial information disclosure and combines the special institutional background of the emerging markets of our country. Through the method of theoretical analysis and empirical test, the influence of non financial information on the future development prospects of listed companies on the enterprise investment efficiency, the mechanism of action and the trend of development are discussed, and the characteristics of "state dependence" are further investigated.
This article is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which introduces the research motivation, research significance, research ideas, framework, methods, technical roadmap and innovation points. The second chapter is literature review, combing the domestic and foreign related literature from two aspects of company investment efficiency and non financial information disclosure, and according to the existing research literature. In the third chapter, the relationship between the non financial information and the investment efficiency of the two parties, the internal mechanism, the development and the trend, the fourth chapter and the fifth chapter respectively from the corporate governance and the depth of the company are discussed. The sixth chapter summarizes the main findings of this paper and puts forward the corresponding policy suggestions, and points out the limitations of the research and the future research direction.
Through theoretical analysis and empirical tests, the following conclusions can be drawn:
First, for the total sample, the low quality non-financial information that the listed companies voluntarily disclosed can also gain the trust of the investors, thus distorting the allocation of market resources, making the companies that disclose a large number of but low quality companies gaining more resources, driving their own interests, such as the "business empire", and the external government intervention. Under the force, managers tend to expand the scale of inefficiency investment, resulting in excessive investment and ultimately damage the efficiency of enterprise investment. Through subsample regression of further sub year, it is found that low quality non-financial information has become more and more difficult to win trust for investors, even if the company discloses more non-financial information, because of a series of false statements in recent years and the increasing capacity of investors. It can play a role in relieving the financing constraints, so it can not further affect the efficiency of enterprise investment.
Second, when corporate governance is more perfect, the opportunism concept of managers' disclosure motivation is suppressed and the information outlook is enhanced, so the quality of non-financial information disclosed by these companies is high. However, in the 2004-2008 year subsample, this article does not find the higher quality of non financial information credibility is also enhanced, so it is with other companies. In comparison, non-financial information disclosed by more perfect companies does not significantly alleviate financing constraints. In the 2009-2010 year subsample, the non financial information disclosed by more perfect companies can be more likely to be trusted by investors, so compared with other companies, the financial constraints can be significantly alleviated, thus making the company available. To invest in those high-yield projects, to avoid investment and improve the efficiency of enterprise investment.
Third, the non financial information is significantly negatively related to overinvestment, whether it is a total sample or a sub sample of each time period, and the non financial information that has been rated as a good or good company for the previous year is more likely to suppress overinvestment, but this difference is not a significant difference. At the same time, this paper also finds that compared with the companies that are qualified or unqualified for the information disclosure, the information disclosure and evaluation for the outstanding or good company disclosure of non-financial information can significantly reduce the financing constraints, help the company to obtain more market resources, and thus avoid the shortage of investment, and for the previous year. The disclosure of non-financial information, which has been rated as a good or good company, is more likely to win trust than a good or good company in the last year, and this difference has passed a statistically significant test.
【学位授予单位】：南开大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F231

【参考文献】