上市公司高管薪酬与业绩相关程度对会计稳健性影响的实证研究
发布时间：2018-07-20 13:18
【摘要】：在当代的公司管理政策之中，所有者将企业的全部资产交与经营者来管理，从而产生了代理成本。由于所有者和经营者之间存在着严重的信息不对称，经营者很可能在利益的驱使之下，夸大资产，虚报利润，从而实现自己的目的。这种目的的实现是通过损害稳健性准则来实现的。经营者这种进行盈余管理，对会计稳健性视而不见的行为，会使外部投资者对企业的经营管理现状产生很大的误解，会严重的损害外部投资者的利益。所以为了保护企业的利益免受伤害，减少诉讼成本、代理成本等，股东及利益相关者一致要求在对外报告的财务报表中应用会计稳健性原则。 本文分为六个部分，第一部分绪论，介绍本文的研究背景和研究意义,国内外研究现状、研究内容、研究方法与创新点。第二部分从不同的角度论述关于高管薪酬的相关理论，并对高管薪酬与业绩相关性进行了初步的讨论。第三部分阐述了会计稳健性产生的动因及经济后果，产生的动因包括有效契约、法律诉讼、税收政策、政府管制等动因，经济后果包括盈余管理、债务契约、信息不对称、投资效率等后果。第四部分由浅入深、逐步递进的分析了上市公司高管薪酬与业绩相关性对会计稳健性的影响，从理论上得出上市公司高管薪酬与业绩的相关程度越大，会计稳健性越差的结论。第五部分对上市公司高管薪酬与业绩相关性对会计稳健性影响进行了实证分析，通过选取上市公司沪市连续三年的样本，采用描述性统计分析和线性回归分析两种方法进行研究，定量的得出了上市公司高管薪酬与业绩相关性越大，会计稳健性越差的结论。第六部分结论。通过本文的分析得出在我国上市公司中，行业不同，规模不同，盈利能力不同，对于稳健性准则应用的程度也有着很大的差别的结论。 本文在高管激励和约束的角度出发对会计稳健性进行研究，可以在理论上为制定高管薪酬契约提供指导。通过讨论高管薪酬与业绩相关的程度对会计稳健性的影响，，提出了了高管薪酬与业绩相关的程度越大会计稳健性越差的结论，为企业提高会计稳健性提供依据。
[Abstract]:In the contemporary corporate management policy, the owner handed over all the assets of the enterprise to the operator to manage, thus resulting in agency cost. Due to the serious information asymmetry between the owner and the operator, the operator is likely to exaggerate the assets and report the profit under the driving of the profit, so as to realize his goal. This goal is achieved by damaging the robustness criterion. The managers' behavior of turning a blind eye to accounting conservatism will make external investors misunderstand the current situation of enterprise management and seriously damage the interests of external investors. Therefore, in order to protect the interests of enterprises from harm, reduce litigation costs, agency costs and so on, shareholders and stakeholders unanimously request the application of accounting conservatism principle in the financial statements of external reports. This paper is divided into six parts. The first part is introduction, which introduces the research background and significance, domestic and foreign research status, research content, research methods and innovation points. The second part discusses the related theories of executive compensation from different angles and discusses the correlation between executive compensation and performance. The third part expounds the causes and economic consequences of accounting conservatism, including valid contract, legal action, tax policy, government regulation and so on. The economic consequences include earnings management, debt contract, information asymmetry, etc. Investment efficiency and other consequences. The fourth part analyzes the influence of executive compensation and performance correlation on accounting conservatism step by step, and draws the conclusion that the greater the correlation degree between executive compensation and performance, the worse accounting conservatism. The fifth part has carried on the empirical analysis to the listed company executive compensation and the performance correlation to the accounting conservatism influence, through the selection listed company Shanghai stock market three consecutive years sample, By using two methods of descriptive statistical analysis and linear regression analysis, the conclusion that the higher the correlation between executive compensation and performance of listed companies is, the worse the accounting conservatism is. The sixth part concludes. Through the analysis of this paper, we can draw a conclusion that the degree of application of the robustness criterion is also very different in the listed companies of our country, the industry is different, the scale is different, the profit ability is different. This paper studies the accounting conservatism from the perspective of executive incentive and restraint, which can provide guidance for the formulation of executive compensation contract. By discussing the influence of executive compensation and performance related degree on accounting conservatism, this paper puts forward the conclusion that the greater the degree of executive compensation is related to performance, the worse accounting conservatism is, which provides a basis for enterprises to improve accounting conservatism.
【学位授予单位】：沈阳理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275.2;F272.92
[Abstract]:In the contemporary corporate management policy, the owner handed over all the assets of the enterprise to the operator to manage, thus resulting in agency cost. Due to the serious information asymmetry between the owner and the operator, the operator is likely to exaggerate the assets and report the profit under the driving of the profit, so as to realize his goal. This goal is achieved by damaging the robustness criterion. The managers' behavior of turning a blind eye to accounting conservatism will make external investors misunderstand the current situation of enterprise management and seriously damage the interests of external investors. Therefore, in order to protect the interests of enterprises from harm, reduce litigation costs, agency costs and so on, shareholders and stakeholders unanimously request the application of accounting conservatism principle in the financial statements of external reports. This paper is divided into six parts. The first part is introduction, which introduces the research background and significance, domestic and foreign research status, research content, research methods and innovation points. The second part discusses the related theories of executive compensation from different angles and discusses the correlation between executive compensation and performance. The third part expounds the causes and economic consequences of accounting conservatism, including valid contract, legal action, tax policy, government regulation and so on. The economic consequences include earnings management, debt contract, information asymmetry, etc. Investment efficiency and other consequences. The fourth part analyzes the influence of executive compensation and performance correlation on accounting conservatism step by step, and draws the conclusion that the greater the correlation degree between executive compensation and performance, the worse accounting conservatism. The fifth part has carried on the empirical analysis to the listed company executive compensation and the performance correlation to the accounting conservatism influence, through the selection listed company Shanghai stock market three consecutive years sample, By using two methods of descriptive statistical analysis and linear regression analysis, the conclusion that the higher the correlation between executive compensation and performance of listed companies is, the worse the accounting conservatism is. The sixth part concludes. Through the analysis of this paper, we can draw a conclusion that the degree of application of the robustness criterion is also very different in the listed companies of our country, the industry is different, the scale is different, the profit ability is different. This paper studies the accounting conservatism from the perspective of executive incentive and restraint, which can provide guidance for the formulation of executive compensation contract. By discussing the influence of executive compensation and performance related degree on accounting conservatism, this paper puts forward the conclusion that the greater the degree of executive compensation is related to performance, the worse accounting conservatism is, which provides a basis for enterprises to improve accounting conservatism.
【学位授予单位】：沈阳理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275.2;F272.92
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