水利风景资源开发的利益博弈及规制机制

发布时间：2018-04-10 23:17

本文选题：水利风景资源 + 利益相关方　；参考：《资源科学》2013年02期

【摘要】：水利风景资源的开发会产生外部不经济性,政府试图通过对水利旅游项目的监管来规范水利风景资源的合理开发和利用。在政府监管的背景下,对水利风景资源开发利益相关者的收益、损失、成本进行分析的基础上,构建各利益相关者的净收益函数,确定监管有效空间和最优监管力度,根据均衡监管力度的在不同监管空间的动态变化,对各方博弈关系进行分类,并建立博弈模型,对现实存在的各方博弈进行分析,以期为水利风景资源规制提供理论依据。模型分析结果表明:水利旅游项目的均衡监管力度集与各相关方的利益博弈有关,是一个动态的过程,均衡监管力度决策集应趋向最优监管力度决策集;现实的水资源管理体制下各方的利益博弈是水利旅游项目监管工作阻力重重的原因,政府很难单方面通过监管来解决水利旅游资源开发的外部性问题;加大惩罚力度、提高监管的重视程度、提高渎职惩罚力度可以降低旅游企业的违规可能性;有效的举报处理机制将会促进社会监督,降低政府监管成本。因此,调整各利益相关者的利益再分配是解决目前解决水利风景资源开发问题的关键,建议政府应从水利风景资源开发相关方的利益出发,寻求责任和利益的整合,在水利风景资源开发的利益相关方之间形成互动的规制机制。
[Abstract]:The exploitation of water resources will produce external diseconomy. The government tries to regulate the rational development and utilization of water resources through the supervision of water conservancy tourism projects.Under the background of government supervision, on the basis of analyzing the benefit, loss and cost of the stakeholders in the exploitation of water resources, the net income function of the stakeholders is constructed, and the effective space of supervision and the optimal supervision intensity are determined.According to the dynamic change of balanced supervision in different regulatory space, the game relationship between the parties is classified, and the game model is established to analyze the real existence of the game, in order to provide a theoretical basis for the regulation of water resources.The results of the model analysis show that: the balanced supervision intensity set of water conservancy tourism project is a dynamic process, which is related to the benefit game of the relevant parties, and the decision set of the balanced supervision intensity should tend to the optimal supervision intensity decision set;Under the real water resources management system, the benefit game of all parties is the reason why the supervision of water conservancy tourism projects is very difficult for the government to unilaterally solve the externality of water resources development through supervision.Increasing the attention of supervision and punishment of malfeasance can reduce the possibility of violating the regulations of tourism enterprises; effective reporting and handling mechanism will promote social supervision and reduce the cost of government supervision.Therefore, adjusting the redistribution of the interests of all stakeholders is the key to solve the problem of water resources exploitation. It is suggested that the government should seek the integration of responsibilities and interests from the interests of the relevant parties in the development of water resources.Form the interactive regulation mechanism among the stakeholders of water conservancy landscape resources development.
【作者单位】：中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所;中国科学院大学;国务院发展研究中心资源与环境政策研究所;水利部综合事业局;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(编号:70873119;40871253)
【分类号】：F426.91;F592;F224.32

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