旅游行业中自费项目相关利益主体的博弈分析

发布时间：2018-04-24 03:04

  本文选题：旅游消费者 + 导游人员　； 参考：《河北大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着我国旅游产业迅猛发展，旅游市场上的一些供给、需求的非理性的特点明显具有博弈特征。随着旅行社之间的竞争也越演越烈，采取的价格竞争策略也有了质的变化，由传统的价格竞争转变为单一的恶性价格竞争，甚至出现零团费的旅游线路，同时在旅游线路中明确的增加了自费项目来获取利润。由于旅游市场机制的不规范加之旅游法规的不完善及旅行社监督管理不善，导致导游人员在提供旅游服务时擅自增加旅游景点，强制推销旅游线路之外的旅游产品，从中获取“灰色收入”，这种现象屡见不鲜，旅游者作为导游及旅行社收益的根源所在，对旅游产品及导游提供的服务质量相对比较敏感，由于上述现象的出现，旅游者对旅游行业中旅行社和导游两个参与人事先就会存在厌恶偏见，这种先验概率的存在使得旅游者对旅行社的选择问题及导游人员在向旅行社推销自费项目问题上产生一种“矛盾”这就构成了一种博弈行为，本文通过对与自费项目直接相关的利益主体—旅游者、旅行社和导游员之间是否进行选择进行具体的描述和分析，首先通过对三个参与人中的两两博弈过程进行分析，分别对旅行社和旅游者之间、旅行社和导游人员之间以及导游人员和旅游者之间的博弈进行系统分析，运用完全信息博弈模型、不完全信息静态、动态博弈模型、委托-代理模型等相关经济理论进行剖析，，然后又针对三个参与人的同时参与的完全信息静态博弈收益矩阵进行分析，论证了在完全信息下，旅行社、导游人员和旅游者如何实现帕累托最优风险分担。同时提出了在加强政府监督的情况下，关于旅行社激励机制设置和诚信机制管理相关对策和措施，为如何实现旅行社自身更好的发展提供理论依据。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of tourism industry in China, the irrational characteristics of supply and demand in the tourism market are obviously characterized by game theory. As the competition among travel agencies becomes more and more intense, the price competition strategy adopted has also changed qualitatively, from the traditional price competition to a single vicious price competition, and even a zero-tour tour route. At the same time in the tourism routes explicitly increased self-financing projects to gain profits. As a result of the non-standard mechanism of the tourism market and the imperfect tourism laws and regulations and the poor supervision and management of travel agencies, tour guides unauthorized to increase tourist attractions while providing tourism services, and to force the promotion of tourism products outside the tourist routes. This phenomenon is not uncommon. Tourists, as tour guides and travel agents, are relatively sensitive to the quality of tourism products and services provided by tour guides. Tourists have a preemptive bias against travel agents and tour guides in the travel industry. The existence of this transcendental probability makes the tourist's choice of travel agency and tour guide produce a kind of "contradiction" on the issue of selling self-paid items to the travel agency, which constitutes a game behavior. Through the specific description and analysis of the choice between tourists, travel agencies and tour guides who are directly related to self-funded projects, this paper first analyzes the process of pairwise game among the three participants. The game between travel agencies and tourists, between travel agencies and tour guides, and between tour guides and tourists is analyzed systematically. The game model of complete information is used, and the static and dynamic game models of incomplete information are used. The principal-agent model and other related economic theories are analyzed, and then the return matrix of three participants participating in the static game of complete information at the same time is analyzed, and it is proved that under the complete information, the travel agency, How to realize Pareto optimal risk sharing between tour guides and tourists. At the same time, under the condition of strengthening the government supervision, the paper puts forward the relevant countermeasures and measures about the establishment of travel agency incentive mechanism and the management of credit mechanism, which provides the theoretical basis for how to realize the better development of travel agency itself.
【学位授予单位】：河北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F592.3;F224.32

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