合作服务视角下的导游服务外包契约设计
发布时间:2018-05-04 04:00
本文选题:导游服务外包 + 外包契约设计 ; 参考:《湖南工业大学》2015年硕士论文
【摘要】:随着经济发展与信息化进程的加速,旅游服务业也正面临前所未有的机遇与挑战。新《旅游法》颁布后,为了提升核心竞争力及满足游客对高品质导游服务的需求,逐渐有旅行社将导游业务外包给专业化的导游服务商。一方面,导游服务商是连接旅行社和游客的枢纽,所以针对导游服务特征设计有效的外包契约对激励导游服务商具有重要实践意义。另一方面,旅行社的参与行为对于导游服务外包项目的成功执行具有重要作用,故本文在构建外包契约模型时均以导游服务商和旅行社的合作服务关系为前提。基于此,本文以委托代理理论、外包契约理论等为理论基础,分别构建单一委托代理关系、多代理人竞争关系和双重委托代理关系下的合作服务契约模型,对导游服务外包合作服务契约设计作了较为系统性和创新性的研究。首先,阐述了导游服务外包的研究背景与重要意义,并对文中所涉及的服务外包、旅游服务外包以及委托代理等理论及其研究现状作了系统的分析与回顾。在此基础上,以旅行社-单一导游服务商之间的委托代理及合作服务关系设计了旅行社参与下的导游服务外包合作服务契约,探讨了单一委托代理关系下影响导游服务外包合作服务契约参数等相关因素。其次,考虑了旅行社与两个导游服务商进行博弈时的导游服务外包合作服务契约设计问题,分析了导游服务商之间的竞争关系对于导游服务外包中合作服务情况的影响。研究证明了这种竞争关系可使导游服务商间彼此监督,可有效降低代理成本并有效避免旅行社易对单一导游服务商产生依赖、旅游旺季时游客井喷式增长所带来的压力。接着,考虑了旅行社的双重委托代理身份,构建基于游客-旅行社-导游服务商之间的双重委托代理关系下的导游服务外包合作服务契约模型,并在模型中增设奖惩机制。分析了在业绩分享机制基础上增设奖惩机制,可有效改善游客效用等问题,并提出合理化地设置业绩分享机制和奖惩机制对于旅行社选择导游服务外包战略时而言显得极为重要。最后,对全文进行总结并对后续研究展望进行叙述。
[Abstract]:With the acceleration of economic development and informatization, the tourism service industry is facing unprecedented opportunities and challenges. After the promulgation of the new Tourism Law, in order to enhance the core competitiveness and meet the demand of tourists for high-quality tour guide service, some travel agencies outsource the tour guide business to professional tour guide service providers. On the one hand, tour guide service providers are the hub to connect travel agencies and tourists, so it is of great practical significance to design effective outsourcing contracts to encourage tour guide service providers. On the other hand, the participating behavior of travel agencies plays an important role in the successful implementation of tour guide service outsourcing projects, so this paper takes the cooperative service relationship between tour guide service providers and travel agencies as the premise when constructing outsourcing contract model. Based on the principal-agent theory and outsourcing contract theory, this paper constructs the cooperative service contract model under the single principal-agent relationship, multi-agent competition relationship and double principal-agent relationship respectively. This paper makes a systematic and innovative study on the design of cooperative service contract for tour guide outsourcing. First of all, the background and significance of the research on the outsourcing of tour guide services are expounded, and the theories and research status quo of the outsourcing, the outsourcing of tourism services and the principal-agent are systematically analyzed and reviewed in this paper. On this basis, based on the principal-agent and cooperative service relationship between travel agency and single tour guide service provider, the contract of outsourcing cooperative service of tour guide service under the participation of travel agency is designed. This paper probes into the related factors such as the contract parameters of the outsourcing cooperative service of tour guide service under the single principal-agent relationship. Secondly, this paper considers the design of cooperative service contract between tour agency and two tour guide service providers, and analyzes the influence of the competitive relationship between tour guide service providers on the cooperation service in the tour guide service outsourcing. It is proved that this competitive relationship can make the tour guides supervise each other, reduce the agency cost and avoid the pressure brought by the tourists' blowout growth during the peak tourist season, and the travel agency is easy to rely on the single tour guide service provider. Then, considering the dual principal-agent identity of the travel agency, this paper constructs a contract model of the outsourcing cooperative service under the dual principal-agent relationship between the traveller, the travel agency and the tour guide service provider, and adds a reward and punishment mechanism to the model. Based on the performance sharing mechanism, it is analyzed that adding reward and punishment mechanism can effectively improve the utility of tourists. It also points out that it is very important for travel agencies to set up performance sharing mechanism and reward and punishment mechanism to select the outsourcing strategy of tour guide service. Finally, the full text is summarized and the prospect of follow-up research is described.
【学位授予单位】:湖南工业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:F592.6
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