资产专用性、谈判实力与农业产业化组织利益分配——基于农民合作社的多案例研究

发布时间：2019-01-05 15:43

【摘要】：利益分配机制是维系农业产业化组织稳定发展的关键制度安排,也是保障农民收入的重要内容。由于"核心成员控制"是当前中国农业产业化组织中普遍存在的现象,大量研究均指出核心成员控制会导致普通成员利益被忽视。然而,现实情况却与理论分析不一致,存在着部分核心成员让利于普通成员的事例。为此,本文运用多案例比较分析方法,从资产专用性的角度对此现象进行了解释,分析结论表明:核心成员是否让利于普通成员取决于二者之间投入要素或产品的相对资产专用性程度;当一方投入要素或产品资产专用性越高时,对另一方的依赖性会增强,其谈判实力将减弱,因而在农业产业化组织分得的利益会越少。本文的研究为农业产业化组织分配制度的形成提供了一个"资产专用性—谈判实力—利益分配"分析框架。
[Abstract]:Benefit distribution mechanism is the key institutional arrangement to maintain the stable development of agricultural industrialization organization, and it is also an important content of protecting farmers' income. As "core member control" is a common phenomenon in agricultural industrialization organizations in China, a large number of studies have pointed out that core member control will lead to the neglect of the interests of ordinary members. However, the reality is inconsistent with the theoretical analysis, and there are some examples in which some core members give way to ordinary members. Therefore, this paper uses the method of multi-case comparative analysis to explain this phenomenon from the point of view of asset specificity. The results show that whether the core members give way to the ordinary members depends on the relative degree of asset specificity of the input elements or products between the two; When one input factor or product asset specificity is higher, the dependence on the other party will be strengthened, and its negotiation strength will be weakened, so the benefit will be less in the agricultural industrialization organization. The research in this paper provides an analytical framework of "asset specificity-negotiation strength-benefit distribution" for the formation of the organization and distribution system of agricultural industrialization.
【作者单位】：中国宏观经济研究院国家发展和改革委员会产业经济与技术经济研究所;中国人民大学农业与农村发展学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金国际(地区)合作与交流项目“变化市场中农产品价值链转型及价格、食品安全的互动关系——以蔬菜、渔产品和乳制品为例”(71361140369);国家自然科学基金面上项目“成员异质性、合作社理论创新与农民专业合作社发展政策体系构建”(71273267)
【分类号】：F321.42

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