财政分权、政府治理与中国经济增长

发布时间：2018-01-08 08:36

本文关键词：财政分权、政府治理与中国经济增长　出处：《重庆大学》2014年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：分权是一个世界现象，而增长却不是。如何构造一个良好的政府治理模式是一个大国发展的关键。本文从政府治理角度出发，对中国经济改革开放后的持续高速增长尝试性地做出制度性解释和分析。“经济分权、政治集权”是中国式分权的核心内涵，这种制度设计促进中国经济增长的途径是什么？它的消极影响有哪些？如何改革和完善这套制度设计以确保中国经济的持续健康发展？这些问题的研究对于我国深化改革和相关政策制定具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。本文首先从中央政府——地方政府治理的制度视角对中国经济增长作出解释，提出中国经济增长的制度性解释框架——中央政府主导下的地方政府竞争机制，然后从公平和效率两个角度来对该制度框架展开深入研究，进而为该项制度的改善提供了政策建议。论文的主要特色和结论如下： (1)基于制度视角，本文通过中央政府主导下的地方政府竞争机制对中国经济增长做出了制度性的解释。本文将该制度解释框架表述为：在强中央的政府主导市场经济中，中央政府通过政治集中和向地方分权，构造有效的政治激励和经济激励来培育地方政府间的竞争机制，以“增长竞争型政府”来推动经济发展的模式。地方政府主导区域经济的竞争机制带来经济总量的持续增长，“增长的代价”也显示出需要补充机制或修正内部制度来平衡增长与成本，并在这一过程中维持增长，中国经济需要由经济转型和政治体制改革带来的新的制度供给来提供中国经济持续高速增长的内在动力。 (2)基于公平视角，本文对上述制度解释框架之中的政府治理机制和地方政府及地方政府官员的行为进行了深入研究。考虑地方政府异质性，本文将地方政府异质性引入到由中央政府主导、地方政府参与的晋升锦标赛，，拓展传统晋升博弈模型，通过研究结论从竞争者异质性角度解释了中国经济增速“西强东弱”中的地方政府行为差异，并得出了一些对政府治理改革有益的启示。考虑地方政府官员公平偏好，本文在传统委托代理激励模型基础上，引入公平偏好理论，通过同时考虑横向公平偏好和纵向公平偏好，改进了“经济自利人”的假设，并将委托代理应用公平偏好理论的分析框架从单对单的代理框架拓展为双代理的代理框架。研究发现通过制度设计来培育地方政府官员的公平偏好并将其维持较高强度是完善政府治理的有效措施之一。 (3)基于效率视角，本文研究分析了上述制度解释框架对我国经济增长技术效率和对地方政府环境保护支出效率的影响。本文将财政分权和晋升锦标赛同时纳入基于C-D生产函数的随机前沿实证模型，研究发现，“经济分权、政治集权”这种极具中国特色的制度设计对经济发展技术效率有正向促进作用。同时，本文利用DEA-Tobit两阶段模型对我国各地方政府环境保护财政支出效率进行了测算和影响因素分析，研究发现：各省份的环境保护财政支出中普遍存在着技术无效率现象，“经济分权、政治集权”的中央政府——地方政府治理模式存在缺陷，其对环境保护支出效率有负面影响，根本在于GDP为核心的考核机制，因此如何平衡经济职能和各项公共职能，此为提高如环境保护等财政支出效率的根本和关键路径。 (4)基于上述研究工作，本文认为应正确认识中央政府——地方政府现有治理机制，有弊端但不可全盘否定。如何改革地方政府评价体系，是优化中央政府——地方政府治理机制的关键，适当对地方施以政治上的分权也是必要措施。客观认识官员的个人利益，通过阳光工资、财产申报等制度完善其激励约束机制。
[Abstract]:Decentralization is a worldwide phenomenon, but growth is not. How to construct a good government governance mode is the key to the development of a country. This paper started from the angle of government administration, to make a systematic explanation and Analysis on the China economy after the reform and opening up. "Try the sustained rapid growth of economic decentralization, political centralization" the core connotation of China decentralization, what is the way to the design of this system China promote economic growth? What are the negative effects of it? How to reform and improve the system design to ensure sustained and healthy economic development China? Study these problems for our country to deepen the reform and related policy has important theoretical value and practical significance this paper from the formulation. To Chinese economic growth system from the perspective of the central government, local government's explanation, puts forward the system of China economic growth framework- The competition mechanism of local government under the guidance of the central government, then from the two angles of fairness and efficiency, we conduct in-depth research on the system framework, and further provide policy recommendations for the improvement of the system.
(1) based on the perspective of the system, the competition mechanism of local government under the guidance of the central government on economic growth Chinese made the institutional explanation. This paper will explain the system framework is expressed as: in a strong central government led market economy, the central government through political concentration and decentralization, effective incentive and political structure economic incentives to foster competition among local governments, with "growth competitive government" to promote economic development mode. The sustained growth of local government competition mechanism of regional economy brings the total economy, the "growth price" also shows the need to add or modify the internal mechanism of the system to balance growth and cost, and maintain growth in this process, China economy needs a new supply system caused by economic restructuring and the reform of the political system to provide China sustained rapid economic growth in the Power.
(2) based on the perspective of fairness, this paper makes a thorough research within the framework of government governance mechanism and local government and local government officials to explain the behavior of local government system. Considering the heterogeneity, the heterogeneity is introduced to the local government led by the central government, the local government to participate in the tournament, expanding the traditional promotion game model. Through the conclusion of the study between local government behavior China economic growth "strong weak West to East" to explain the competitors from the angle of heterogeneity, and draws some beneficial enlightenment for the government governance reform. Local government officials consider the fairness preference, principal-agent incentive model based on traditional introduction of fairness preference theory, by considering the horizontal and vertical equity preference fairness preference, improved the "economic self-interest" hypothesis, and the proxy application of fairness preference theory From the single to one agency framework to the dual agent framework, it is found that it is one of the effective measures to improve government governance by institutional design to cultivate the fairness preference of local government officials and maintain them to a higher level.
(3) from the perspective of efficiency, this paper analyzes the system framework of China's economic growth and the impact on the technical efficiency of local government environmental protection expenditure efficiency. This paper will also include research discovery, stochastic frontier production function based on empirical mode C-D fiscal decentralization and the Promotion Tournament, "economic decentralization, political centralization system design" this very China characteristics have a positive role in promoting the economic development of technical efficiency. At the same time, this paper uses the DEA-Tobit two stage model of the efficiency of fiscal expenditure of the local government environmental protection in China was calculated and the influence factor analysis, found that widespread environmental protection expenditure of the provinces in the technical inefficiency phenomenon. "Economic decentralization, political centralization of the central government, local government governance mode defects, its negative impact on the efficiency of environmental protection expenditure, root This is the assessment mechanism based on GDP. Therefore, how to balance the economic functions and public functions is the fundamental and critical path to improve the efficiency of fiscal expenditure, such as environmental protection.
(4) based on the above research, this paper thinks that the central government should have a correct understanding of the existing local government governance mechanism, there are drawbacks but do not negate. How to reform the local government evaluation system is a key to optimize the central government - local government governance mechanism, to impose appropriate local political decentralization is necessary. Objective understanding of officials the interests of the individual, through the sunshine wages, the property declaration system to improve the incentive and restraint mechanism.

【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F812.2;F124

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