中国—东盟经贸格局演变与南海经贸战略选择

发布时间：2018-01-21 21:14

本文关键词： 中国—东盟经贸格局演变非零和博弈南海经贸战略　出处：《广西大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：中国南海蕴藏着丰富的石油和天然气资源以及丰富多样的渔业资源,因此,经济快速发展对资源需求日益强烈的新兴东盟国家争先开发中国南海的宝贵资源。自2009年中国南海问题爆发以来,越南和菲律宾加紧对中国南海资源的开发,并持续地制造和升级领土冲突,同时南海区域外大国也试图介入南海问题,严重影响了中国的领土完整和经济利益。中国与东盟一方面存在领土冲突,另一方面也存在巨大的共同利益。中国—东盟自由贸易区的建设已经历十年时间,对中国和东盟国家的经济发展起到了积极的推动作用,在贸易与投资方面为中国和东盟国家带来了巨大的创造效应和转移效应,并通过贸易与投资促进双方产业形成网络化分工,双方的经贸共同利益不断深化。笔者认为中国南海的领土冲突涉及国际经济、国际政治、军事、文化等多种因素,属于综合性难题；而经贸往来是双方最主要的联系,并推动双方的经济发展,为双方带来巨大的共同利益。因此,双方存在着合作的可能性,中国南海的领土冲突应运用合作博弈模型进行分析,并不是“非负即正”的零和博弈。作为博弈中的一方,中国应抓住经济全球化和区域经济一体化的机遇,积极参与国际经济合作和竞争,尤其是区域经济合作,促进经济发展和地区稳定,以减弱和平衡中国南海的领土冲突。本文旨在通过运用托马斯·谢林提出的非零和博弈理论对中国南海的领土冲突进行深入分析,探究中国如何运用经济手段制衡和减弱双方领土争端问题,并提出相应的中国南海安全战略,为维护中国东盟关系健康发展提供合理建议。首先,本文概括中国南海的领土争端现状和特点；其次,由于贸易与投资为中国与东盟的主要经济联系,本文将归纳中国一东盟贸易与投资的现状和特点,并推测其未来的演变趋势；并在此基础上,研究中国与菲律宾、越南间的贸易与投资特点与现状,并推测未来的演变趋势；再次,根据现实经贸联系分析和领土收益的分析结果,建立非零和博弈模型,进一步分析中国与菲律宾、越南在领土冲突博弈中的损失和收益。最后,根据博弈模型分析结果,笔者尝试提出中国能够平衡各方和减弱领土冲突的博弈战略构想。
[Abstract]:The South China Sea is rich in oil and gas resources and various fishery resources. With the rapid development of economy, the emerging ASEAN countries, which are in increasing demand for resources, are scrambling to exploit the precious resources in the South China Sea. Since the outbreak of the South China Sea problem in 2009. Vietnam and the Philippines have stepped up the exploitation of resources in the South China Sea and continuously created and escalated territorial conflicts, while the great powers outside the South China Sea have also tried to intervene in the South China Sea issue. Seriously affected China's territorial integrity and economic interests. On the one hand, there are territorial conflicts between China and ASEAN, on the other hand, there are also huge common interests. The construction of China-ASEAN Free Trade area has been going through ten years. It has played a positive role in promoting the economic development of China and ASEAN countries, and has brought great creative and transfer effects to China and ASEAN countries in terms of trade and investment. And through trade and investment to promote the two industries to form a network division of labor, mutual economic and trade interests continue to deepen. The author thinks that the territorial conflict in the South China Sea involves many factors, such as international economy, international politics, military affairs, culture and so on. Economic and trade exchanges are the most important ties between the two sides, and promote the economic development of both sides, bringing great common interests for both sides. Therefore, there is the possibility of cooperation between the two sides. The territorial conflict in the South China Sea should be analyzed by the cooperative game model, which is not a zero-sum game. As one side of the game, China should seize the opportunity of economic globalization and regional economic integration. We will actively participate in international economic cooperation and competition, especially regional economic cooperation, and promote economic development and regional stability. In order to weaken and balance the territorial conflict in the South China Sea, this paper aims to analyze the territorial conflict in the South China Sea by using the non-zero sum game theory proposed by Thomas Schelling. Explore how China uses economic means to balance and weaken the issue of territorial disputes between the two sides, and put forward the corresponding security strategy for the South China Sea, to maintain the healthy development of China-ASEAN relations to provide reasonable advice. This paper summarizes the present situation and characteristics of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Secondly, as trade and investment are the main economic relations between China and ASEAN, this paper will sum up the current situation and characteristics of China-ASEAN trade and investment, and speculate on its future evolution trend. On this basis, the characteristics and present situation of trade and investment between China and the Philippines and Vietnam are studied, and the trend of evolution in the future is speculated. Thirdly, based on the analysis of economic and trade relations and territorial income, a non-zero-sum game model is established to further analyze the losses and benefits of China, Philippines and Vietnam in the territorial conflict game. Finally. According to the result of game model analysis, the author tries to put forward a game strategy that China can balance the parties and weaken the territorial conflict.
【学位授予单位】：广西大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F752.7

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