基于区域利益的京津冀协同发展研究
[Abstract]:The coordinated development of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei has become an important national strategy, but the incoordination of regional interests makes it difficult for Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei to coordinate development. The economy of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei has been developing rapidly, but compared with the Yangtze River Delta, the overall competitiveness is obviously weak, under the motive of the local governments pursuing the interests of administrative divisions, Beijing focuses on its own development and neglects the economic radiation effect on Tianjin-Hebei. Relying on its own strong industrial strength and coastal ports, Tianjin is a "northern economic center", and is not enthusiastic about the coordinated development of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei; the level of economic development in Hebei is in sharp contrast to that in the Beijing-Tianjin region. The phenomenon of "poverty zone around Beijing and Tianjin" is still serious. These problems can be traced back to the unsound institutional mechanism of regional interest coordination mechanism. This paper takes the internal relation of regional economic operation and the goal of coordinated development of macro-economy as the basic starting point, taking the coordinated development of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei as the axis and the relative independence of regional interests as the logical starting point. This paper studies the external manifestation and internal motivation of the conflict of interest in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei regions. In this paper, the connotation of regional interest is defined scientifically, and the constitution of regional interest is divided into personal interest, enterprise interest, local government interest and central government interest. Secondly, from the government profit behavior, residents profit behavior, enterprise profit behavior to Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei region profit behavior. Thirdly, in order to explore the deep-seated reasons of the regional interest subject's profit-seeking behavior, the paper analyzes the benefit game between the central government and the local government by using the bargaining game model and the reputation model. And based on a large number of statistical data, this paper makes a deep study on the benefit game between residents and government, enterprises and government, and puts forward the mechanism and path of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei coordinated development from the perspective of regional interests. In order to improve the current problem of "big city disease" in Beijing and the vicious competition between Beijing and Tianjin, Hebei is backward in an all-round way, so as to realize the development of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei groups, and to construct the first and best area for the coordinated development of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward the mechanism and realization path of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei regional interest coordination. The coordination mechanism of regional interests of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region includes four types: innovating the mechanism of win-win benefit, setting up the mechanism of sharing resources, perfecting the mechanism of compensation of interests, and constructing the new mechanism of assessing political achievements. Among them, the innovation benefit win-win mechanism includes the establishment of interest appeal expression mechanism and benefit distribution mechanism, the establishment of resource sharing mechanism, including industrial sharing, infrastructure sharing and science and technology resources sharing mechanism. Benefit compensation mechanism includes industry transfer compensation and ecological compensation mechanism. The new performance assessment mechanism includes environmental improvement, livelihood improvement and regional integration index. The ways to realize the regional interests of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei include defining the whole interests of the region, setting up the concept of coordinated development and establishing the system of regional governance. The regional governance system includes the regional governance legal system, the regional governance policy system, the multi-subject governance framework system and so on.
【学位授予单位】:首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F127
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