权力结构影响收入分配的机制研究与模拟分析

发布时间：2018-08-14 10:58

【摘要】：本文在资源、权力与经济利益分配的既有分析框架下，界定了从资源到权力之间的关于权力结构的理论内涵。我们认为资源决定了主体在分配过程中可行使权力的大小，但是从资源到权力的转换过程还受制于制度环境的相关约束，继而可以通过权力结构来刻画在分配过程中从资源到权力的转化过程，从中表达权力主体对客体的影响关系，以及制度环境对社会主体的制约效果。权力结构是对权力的具体刻画，而权力又是经济主体获得分配所得的根本动力，因此本文试图分析在分配过程中权力结构对收入分配的影响效果。在本文的分析过程中得到了这样如下几个基本结论： 1、权力结构是影响收入分配的根本因素，这是本文讨论的理论基础。在本文的分析框架中，权力结构刻画了从资源到权力的形成过程，反映了社会主体之间的关系，也在一定程度上反映了社会配置资源的能力。权力是社会主体之间的影响力，并且具有不对称性，影响力的成因在于对资源的掌握和支配，不对称性源于对资源的不同依赖程度，所以即便在相同的资源结构下社会主体的权力也存在差异。借助于已有的元资源和衍生资源的划分方式，本文认为衍生资源是社会主体对元资源的整合和运用，衍生资源按照功能可以分为政治资源、经济资源和社会资源，其中经济资源是一种生产性资源，而政治资源和社会资源是非生产性资源。政治资源、经济资源和社会资源可以相应的转化为政治权力、经济权力和社会权力，社会主体之间行使的权力是这三方面权力的综合显现。而从生产性和非生产性对资源划分的角度也可以把权力相应地分为生产性权力和非生产性权力。在本文的主体研究部分主要考察了由生产性权力与非生产性权力组合构成的分配权力结构对收入分配结果产生的影响。 2、通过基于冲突理论的分配模型分析，本文得出了以个人收入最大化为目标的最优分配过程的实现条件是经济主体的非生产性分配权力相等的基本结论，在非生产性分配权力相等的情况下，经济主体的分配所得主要依靠生产性分配权力获得，但同时非生产性分配权力是生产分配过程的一种补充，能够保证社会财富分配不会出现穷者愈穷，富者愈富的分配结果。对非生产性分配需要区别看待，一方面非生产性分配可能是由政府参与的赋予其它社会主体的再分配权力，这种非生产性权力是基于主体对其他社会主体的福利关怀而形成的社会价值基础，满足分配的正义性。另一方面非生产性分配可能源于对非生产性资源的不当利用而形成分配权力的错配，比如借助行政资源的寻租行为，在这种情况下的非生产性分配权力不具有分配的正义性，是对他人利益的不合理侵占。因此在分配制度的设计上应该针对不同的非生产性权力的分配效果加以区分，既让弱势的社会主体能够得到再分配带来的经济援助，又避免寻租的泛滥。 3、在分析生产性分配权力与非生产性分配权力关系对分配结果的影响过程中可以看出，两种分配权力的关系比例是决定分配结果的一个重要因素，同时经济主体之间的资源禀赋关系是决定分配结果的另一重要因素。新制度经济学指出制度变迁存在路径依赖，路径依赖其实就是经济活动随时间变化的连续性发展的必然结果，分配过程亦是如此。当将分配过程从单期扩展为存在跨期联系的情况时，，就能够模拟出分配过程的长期演变路径。对生产性分配权力的倾向程度决定了合作生产的产出水平以及生产合作者之间的分配关系。对生产性分配权力的倾向性越高，合作产出的水平也越高，生产合作者之间的收入差距也相对较大，当对生产性分配权力的倾向性降低时，收入差距减小了，合作产出水平也降低了。但是无论权力倾向性系数如何选择，在经过一段时间后合作生产者之间的收入都会趋于均衡。所以本文认为为了降低贫富差距而过分重视非生产性分配过程不仅不会实现共同富裕，还会造成社会经济发展的停滞，只有重视生产性分配过程并且结合适度的非生产性分配过程才能在走向富裕的过程中实现共同富裕。 4、在研究权力结构对初次分配的影响特别是对工资性收入的影响中，本文构建了含有权力变量的工资定价模型。作为初次分配过程中最主要的分配形式，工资性收入可以分解为两个步骤，第一步是企业所有者与企业工会之间的谈判形成了企业职工的工资总额，第二步再根据企业职工个人分配权力决定个人工资的多寡。通过分析可以看出当职工个人分配权力函数中生产性分配权力越大企业内部的工资差距也就越大。从社会角度看待企业职工工资差异可以发现技术密集型企业职工工资高于资本密集型企业，更优于劳动密集型企业。因此产业升级有利于提高企业职工的工资水平。 5、政府作为分配过程中不可或缺的主体，本文也根据它与公民之间的权力关系展开分析。政府是一个兼具公利性和自利性的特殊主体，在不同的特征下政府与公民之间的权力制约方式不同。公利性政府会根据公民个人利益最大化目标和社会福利目标作为政府决策的依据，而具有自利性的政府则会根据自身利益决策。但是模型同时也说明政府即便是自利的，也不能为所欲为实行权力，它所具有的行政权力也会受到公民经济权力的制约。
[Abstract]:Under the existing analytical framework of resource, power and economic benefit distribution, this paper defines the theoretical connotation of power structure from resource to power. We believe that resources determine the size of power that can be exercised by the subject in the process of distribution, but the process of transformation from resources to power is also subject to the relevant constraints of the institutional environment, and then. The power structure can be used to describe the process of transformation from resources to power in the process of distribution, from which the influence of power subject on the object and the restraint effect of institutional environment on the social subject can be expressed. The graph analyses the effect of power structure on income distribution in the process of distribution.
1. The power structure is the fundamental factor affecting income distribution, which is the theoretical basis discussed in this paper. In the analysis framework of this paper, the power structure describes the formation process from resources to power, reflects the relationship between social subjects, and to a certain extent reflects the ability of social resources allocation. Power is asymmetrical. The cause of influence lies in the mastery and control of resources. The asymmetry stems from the different degree of dependence on resources. Therefore, even under the same resource structure, the power of social subjects varies. By means of the existing division of meta-resources and derivative resources, this paper argues that derivative resources are social. According to the function, the derived resources can be divided into political resources, economic resources and social resources. Economic resources are productive resources, while political and social resources are non-productive resources. The power exercised between social subjects and social power is a comprehensive manifestation of these three aspects of power. From the perspective of productive and non-productive division of resources, power can be divided into productive power and non-productive power. The influence of the distributive power structure on the results of income distribution.
2. Through the analysis of the distribution model based on the conflict theory, this paper draws a conclusion that the realization condition of the optimal distribution process with the goal of maximizing personal income is that the non-productive distribution power of the economic subject is equal. When the non-productive distribution power is equal, the distribution income of the economic subject mainly depends on the productive distribution right. The power of non-productive distribution is a supplement to the process of production distribution, which can ensure that the distribution of social wealth will not result in the distribution of the poorer and the richer. On the other hand, the non-productive distribution may result from the improper use of non-productive resources, such as the rent-seeking behavior of administrative resources, in this case. The non-productive distribution of power does not have the justice of distribution, and it is an unreasonable encroachment on the interests of others. Therefore, in the design of distribution system, we should distinguish the distribution effect of different non-productive power, so that the disadvantaged social subjects can get the economic assistance brought by redistribution, and avoid the proliferation of rent-seeking.
3. In the process of analyzing the influence of the relationship between productive distribution power and non-productive distribution power on distribution results, it can be seen that the ratio of the two kinds of distribution power is an important factor to determine the distribution results, and the relationship between the resource endowment of economic subjects is another important factor to determine the distribution results. Institutional change has path dependence. Path dependence is the inevitable result of the continuous development of economic activities over time, and so is the distribution process. When the distribution process is expanded from a single period to a situation with intertemporal links, the long-term evolution path of the distribution process can be simulated. The higher the propensity to productive power distribution, the higher the level of cooperative output, and the relatively large income gap between producers. When the propensity to productive power distribution is reduced, the income gap decreases, and the level of cooperative output is also higher. However, no matter how the power inclination coefficient is chosen, the income between the cooperative producers will tend to be balanced after a period of time. Therefore, this paper argues that excessive emphasis on the non-productive distribution process in order to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor will not achieve common prosperity, but will also cause the stagnation of social and economic development, only pay attention to production. The process of sexual distribution combined with moderate non-productive distribution can realize common prosperity in the process of becoming rich.
4. In the study of the influence of power structure on the initial distribution, especially on wage income, this paper constructs a wage pricing model with power variables. As the main distribution form in the initial distribution process, wage income can be divided into two steps. The first step is the negotiation form between the owner and the trade union. The second step is to determine the amount of individual wages according to the individual distribution power of the employees in the enterprise. The wages of employees in technology-intensive enterprises are higher than those in capital-intensive enterprises, and better than those in labor-intensive enterprises. Therefore, industrial upgrading is conducive to raising the wages of employees in enterprises.
5. As an indispensable subject in the process of distribution, the government is also analyzed according to the power relationship between the government and the citizens. The social welfare goal is the basis of government decision-making, while the self-interested government will make decisions according to its own interests. But the model also shows that the government can not exercise power even if it is self-interested, and its administrative power will be restricted by the economic power of citizens.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F124.7

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