审计专用性投资不足问题研究

发布时间：2018-01-15 10:39

本文关键词：审计专用性投资不足问题研究　出处：《湖南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：会计师事务所在接受客户委托时要深入了解客户及其环境，积累相关行业和客户专门知识，这可以视为一种专用性投资，并且其投资水平的高低会影响审计服务的质量。由于我国审计市场属于典型的垄断竞争市场，会计师事务所对客户存在一定程度上的经济依赖，议价能力较弱。基于成本-收益的考量，事务所缺乏进行高水平审计专用性投资的动力，成为我国实现高质量审计的现实障碍。本文以不完全契约理论为基础，，以审计专用性投资不足问题作为主要研究对象，为使模型更加接近真实审计市场，本文在传统GHM模型上，修正了信息对称这一假设，构建了一个信息不对称下的审计敲竹杠模型，分析了审计专用性投资不足的现状；鉴于已有研究的局限性，分别构建了专用性投资成本和审计声誉效应相关的审计敲竹杠模型，从静动态角度探讨了这两个因素引入对审计专用性投资不足的改进作用。模型结论表明：信息不对称引起的“隐藏信息”会降低高能型事务所而提高低能型事务所的专用性投资水平；专用性投资成本影响双方谈判力的情况下，会计师事务所专用性投资激励更强；审计声誉效应也会对专用性投资水平产生影响；敲竹杠行为是否影响投资水平主要取决于初始谈判力的大小和审计声誉效应的好坏，并且一定条件下，会计师事务所有可能做出社会最优甚至过度的审计专用性投资。最后，根据模型的分析结果，主张通过建立审计双方信任机制、加强事务所执业能力以及培育寡占型市场结构来增强专用性投资水平以提高审计质量，这也是本文的现实意义所在。
[Abstract]:Accounting firms should deeply understand customers and their environment, accumulate relevant industry and customer expertise, which can be regarded as a kind of special investment. And the level of investment will affect the quality of audit services. Because our audit market is a typical monopoly competition market, accounting firms have a certain degree of economic dependence on customers. The bargaining power is weak. Based on the cost-benefit consideration, the firm lacks the motive power to carry out the high-level audit special investment, which becomes the realistic obstacle to the realization of the high quality audit in our country. Based on the theory of incomplete contract, this paper focuses on the problem of insufficient investment in audit specificity. In order to make the model more close to the real audit market, this paper is based on the traditional GHM model. This paper corrects the hypothesis of information symmetry, constructs a model of audit rip-off under asymmetric information, and analyzes the current situation of insufficient investment in audit specificity. In view of the limitations of existing research, the audit rigging models related to the specific investment cost and audit reputation effect are constructed respectively. From the static and dynamic point of view, this paper discusses the improvement effect of these two factors on the insufficient investment in audit specificity. The conclusion of the model shows that the "hidden information" caused by information asymmetry is "hidden information". It will reduce the high-energy firms and improve the investment level of the low-energy firms. When the cost of special investment affects the negotiating power of both sides, the incentive of specific investment of accounting firm is stronger; Audit reputation effect will also have an impact on the level of dedicated investment; Whether the behavior of racketeering affects the level of investment mainly depends on the size of the initial bargaining power and audit reputation effect, and under certain conditions. Accounting firms are likely to make socially optimal or even excessive audit specific investments. Finally, according to the analysis results of the model, it is proposed that the audit quality should be improved by establishing the mutual trust mechanism, strengthening the practice ability of the firm and cultivating the oligopolistic market structure to enhance the level of dedicated investment. This is also the practical significance of this article.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F233;F239.22

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