政府审计部门激励与监督机制研究——基于博弈均衡模型的分析

发布时间：2018-02-01 06:09

本文关键词： 政府审计激励机制监督处罚机制博弈均衡　出处：《财会通讯》2010年30期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文通过对政府审计过程博弈模型均衡分析,发现激励机制与监督约束机制对保证审计人员提交高质量的审计报告起着重要作用。激励机制能引导政府审计人员充分发挥专业胜任能力,但在存在合谋现象时,却无法保证审计人员应有的独立性;监督处罚机制可有效地抑制审计过程中的设租—寻租行为,但其作用的有效发挥必须以激励机制的存在为前提。两种机制不能相互替代,但能相互促进,共同降低管理成本。建议管理当局在提升政府审计质量过程中重视对两种机制的协调使用。
[Abstract]:This paper analyzes the equilibrium of the game model of the government audit process. It is found that the incentive mechanism and the supervision and restraint mechanism play an important role in ensuring the auditors to submit high-quality audit reports. The incentive mechanism can guide the government auditors to give full play to their professional competence. However, when there is collusion, the auditor's independence can not be guaranteed. The mechanism of supervision and punishment can effectively restrain the rent-setting and rent-seeking behavior in the audit process, but the effective exertion of its function must be based on the existence of the incentive mechanism. The two mechanisms can not replace each other, but can promote each other. It is suggested that the management should pay attention to the coordinated use of the two mechanisms in the process of improving the quality of government audit.
【作者单位】：中国人民解放军军事经济学院;中南财经政法大学政府会计研究所;
【分类号】：F239.4
【正文快照】： 一、引言政府审计部门的职责对政府使用公共资源的真实性、合法性及效益性进行检查和监督。政府、人大及社会公众都希望政府审计部门能提交高质量的审计报告,以了解政府各部门对财政资金的使用情况。DeAngelo(1981)首次提出,审计质量由审计人员的专业胜任能力和独立性的联合

【共引文献】