强制审计师任命与审计质量关系:基于国资委统一选聘的证据

发布时间：2018-03-14 03:43

本文选题：审计师选择　切入点：审计质量　出处：《经济管理》2010年12期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：为履行中中央企业业出资人职责,国资委自2004年开始陆续出台了一系列规定,要求对所属中央企业实行统一选聘会计师事务所制度,这改变了长期以来由企业管理层实质控制审计师雇佣和解聘的局面。本文以2004～2008年按规定变更事务所的中央企业上市公司为研究对象,采用操控性应计利润和线下项目衡量审计质量。研究发现,与变更前相比,国资委选聘的会计师事务所的收入规模更大、CPA人数更多、事务所的排名更靠前。但是,变更审计师后上市公司的审计质量没有显著提高,与未变更审计师的中央企业上市公司配对检验也没有发现两者存在显著差异。研究表明,由国资委选聘审计师并未对上市公司的审计质量产生实质性影响。这一结论与DeFondetal.(2000)的研究相一致,表明,政府监管机构选聘审计师尽管可以改变管理层对审计师的影响,但无法产生由市场自发形成的对高质量审计需求的效果。
[Abstract]:To fulfill the responsibilities of investor in the central enterprises, the SASAC since 2004 has promulgated a series of regulations, required to implement the system of unified accounting firm selection of the central enterprises, which has been changed by the essence of Enterprise Management Control Auditor hiring and firing situation. This paper takes 2004~2008 years according to the provisions of the central enterprises to change the firm listed companies as the research object, using discretionary accruals and offline measure of audit quality. The study found that, compared with the prior to the change of accounting firms, the SASAC hiring income is larger, the number of CPA more firms ranked higher. However, after the change of auditors audit quality of listed companies is not significantly improved the listed company, and did not change the auditor's t-test for central enterprises also found no significant differences between the two. The results show that the selection by the SASAC The auditor did not have a substantial impact on the audit quality of listed companies. This conclusion is consistent with DeFondetal. (2000), the study shows that government regulators can change the effect of auditor hiring despite the management of the auditor, but is unable to produce the market formed by the demand for high quality audit results.

【作者单位】：南京大学商学院;复旦大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金“审计质量决定机制与审计师选择”(70772080),国家自然科学基金“审计师声誉机制实证研究:基于政府管制与市场竞争的视角”(71002026)
【分类号】：F239.4

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