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政府审计处理处罚模式对审计效果的影响与对策研究

发布时间:2018-04-09 13:57

  本文选题:审计处理处罚 切入点:单罚制 出处:《南京审计学院》2015年硕士论文


【摘要】:政府审计是国家治理监督体系中的重要组成部分,其目标是通过权力监督权利,严肃查处贪污浪费、经济犯罪、损失资源、铺张奢侈等机会主义行为,最终达到保护人民群众的利益。无论关于审计本质的“经济监督论”、“经济控制论”,还是“权利制约论”“民主法治论”,监督和查处都是最重要的手段,监督需要审计机关具有独立性,查处需要审计机关具有威慑性。独立性是审计的灵魂,独立的目的就是为了保证审计机关的权威。我国审计机关隶属于行政部门,拥有一定的审计处理处罚权。审计处理处罚权是审计机关发挥其威慑性的途径之一。审计机关在法定的职责权利范围内,对违规违法行为做出处理或者处罚,促进社会公平公正,督促被审计单位整改,对被审计单位的违规行为具有威慑和抑制作用。审计机关对违法行为不具有处理处罚权利但拥有处理处罚建议的可以移送纪检监察部门,及时制止违法行为,同时保障了刑侦或者检查机关及时取证,对违法犯罪行为进行有效打击。 政府审计处理处罚有两种模式,一是单罚制,也就是只对违规单位或直接责任人进行处理处罚;二是双罚制,也就是既对违规单位进行处罚,,同时还对直接责任人进行处罚。本文在分析国家审计本质的基础上,借鉴单、双罚制理论,结合我国目前的实际情况,分析双罚制在我国的适应性:即我国审计处理处罚中的双罚制措施应该能起到抑制被审计单位违规行为的作用,根据全国地方审计机关的数据分析发现,单罚中的上交财政和归还原渠道资金对抑制被审计单位违规行为有抑制作用,而减少财政拨款、应调帐处理、移送处理都不具有显著作用,各种双罚措施都不具有显著作用。出现上述悖论的主要原因是单罚措施特别是对人的移送处理力度太小,从而对抑制被审计单位的违规行为没有显著作用。
[Abstract]:Government auditing is an important part of the state governance and supervision system. Its goal is to strictly investigate and deal with opportunistic acts such as corruption and waste, economic crimes, loss of resources, extravagance and other opportunistic acts through power supervision, right supervision, serious investigation and punishment of corruption and waste, economic crimes, and the loss of resources.The ultimate goal is to protect the interests of the people.No matter the "economic supervision theory", "economic cybernetics" or "right restriction theory" or "democratic rule of law" about the essence of audit, supervision and investigation and punishment are all the most important means.Investigation and punishment need audit institutions to be deterrent.Independence is the soul of audit, and the purpose of independence is to ensure the authority of audit institutions.The audit institution of our country is subordinate to the administrative department and has the right to deal with the punishment of audit.The right of punishment is one of the ways for audit institutions to play their deterrent role.The audit institution, within the scope of its legal duties and responsibilities, deals with or punishes violations of the law, promotes social fairness and justice, urges the audited units to rectify and reform, and acts as a deterrent and a deterrent to the irregularities of the audited units.Audit institutions that do not have the right to deal with illegal acts but have the right to deal with punishment proposals may transfer them to discipline inspection and supervision departments to stop the illegal acts in a timely manner, and at the same time ensure that criminal investigation or inspection organs obtain evidence in a timely manner,Effectively crack down on illegal and criminal acts.There are two modes of government audit punishment, one is single penalty system, that is, only dealing with the unit that violates the law or the person directly responsible; the other is the system of double punishment, that is, the punishment is not only for the unit that violates the law, but also for the person directly responsible.On the basis of analyzing the essence of national audit, this paper draws lessons from the theory of single and double penalty, and combines with the actual situation of our country at present.This paper analyzes the adaptability of the double penalty system in our country: that is, the double penalty system in the audit treatment of our country should play a role in restraining the illegal behavior of the audited units. According to the analysis of the data of the local audit institutions throughout the country, it is found that,The single penalty of handing in the finance and returning the funds of the original channel can restrain the illegal behavior of the audited units, but the reduction of the financial allocation, the transfer of accounts and the transfer of funds have no significant effect, and all kinds of double penalty measures have no significant effect.The main reason for the above paradox is that the single penalty measures, especially the transfer of people, are too small, which has no significant effect on restraining the illegal behavior of the audited units.
【学位授予单位】:南京审计学院
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:F239.4

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