审计委员会的本原性质与作用机理研究

发布时间：2018-04-11 02:11

本文选题：审计委员会 + 本原性质　；参考：《天津商业大学》2007年硕士论文

【摘要】： 审计委员会是一个重要治理机制,近两年来学术界对审计委员会展开广泛的研究。而对于审计委员会的本原性质和作用机理的研究较少且意见不一,正确认识审计委员会的性质和作用机理,理顺审计委员会的治理关系,为审计委员会的实际效率提供制度层面的注解,才能完善审计委员会制度,提高其治理效率。本文采用规范研究的方法,以委托代理理论、受托责任理论、信号传递理论、企业理论为研究基础,以控制权分享和公司治理机制为研究主线,通过对审计委员会赖以存在的董事会制度和独立董事制度的研究,尤其是对董事会和独立董事的性质的研究,本文认为企业是人力资本和非人力资本投资者投入的要素使用权交易合约的动态履行过程,要素所有者分享企业终极所有权,即剩余索取权和剩余控制权。在企业内,基于委托代理关系形成了一个受托责任的链条,进而形成一系列授权与控制机制。作为受托人的经理人具有双重身份:作为人力资本的投资者,经理人员享有作为所有者的剩余索取权和剩余控制权,作为基于企业内部受托责任的责任人,经理人员享有董事会授予的特定经营权。在公司治理中人力资本所有者利用控制权优势虐待非人力资本所有者,产生第一类代理问题,在公司治理中引入董事会制度,董事会的性质就是股东投入资产的“监护人”,经理人参与董事会是监护自身投入资产的需要。企业控制权的分享机制只是一个模糊的权力边界。围绕受托责任链形成相应的控制权分享机制,同时还形成一套有效地分权与制衡机制,即公司治理机制。实现良好治理的核心是充分的信息披露。审计机制是为了实现信息质量的制度安排。大股东形成的内部人控制产生第二类代理问题,由独立董事代表企业弱势参与者行使剩余控制权而成为董事会的成员成为理性的制度安排。独立懂事的本质是代替企业弱势参与者行使其剩余控制权的代理人。但现有的审计机制却不能控制在第二种委托代理关系下由所有者操纵审计意见所导致的审计委托与受托关系异化,于是引入了审计委员会制度。本文的研究认为审计委员会的本原性质是为了实现审计机制良性运转、保证外部审计独立性的公司治理装置,审计委员会是代表股东行使审计委托权、负责管理外部审计事务的专门机构,审计委员会成员必须具备超然的独立性和专业胜任能力,独立于企业的经理人,对股东负责。同时,本文通过对公司信息控制权的分析,设计出一套审计委员会的运作机理,并提出相应问题。
[Abstract]:Audit Committee is an important governance mechanism. In recent two years, the academic circles have carried out extensive research on Audit Committee.However, there are few researches on the original nature and mechanism of the audit committee, and different opinions, so we should correctly understand the nature and mechanism of the audit committee, and straighten out the governance relationship of the audit committee.In order to perfect the audit committee system and improve its governance efficiency, the system of audit committee can be improved by providing the annotations of system level for the actual efficiency of audit committee.Based on the principal-agent theory, fiduciary responsibility theory, signaling theory and firm theory, this paper takes the sharing of control rights and the mechanism of corporate governance as the main line.Through the study of the board of directors system and the independent director system on which the audit committee depends, especially the study of the nature of the board of directors and independent directors,This paper holds that the enterprise is the dynamic performance process of the transaction contract of the use right of the elements invested by the investors of human capital and non-human capital, and the owner of the factor shares the ultimate ownership of the enterprise, that is, the residual claim and the residual right of control.In an enterprise, a chain of fiduciary responsibility is formed based on principal-agent relationship, and then a series of authorization and control mechanisms are formed.As a trustee, the manager has a dual identity: as an investor in human capital, the manager has the residual claim and residual control right as the owner, and as the responsible person based on the fiduciary responsibility within the enterprise.The manager shall have a specific right of operation granted by the board of directors.In corporate governance, the owners of human capital abuse the non-human capital owners by the advantage of control rights, which leads to the first kind of agency problem. The board of directors is introduced into the corporate governance. The nature of the board of directors is the "guardian" who the shareholders put into the assets.Managers' participation in the board of directors is the need to monitor their invested assets.The sharing mechanism of corporate control is only a vague boundary of power.Around the chain of fiduciary responsibility to form the corresponding control sharing mechanism, but also to form an effective separation of powers and checks and balances, that is, corporate governance mechanism.The core of good governance is adequate information disclosure.Audit mechanism is to realize the system arrangement of information quality.The second kind of agency problem arises from the insider control formed by the large shareholders. The independent director exercises the residual control right on behalf of the weak participants of the enterprise and becomes the member of the board of directors as a rational institutional arrangement.The essence of independent and sensible is to replace the weak participants in the enterprise to exercise their residual control.However, the existing audit mechanism can not control the alienation of audit entrustment and fiduciary relationship caused by the owner manipulating audit opinions under the second principal-agent relationship, so the audit committee system is introduced.In this paper, the author thinks that the original nature of audit committee is to realize the sound operation of audit mechanism and guarantee the independence of external audit. The audit committee is to exercise audit entrustment power on behalf of shareholders.The members of the audit committee who are responsible for the management of external audit affairs must have detached independence and professional competence, independent of the managers of the enterprise, and accountable to the shareholders.At the same time, through the analysis of the control right of company information, this paper designs a set of operating mechanism of audit committee, and puts forward the corresponding problems.
【学位授予单位】：天津商业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：F239.4

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