来自会计师事务所的高管对审计质量影响的机理研究

发布时间：2018-04-11 17:46

本文选题：审计意见 + 审计质量　；参考：《重庆大学》2007年硕士论文

【摘要】： 作为衡量上市公司财务信息质量的标尺之一,审计质量历来都受到国内外学术界的极大关注,并形成了卓有成效的大量成果。但随着安然、世通等欺诈丑闻的曝光及萨班斯——奥克斯莱法案(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)的颁布实施所产生的新特征,使我们开始关注审计质量的纵深课题,即上市公司聘请来自现任会计师事务所的高管会对审计质量产生怎样的影响? 基于以上的原因,本文运用规范分析及实证研究的方法对上市公司关联聘用的行为动机和关联雇佣行为对审计意见的影响进行了分析。意在弥补国内相关研究不足的基础上,为监管机构加强监督以及完善我国审计市场提供一定的依据。本文的研究主要分为三部分,相应的研究内容及结论如下: 第一部分为理论分析部分,主要为第3章。本部分通过对企业委托代理理论、博弈理论和保险理论以及审计意见相关理论进行分析,对审计产生的动因、审计的委托代理机制以及不同类型审计意见的成因、市场反应进行了规范性研究,并在此基础上提出了“清洁”和“不清洁”审计意见的划分方法,为实证研究部分提供了理论支持。第二部分为实证研究部分,包括第4章、第5章和第6章。第4章通过规范性分析,介绍了“不清洁”审计意见对上市公司的影响,并分析了关联高管对审计师审计质量的影响途径,从而指出上市公司有运用聘任关联高管的手段来影响审计师决策,改善审计质量的动机。第5章及第6章为实证的核心部分,本文采用修正的Lennox(2000)审计意见估计模型研究了上市公司雇佣关联高管的动机;然后运用logistic回归模型检验这种行为是否能改善审计意见从而损害了审计质量。研究结果表明:上市公司聘用来自会计师事务所的高管的动机在于预计的关联雇佣行为将给审计意见带来的改善作用。同时,与国外研究一致,本文的结论也表明在我国的审计市场上雇佣关联高管的公司更易收到“清洁”的审计意见,也就是说这种关联雇佣关系很可能损害了审计质量,影响了审计独立性。第三部分为政策建议部分,主要为第7章。本部分在前述实证研究结论的基础上,提出了两方面的对策建议,一方面是对上市公司聘请来自会计师事务所的高管的监管建议,另一方面提出了完善我国审计市场的思路。
[Abstract]:As one of the yardsticks to measure the quality of financial information of listed companies, audit quality has always been paid great attention to by the academic circles at home and abroad, and has formed a great deal of fruitful results.However, with the exposure of fraud scandals such as Enron, WorldCom and the promulgation of Sarbanes-Oxley Actand Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we began to pay attention to the in-depth issue of audit quality.That is, how does hiring executives from current accounting firms affect the audit quality of listed companies?Based on the above reasons, this paper uses normative analysis and empirical research to analyze the impact of the behavior motivation and related employment behavior of listed companies on audit opinions.The purpose is to make up for the lack of domestic research, and to provide some basis for the supervision of the supervision and the improvement of the audit market in China.The research of this paper is divided into three parts, the corresponding research contents and conclusions are as follows:The first part is the theoretical analysis part, mainly the third chapter.Through the analysis of the principal-agent theory, game theory, insurance theory and audit opinion theory, this part analyzes the causes of audit, the principal-agent mechanism of audit and the causes of different types of audit opinions.On the basis of the normative research on market reaction, this paper puts forward the method of dividing "clean" and "unclean" audit opinions, which provides theoretical support for the empirical research.The second part is the empirical research, including chapter 4, chapter 5 and chapter 6.Chapter 4, through normative analysis, introduces the influence of "unclean" audit opinion on listed companies, and analyzes the influence of related executives on auditor audit quality.It is pointed out that listed companies have the motivation of employing associated executives to influence auditors' decisions and improve audit quality.Chapter 5 and chapter 6 are the core parts of the empirical study. This paper uses the modified Lennox2000) audit opinion estimation model to study the motivation of the listed companies to hire associated executives;Then the logistic regression model is used to test whether this behavior can improve the audit opinion and thus impair the audit quality.The results show that the motivation of hiring executives from accounting firms in listed companies lies in the improved effect of the expected related employment behavior on audit opinions.At the same time, consistent with foreign studies, the conclusion of this paper also shows that companies employing associated executives in the audit market in China are more likely to receive "clean" audit opinions, that is to say, this kind of related employment relationship may damage the audit quality.The audit independence is affected.The third part is the policy suggestion part, mainly is the 7th chapter.On the basis of the above empirical research conclusions, this part puts forward two countermeasures and suggestions. On the one hand, it proposes to supervise the listed companies' hiring of executives from accounting firms; on the other hand, it puts forward the idea of perfecting the audit market in our country.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：F233;F239.4

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