配股政策、盈余管理与审计独立性关系研究

发布时间：2018-04-20 04:11

本文选题：配股政策 + 盈余管理　；参考：《江苏大学》2007年硕士论文

【摘要】： 中国资本市场监管(如配股政策、ST、PT政策等)的刚性政策,诱发了上市公司盈余管理的动机,而这种政策刚性通过压力传导机制影响到提供外部监督和鉴证的注册会计师(CPA)的审计行为。脱离这一背景而孤立地研究中国CPA的审计行为以及其审计独立性问题,这样的研究结论容易误导我们的审计理论和实践。遵循现代审计理论与实务(风险导向审计)中一个重要概念——审计重要性水平,公司经营风险、审计重要性水平与审计意见类型三者之间存在下列因果关系:公司经营风险提高,审计师倾向于降低审计重要性水平,给定同样的盈余管理水平,较之于低风险的公司,高经营风险的公司被出具非标准审计意见的概率增大。遵循上述思路,本文将审计重要性水平纳入上述研究框架中来考察配股政策诱发的盈余管理行为与审计独立性问题。本文第一章为导论,第二章为文献回顾,第三章从配股政策对净资产收益率计算方法的变化出发,在总结以往盈余管理研究所使用的财务指标的缺陷基础上,构建了文中使用的新财务指标,并对2001-2005年配股公司的盈余管理行为进行了实证检验,研究发现配股公司的盈余质量在提高,盈余管理行为在逐步减弱。第四章对配股区间公司的审计独立性缺失提出疑问,本部分主要为理论分析,为后一章的实证研究作铺垫。第五章选用2001-2005年上市公司作为样本,采用总应计利润替代法、带长期投资项的截面Jones模型和带长期投资项的调整的KS模型三种方法计算操控性应计利润。通过同等经营风险水平下标准审计意见组的操控性应计利润与非标意见组的对比,估计审计师设置的重要性水平,并通过对配股公司操控性应计利润的统计,研究发现配股公司的确存在盈余管理行为,但由于其操控性应计利润并未达到审计师设置“重要性水平”的界限,所以研究结论并不支持审计师对配股企业的独立性缺失的观点。第六章为研究结果和研究局限。
[Abstract]:The rigid policy of China's capital market supervision (such as stock rights issue policy and STPT-policy, etc.) induces the motive of earnings management of listed companies. This policy rigidity influences the audit behavior of CPA (CPA) which provides external supervision and authentication through the pressure conduction mechanism. It is easy to mislead our audit theory and practice to study the audit behavior and audit independence of CPA in China in isolation from this background. Following an important concept in modern audit theory and practice (risk-based auditing), which is the level of audit materiality, the management risk of a company, There is a causal relationship between the audit materiality level and the type of audit opinion: the operating risk of the company is increased, the auditor tends to reduce the audit importance level, and given the same earnings management level, compared with the low-risk company, High risk companies are more likely to issue non-standard audit opinions. Following the above thinking, this paper brings the audit importance level into the above research framework to investigate the earnings management behavior and audit independence induced by the rights issue policy. The first chapter of this paper is the introduction, the second chapter is the literature review, the third chapter starts from the change of equity policy to the net assets return calculation method, on the basis of summing up the defect of the financial index used in the earnings management research in the past, the third chapter is the literature review. This paper constructs the new financial index used in this paper and makes an empirical test on earnings management behavior of rights issue companies from 2001 to 2005. It is found that earnings quality of rights issue companies is improving and earnings management behavior is gradually weakening. The fourth chapter questions the lack of audit independence of the interval companies, this part is mainly theoretical analysis, for the latter chapter of the empirical research to pave the way. In the fifth chapter, the listed companies from 2001 to 2005 are selected as samples, the total accrual profit substitution method, the cross-section Jones model with long-term investment term and the adjusted KS model with long-term investment term are used to calculate the operating accrual profits. By comparing the operating accrual profit of the standard audit opinion group with that of the non-standard opinion group under the same operating risk level, the importance level of auditor setting is estimated, and the statistics of the operating accrual profit of the rights issue company are also given. It is found that the earnings management behavior does exist in the rights issue companies, but the operating accrual profits do not reach the threshold of the "materiality level" set by the auditor. Therefore, the findings do not support the auditor's lack of independence. The sixth chapter is the research results and limitations.
【学位授予单位】：江苏大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：F832.51;F239.6;F224

【参考文献】