注册会计师审计对管理层机会主义行为的约束

发布时间：2018-04-22 01:17

本文选题：注册会计师 + 管理层　；参考：《会计之友》2017年18期

【摘要】：高管在职消费是委托代理问题的常见形式。在职消费可能被经理人滥用,特别是存在治理缺陷的情况下更多地被用于满足个人消费欲望。过度的在职消费可能会引致严重的利益侵害,成为一种显性的剩余损失。高管的这种机会主义行为日益受到委托代理问题研究的关注。文章在给出在职消费一个新的估算方法的基础上,运用2013—2015年的数据就注册会计师审计对管理层在职消费行为的约束作用进行了研究。研究结果表明,高质量的审计能够有效抑制管理层的过度消费行为,提升公司价值。注册会计师审计的这种治理作用在国有企业和民营企业中都存在。基于上述结论文章建议在未来国企改革中应加大民营企业持股,完善外部审计治理。
[Abstract]:Executive on-the-job consumption is a common form of principal-agent problem. On-the-job consumption may be abused by managers, especially when there are governance defects, it is more used to satisfy personal consumption desire. Excessive on-the-job consumption may lead to serious infringement of interests and become a dominant residual loss. The opportunistic behavior of senior executives has been paid more and more attention to by the research of principal-agent problem. On the basis of a new estimation method of on-the-job consumption, this paper uses the data from 2013-2015 to study the restrictive effect of CPA audit on management's in-service consumption behavior. The results show that high-quality audit can effectively restrain management overconsumption behavior and enhance company value. The governance function of CPA audit exists in both state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. Based on the above conclusions, this paper suggests that private enterprises should increase their shareholding and improve external audit governance in the future reform of state-owned enterprises.
【作者单位】：河南牧业经济学院;北京邮电大学;
【基金】：河南牧业经济学院教学团队项目(201612);河南牧业经济学院科研创新团队项目(201604) 2014年河南省青年骨干教师项目(2014GGJS125)
【分类号】：F239.4

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