基于“理性”会计人的审计合谋内部突破研究

发布时间：2018-04-23 13:28

本文选题：“理性”会计人 + “工具”会计人　；参考：《会计之友(下旬刊)》2010年03期

【摘要】：真实的会计报告与公允的审计报告是投资者作出投资决策、评价公司经营情况的重要依据。从委托—代理理论的角度来看,投资者作为委托人,将资产委托给代理人(管理者)管理,并聘请注册会计师对代理人提供的反映其代理经营结果的财务状况、经营成果及现金流量的会计报告进行审计。然而,实际中审计合谋行为经常出现,国内外理论界学者对此进行了深入的研究,提出很多防范审计合谋的建议。文章试图从一个新的角度——基于"理性"会计人的角度,对怎样防范审计合谋进行分析。首先区分了"理性"会计人和"工具"会计人,进而提出了合谋引力理论,在此基础上建立了基于理性会计人审计合谋突破的动态博弈模型,求出了均衡解,最终得出了建立理性会计人举报制度有利于防范审计合谋的结论。
[Abstract]:True accounting report and fair audit report are the important basis for investors to make investment decision and evaluate the company's management. From the perspective of principal-agent theory, the investor, as the principal, entrusts the assets to the agent (manager) to manage, and employs the certified public accountant to provide to the agent the financial condition which reflects its agent management result, Audit the accounting report of operating results and cash flow. However, audit collusion often occurs in practice, which has been deeply studied by domestic and foreign theorists, and many suggestions are put forward to prevent audit collusion. This paper tries to analyze how to prevent audit collusion from a new angle-based on rational accountant. In this paper, the rational accountant and the tool accountant are distinguished, and then the theory of collusion gravity is put forward. On this basis, the dynamic game model based on the breakthrough of audit collusion of rational accountant is established, and the equilibrium solution is obtained. Finally, it comes to the conclusion that the establishment of rational accounting report system is beneficial to prevent audit collusion.
【作者单位】：唐山学院;河北工业大学管理学院;
【分类号】：F239.4

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