真实盈余管理对审计收费的影响研究

发布时间：2018-04-23 15:41

本文选题：真实盈余管理 + 审计收费　；参考：《集美大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：盈余管理问题始终是财务会计领域的一个重要话题。盈余管理包括应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理。真实盈余管理是对企业真实经营活动的盈余操控行为。由于其操作手段的隐蔽性,在监管环境趋严的现实条件下,相较于应计盈余管理,真实盈余管理越来越受到上市公司管理层的青睐。而真实盈余管理会导致企业经营风险的增加。那么,作为第三方机构,审计师能否识别该风险因素并在审计收费决策时加以考虑?此外,在我国特殊制度背景下,我国上市公司中最终控制人为政府的占多数,国有企业与非国有企业由于受到监管的程度不同因而面临的风险大小也有差异,审计师是否区别对待不同产权性质的上市公司中真实盈余管理所包含的信息?鉴于此,本文研究了上市公司真实盈余管理对审计收费的影响,并进一步区分产权性质,研究了不同产权性质下这种影响的差异性。本文首先在对以往文献进行回顾的基础上,进行了文献评述。其次,分析了真实盈余管理对审计收费影响的作用机理以及产权性质对两者相关性影响的机理,在此基础上提出相应假设。再次,通过构建计量指标与模型,并选取2011-2015年我国沪深A股上市公司年度数据作为研究样本,实证检验了我国上市公司真实盈余管理对审计收费产生的影响,进一步按照产权性质不同,将样本划分为国有企业组和非国有企业组,分别进行多元线性回归,对比检验了不同产权性质的上市公司真实盈余管理对审计收费影响的差异。最后,本文得出以下结论:第一,真实盈余管理对审计收费具有显著的正向影响,即上市公司通过实施真实经营活动进行盈余操控的程度越大,审计收费越高。第二,审计师区别对待了不同产权性质上市公司中真实盈余管理所包含的信息,即与非国有企业相比,国有企业真实盈余管理程度对审计收费的影响更为显著。
[Abstract]:Earnings management is always an important topic in the field of financial accounting. Earnings management includes accrual earnings management and real earnings management. Real earnings management is the manipulation of real business activities. Because of the concealment of its means of operation, under the realistic condition of strict supervision environment, compared with accrual earnings management, real earnings management is more and more favored by the management of listed companies. The real earnings management will lead to the increase of business risks. Can the auditor, as a third party, identify the risk factor and take it into account in the audit of the fee decision? In addition, under the background of the special system of our country, the final control of the listed companies in our country is dominated by the government, and the risks faced by the state-owned enterprises and the non-state-owned enterprises are also different because of the different degree of supervision. Do auditors discriminate between the information contained in real earnings management in listed companies with different property rights? In view of this, this paper studies the impact of real earnings management on audit fees of listed companies, and further distinguishes the nature of property rights, and studies the differences of the effects under different property rights. Based on the review of the previous literatures, this paper reviews the literature. Secondly, this paper analyzes the mechanism of the effect of real earnings management on audit fees and the mechanism of property right's influence on the relationship between the two, and puts forward the corresponding assumptions on this basis. Thirdly, by constructing the measurement index and model, and selecting the annual data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011-2015 as the research sample, this paper empirically tests the impact of real earnings management on audit fees of listed companies in China. Further according to the nature of property rights, the sample is divided into state-owned enterprise group and non-state-owned enterprise group, and multivariate linear regression is carried out respectively, and the differences of real earnings management on audit fees of listed companies with different property rights are compared and tested. Finally, this paper draws the following conclusions: first, the real earnings management has a significant positive impact on audit fees, that is, the greater the degree of earnings manipulation through the implementation of real business activities, the higher the audit fees. Second, auditors discriminate the information contained in the real earnings management of listed companies with different property rights, that is, the degree of real earnings management of state-owned enterprises has a more significant impact on audit fees than that of non-state-owned enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：集美大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F239.4

【参考文献】