家族企业非执行董事亲缘与审计需求研究

发布时间：2018-04-24 20:27

本文选题：家族企业 + 非执行董事　；参考：《河南财经政法大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：伴随着改革开放与中国经济稳步增长,民营经济已经成为我国市场经济的重要组成部分,家族企业作为一类特殊的民营经济形式,展现出了巨大的活力。据统计,截至2016年底,我国资本市场上家族上市公司已有超过900家,已超过国有上市公司总数,成为了我国经济增长最强劲的动力。同时在家族企业内部也存在着独特的问题,例如“任人唯亲”与“任人唯贤”的冲突、家族互利与信任缺失的冲突、家族长远利益与对非家族股东利益侵占的冲突等。然而家族企业内部治理的特殊模式能否产生有效的审计需求,从而缓解利益冲突,提高企业治理水平已经成为了关注重点。本文将从非执行董事视角考察家族企业的审计需求。独立审计是缓解企业代理问题的重要手段,是外部监督制衡的主要力量,是企业内部监督的替代机制。企业中的非执行董事被誉为专职的“监督董事”,这一治理特征是否对独立审计安排产生影响?本文以我国上市家族企业为研究对象,依据家族亲缘,将广义的非执行董事区分为家族非执行董事与非家族非执行董事,以对比分析的方式考察家族上市公司非执行董事亲缘对审计需求的影响,对家族企业董事会特征和审计市场建设具有一定意义。本文首先对家族企业治理相关文献、以及独立审计理论相关文献进行了梳理,并基于此对家族企业的特殊审计需求进行研究,提出了本文的若干研究假设。本文选取了2011-2015年沪、深两市A股上市家族企业为研究样本,通过实证检验,从审计师选择、审计质量和审计费用维度研究了家族企业中非执行董事亲缘对审计需求的影响。研究发现:非家族非执行董事治理具有更高的独立审计需求,同时审计质量较高,审计师收费较低;反观家族非执行董事治理下独立审计需求不足,审计质量较低,而审计师为应对风险,对其收取了更高的审计费用。进一步研究发现,在家族控制权增强的情况下,非家族非执行董事提高了独立审计需求。基于此,本文提出了相关建议。
[Abstract]:With the reform and opening up and the steady growth of China's economy, the private economy has become an important part of the market economy in China. As a special type of private economy, family enterprises have shown great vitality. According to statistics, by the end of 2016, there are more than 900 family listed companies in China's capital market, which has surpassed the total number of state-owned listed companies, and has become the most powerful driving force for economic growth in China. At the same time, there are some unique problems in the family business, such as the conflict between "cronyism" and "appointment of meritocracy", the conflict between family mutual benefit and lack of trust, the conflict between the long-term interests of the family and the encroachment on the interests of non-family shareholders, and so on. However, whether the special mode of internal governance of family enterprises can produce effective audit needs, so as to alleviate conflicts of interest and improve the level of corporate governance has become the focus of attention. This paper examines the audit needs of family firms from the perspective of non-executive directors. Independent audit is an important means to alleviate the agency problem of enterprises, is the main force of external supervision and checks and balances, and is the substitute mechanism of internal supervision. The non-executive director in the enterprise is praised as the full-time "supervisory director", whether this governance characteristic has the influence to the independent audit arrangement? In this paper, the listed family enterprises in China are taken as the research object. According to the kinship of the family, the generalized non-executive director is divided into the family non-executive director and the non-family non-executive director. The comparative analysis of the influence of non-executive directors' kinship on the audit demand is of great significance to the characteristics of the board of directors and the construction of the audit market. This paper firstly combs the relevant literatures of family business governance and independent audit theory, and based on this, studies the special audit needs of family business, and puts forward some research hypotheses of this paper. This paper selects the A-share listed family firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2011-2015 as the research sample, through the empirical test, from the auditor selection, audit quality and audit cost dimension to study the influence of non-executive directors' kinship on the audit demand. It is found that the non-family non-executive director governance has higher independent audit demand, higher audit quality and lower auditor fees, while the independent audit demand under family non-executive director governance is insufficient, and the audit quality is low. In order to deal with the risks, auditors charge higher audit fees. Further research shows that non-family non-executive directors increase the demand for independent audit under the situation of enhanced family control. Based on this, this paper puts forward some relevant suggestions.
【学位授予单位】：河南财经政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F239.4;F271;F276.5

【参考文献】