家族管理、终极控制与审计师选择
发布时间:2018-04-27 15:00
本文选题:家族企业 + 控制机制 ; 参考:《当代经济科学》2010年02期
【摘要】:基于家族控制的竞争优势与控制权私人收益两种理论基础,本文以2003-2008年的家族上市公司为样本,论文考察了家族公司家族管理、控制机制与外部审计师选择之间的关系。研究发现,相对于以间接方式上市的家族公司,直接上市更有可能选择审计质量较高的"四大";家族管理即实际控制人担任董事长或总经理、家族指定管理层与高管持股比例较高的企业更有动机选择高质量审计,而家族控制机制即金字塔结构、控制权与现金流分离程度对高质量审计的需求有显著的负向影响。进一步研究发现,家族管理对高质量审计师需求的正向作用在直接上市的家族公司中更为显著;家族控制对审计师需求的负向作用仅在控制权比例大于30%的子样本中显著;当家族管理控制人参与家族管理时,会降低两权分离所带来的外部审计师需求的负效应。本文的贡献在于对家族上市公司的管理与控制特征进行了更为细致的分类,并从家族偏好、家族管理与控制机制三方面考察了其外部审计师选择行为。研究增进了对我国家族上市公司的认识,对理解家族上市公司控制手段与管理模式提供了新的视角。
[Abstract]:Based on the competitive advantage of family control and the private income of control, this paper studies the relationship between family management, control mechanism and the choice of external auditor with the sample of family listed companies from 2003 to 2008. The study found that direct listing is more likely to select the "Big four" with higher audit quality than the family companies listed indirectly, and that the family management, that is, the actual controller, is the chairman or general manager of the company. Enterprises with higher proportion of family-appointed management and senior management have more incentive to choose high-quality audit, and family control mechanism is pyramid structure, the degree of separation of control and cash flow has a significant negative impact on the demand for high-quality audit. Further research shows that the positive effect of family management on the demand for high-quality auditors is more significant in the directly listed family companies, and the negative effect of family control on auditor demand is only significant in the subsamples with more than 30% of control rights. When the family management controller participates in the family management, it will reduce the negative effect of the external auditor demand caused by the separation of the two powers. The contribution of this paper lies in a more detailed classification of the management and control characteristics of family-listed companies, and the selection of external auditors from three aspects: family preference, family management and control mechanism. The research improves the understanding of the family listed companies in China and provides a new perspective for understanding the control means and management mode of the family listed companies.
【作者单位】: 对外经济贸易大学国际财务与会计研究中心;对外经济贸易大学国际商学院;
【基金】:国家自然科学基金(70872050,70672060) 教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(06JJD630008) 教育部人文社会科学规划项目(06JA630014) 对外经济贸易大学“211工程”三期重点学科建设项目等资助
【分类号】:F239.4;F276.5;F224
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