盈余管理、事务所客户资源控制权的归属与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

发布时间：2018-04-28 23:03

本文选题：盈余管理 + 审计质量　；参考：《审计研究》2010年01期

【摘要】：与西方市场仅能观察到事务所变更不同的是,中国资本市场还同时提供了审计师变更的佐证。基于此,本文应用新制度经济学中的资产专有理论,从审计师和事务所两个角度,分析了中国证券市场特有的审计师/事务所变更行为,并结合盈余管理和审计意见进一步分析这种行为的原因和后果。文章通过对比签字审计师离开事务所并带走客户的公司与签字审计师离开事务所没有带走客户的公司后,发现在审计师"跳槽"之前,公司的盈余管理越强,越会跟随审计师到新的事务所,表明客户资源的控制权归审计师而非事务所所有。并且,我们还发现,这类公司在审计师变更前的审计质量更差。本文的研究丰富了审计理论的研究手段和现有成果,并对于规范审计师行为和提高审计独立性具有积极的理论价值和现实意义。
[Abstract]:Unlike western markets, where only changes in firms are observed, Chinese capital markets also provide evidence of auditor changes. Based on this, this paper applies the theory of asset proprietary in the new institutional economics to analyze the specific behavior of auditor / firm change in China's securities market from the perspectives of auditor and firm. Combined with earnings management and audit opinion to further analyze the causes and consequences of this behavior. By comparing the companies that the signed auditor left the firm and took the client with the signed auditor and the company that the signed auditor left the firm without taking the client, the author found that the earnings management of the company is stronger before the auditor "changes jobs". The more you follow the auditor to the new firm, the more control of customer resources is owned by the auditor and not by the firm. Moreover, we also found that the quality of auditors before the change of auditors in such companies is worse. The research in this paper enriches the research means and existing achievements of audit theory, and has positive theoretical value and practical significance for standardizing auditor behavior and improving audit independence.
【作者单位】：上海财经大学会计学院;香港理工大学会计及金融学院;上海财经大学会计与财务研究院;远东国际租赁有限公司;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(批准号70802035) 教育部重点研究基地重大课题(批准号07JJD630007) 第四十三批中国博士后科学基金资助项目(批准号20080430649)阶段性研究成果上海财经大学“211”工程三期建设项目的资助
【分类号】：F239.4

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