基于审计师激励效果的审计合谋治理研究

发布时间：2018-05-07 12:36

本文选题：审计合谋治理 + 审计师激励　；参考：《湖南大学》2008年硕士论文

【摘要】： 审计合谋的存在,使审计失败随之而至,同时伴随着会计信息质量低下与审计市场失效,极大伤害了投资者权益,更是破坏了注册会计师行业的良性发展。尽管目前我国采取了有关的审计合谋整治措施,但是,由于对审计师的激励不恰当、不科学、不到位,使审计合谋的治理效果不显著。因此,通过分析如何激励审计师的方式来研究审计合谋的治理,割断审计师与审计业务的紧密经济关系,加强注册会计师行业监管的惩罚手段,是本文提出治理审计合谋的主要思路。而这一问题的讨论是在经济人假设下,以博弈理论、委托代理理论和激励机制为理论基础展开的。首先阐述了审计合谋产生的机理,利用事务所与审计师之间的博弈分析,得出结论:对审计师的奖励不但不能从正面有效抑制审计合谋反而滋生合谋,而对审计师的惩罚可以有效的抑制审计合谋,于是提出了强化对审计师的惩罚以及割断审计师利益与审计收入挂钩的有效建议;其次,利用上述结果进一步构建了在行业监管基础上的一个双方博弈,以探讨对审计师的惩罚区间,通过对监管部门与审计师的收益进行博弈分析,根据委托代理理论建立符合分析要求的模型,并运用此模型获得了使审计师拒绝合谋时的惩罚区间,提出了审计师的惩罚应以经济惩罚为主且在一定的区间时,可以有效抑制审计合谋的出现,并建议以提高行业监管概率与惩罚力度、制定履约财产公证与承诺制、建立履约财产的保障机制等措施来治理审计合谋。
[Abstract]:The existence of audit collusion makes audit failure come along with the low quality of accounting information and the invalidation of audit market, which greatly damages the rights and interests of investors and destroys the benign development of CPA industry. Although our country has adopted the relevant audit collusion rectification measures at present, but because of the inappropriate, unscientific and unsuitable incentive to the auditor, the governance effect of the audit collusion is not remarkable. Therefore, through the analysis of how to motivate auditors to study the governance of audit collusion, cut off the close economic relationship between auditors and audit business, and strengthen the punishment means of CPA industry supervision. It is the main idea of managing audit collusion. The discussion of this problem is based on the theory of game theory, principal-agent theory and incentive mechanism under the hypothesis of economic man. Firstly, this paper expounds the mechanism of audit collusion, and draws a conclusion by using the game analysis between firm and auditor: the reward for auditor not only can not restrain audit collusion effectively, but breed collusion. The punishment of auditors can effectively suppress audit collusion, so it puts forward the effective suggestions of strengthening the punishment of auditors and cutting off the link between auditor interests and audit income. Using the above results, a game based on industry supervision is further constructed to discuss the punishment interval of auditors, and through the game analysis of the income of regulators and auditors, According to the principal-agent theory, this paper establishes a model that meets the requirements of analysis, and obtains the punishment interval of auditors when they refuse to conspire with each other by using this model, and points out that auditors' punishment should be mainly economic and in a certain range. It can effectively restrain the appearance of audit collusion, and suggest that the audit collusion should be governed by improving the supervision probability and punishment, establishing the system of notarization and commitment of performance property, establishing the guarantee mechanism of performance property, and so on.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F239.0;F224.32

【引证文献】