管理舞弊控制与审计质量

发布时间：2018-05-10 04:44

本文选题：管理舞弊 + 管理舞弊控制　；参考：《西南财经大学》2007年博士论文

【摘要】： 众所周知,会计信息是决策的重要依据,会计信息失真带来的经济后果可能是十分严重的,更何况是管理舞弊产生的恶劣影响。然而,自18世纪英国南海公司舞弊案催生独立审计以来,因为管理舞弊的广泛存在,审计师与公司管理层之间一直上演着猫捉老鼠的游戏。所以,管理舞弊控制与审计质量,也就不可避免地成为了具有历史性和长久性的研究课题。财务报表是由管理层负责编制的,即使由注册会计师依据一般公认审计准则进行了审计,财务报表所揭露的信息终究是财务性、历史性的,公开时点远远落在企业经济行为之后。尽管如此,注册会计师审计仍然被视为公司管理舞弊控制的重要防线。在管理舞弊控制方面,审计师有自己的职业优势,也存在着职业劣势。审计师管理舞弊控制的理论基础是什么?从理论上讲,高质量审计应该能够在管理舞弊控制方面有着良好表现,控制管理舞弊应该能够提高审计质量,能否以实证研究的方式为理论提供数据支持呢? 本文共分七章。第一章,绪论。主要对本文的研究背景、研究问题和研究方法进行说明。第二章,管理舞弊控制与审计质量概述。首先,本章回顾了舞弊诉讼对审计准则、审计程序、审计信息披露、舞弊审计责任等产生的重大影响。舞弊诉讼判例反映出一种日渐明显的趋势,即加大了审计师揭示管理舞弊的法律责任。审计职业界为了适应法律环境的变化,为了更好地提高服务水准,不得不修改既有的审计规范或更新过时的审计理念,从而提高了揭示管理舞弊的审计能力,也缩小了与社会公众的审计期望差距,提高了审计执业质量。其次,本章结合所要研究的问题进行了相关文献回顾,文献回顾对管理舞弊的界定、研究样本的选择和研究内容的安排带来了启示。第三章,管理舞弊控制与审计质量研究的理论基础。蔡春教授(1991,2002)提出的受托经济责任观和审计控制观指出,审计是一种以确保受托经济责任之全面有效履行为目标的特殊的经济控制行为。以此为理论基础,本章论述了受托经济责任是联系管理舞弊控制与审计质量的纽带,控制管理舞弊是社会公众对高质量审计的期望,也是提高审计质量的前提。美国著名的特雷德韦委员会(Treadway Commission)将注册会计师审计作为公司舞弊控制的四道防线之一。管理舞弊控制方面,审计师有自己的职业优势,也存在着职业劣势。本章指出,尽管审计师的“追求个人私利的理性经济人”身份为其超然独立带来了先天性阻力,但正当怀疑理念、应有关注理念、舞弊推定原则,以及审计判断和审计分析技术等审计学基本理念与技术,仍然可以为审计师侦查舞弊发挥指导作用。第四章,研究设计。本章奠定了本文后续实证研究的样本基础。首先,政府监管与管理舞弊样本的选择。以国泰安“CSMAR违规处理数据库”中被公告违规的公司作为研究管理舞弊的样本来源,通过逐步筛选得到了198个管理舞弊样本:(1)因为实证研究中运用到了现金流量数据,违规样本的选择时间始于1998年;(2)因为研究中运用到的审计意见数据是针对上市公司年度会计报表的,所以选择涉及年报的违规样本,而将涉及中报、季报、临时公告、招股说明书、上市公告、配股增发说明书的违规样本剔除。其次,会计报表舞弊识别与管理舞弊风险样本的选择。会计报表舞弊识别指标的选择按如下顺序进行:(1)为管理舞弊样本查找配对样本,配对样本从同一行业、同一年度、资产最接近、而且没有被报道过舞弊事件的非丑闻公司中查找;(2)通过管理舞弊样本组与配对样本组财务指标的非参数检验,得到两组之间存在显著性差异的三个财务指标;(3)以这三个财务指标作为解释变量进行回归分析,发现其中的“关联交易度”是影响管理舞弊(被解释变量)的最显著的财务指标。以关联交易度为会计报表舞弊识别指标,得到198个因关联交易过度而可能存在管理舞弊风险的样本。最后,以修正的琼斯模型(Modified Jones Model)计量盈余管理程度,得到198个因盈余管理过度而可能存在管理舞弊风险的样本。由此,得到本文后续实证研究的594个管理舞弊(风险)样本。第五章,高质量审计与管理舞弊控制关系的实证检验。首先,审计意见与管理舞弊相关性的实证检验表明,尽管中外媒体披露了大量的审计师针对舞弊报表的审计失败案例,使得社会公众对审计师在经济社会中应有的作用产生了怀疑,并对审计师揭露管理舞弊的能力产生了疑问,但从总体上来讲,审计师能够对舞弊报表谨慎选择审计意见,能够以出具非标审计意见的方式对管理舞弊说“不”。其次,以中国审计市场上的“九大”和国际五大作为高质量审计的替代变量,检验高质量审计在管理舞弊控制方面的表现,实证结果表明,2001-2003中国审计市场上的“九大”在管理舞弊控制方面有着良好表现,但在管理舞弊风险控制方面没有良好的表现。2001-2005中国审计市场上的国际五大则在管理舞弊控制和管理舞弊风险控制方面均没有良好表现。本章的实证结论与相关学者的研究结论都表明,如果不改善中国内地独立审计制度安排,理论上的“高质量审计”在中国内地是难以发挥其高质量审计功能的。第六章,管理舞弊控制与审计质量相关性的实证检验。本章以审计师对会计稳健性(conservatism)的审计意见反应和操控性应计利润(Discretionary Accruals, DA)作为审计质量的替代变量,分别进行了管理舞弊控制与会计稳健性的实证检验和管理舞弊控制与操控性应计利润的实证检验。管理舞弊控制与会计稳健性的实证检验结论说明,从整体上讲审计师识别了存在管理舞弊的上市公司之间的会计稳健性差异。这为会计信息使用者推测上市公司的会计稳健性提供了一个新的视角。管理舞弊控制与操控性应计利润的实证检验结论表明,审计师控制管理舞弊和管理舞弊风险,降低了客户公司报告盈余中的“操控”成份,控制管理舞弊和管理舞弊风险提高了客户公司的盈余质量。第七章,结论、局限性与后续研究建议。本章主要归纳了本文的主要结论,并指出了研究的局限性,同时提出了进行后续研究的建议。笔者在既有研究的基础上进行了一定的尝试和努力,论文可能的改进与创新如下: 第一,本文不但遵照研究惯例从政府监管角度选择违规公司作为管理舞弊样本,还通过会计报表舞弊识别与盈余管理计量选择了可能存在管理舞弊风险的样本,扩大了管理舞弊研究的范围。第二,本文引入管理舞弊(风险)控制变量修正了Ball and Shivakumar(2005)的分段线性回归模型(piecewise-linear regression model),并对其进行了实证研究。实证检验结论说明,从整体上讲,审计师具备识别存在管理舞弊上市公司之间的会计稳健性差异的能力。这为会计信息使用者推测上市公司的会计稳健性提供了一个新的视角。第三,本文以操控性应计利润(DA)作为审计质量的替代变量进行了非参数检验。结果表明,控制了管理舞弊(风险)样本组的操控性应计利润低于没有控制管理舞弊(风险)样本组的操控性应计利润,说明上市公司的报告盈余是管理当局与审计师共同作用的结果;审计师控制管理舞弊(风险),有助于降低客户公司报告盈余中的“操控”成份,为控制管理舞弊(风险)有助于提高盈余质量,进而提高审计质量,提供了有力的数据支持。
[Abstract]:It is well - known that accounting information is an important basis for decision - making , and the economic consequences of accounting information distortion may be very serious , and worse , it is the bad influence of management fraud . However , since the fraud of the South China Sea Corporation in the 18th century has prompted the independent audit , since the management of fraud is widespread , the auditors and the management of the company have been playing cat - and - mouse games . Therefore , management of fraud control and audit quality inevitably becomes a historic and long - term research topic .

The financial statements are prepared by management , even when audited by certified public accountants on the basis of generally accepted auditing standards , the information disclosed in the financial statements is financial , historical and public , and falls far behind the economic behavior of the enterprise . However , the CPA audit is still regarded as an important defensive line of the company ' s management fraud control . In the management of fraud control , the auditor has its own professional advantage and has a professional disadvantage .

This article is divided into seven chapters .

Chapter One , Introduction . The research background , research problems and research methods are mainly described in this paper .

Chapter 2 , management fraud control and audit quality overview . First , this chapter reviews the major influence of fraud litigation on auditing standards , audit procedures , audit information disclosure , fraud auditing responsibilities , etc . The case of fraud litigation reflects a growing trend , that is , increases auditors ' legal liability for managing fraud . In order to improve the auditing ability of management fraud , the audit profession has to modify the existing auditing standards or to update outdated auditing concepts , thus improving auditing practice quality . Secondly , this chapter reviews the definition of management fraud , and studies the choice of sample and the arrangement of research contents .

In chapter 3 , the theory basis of management fraud control and audit quality research is discussed . It is pointed out that auditing is a kind of special economic control behavior to ensure the comprehensive and effective performance of entrusted economic responsibility .

In chapter four , the paper establishes a sample basis for the follow - up empirical research in this chapter . First of all , there are 198 sample sources of fraud in government supervision and management .

Chapter five , the empirical test of the relationship between audit opinion and management fraud control shows that , although the Chinese and foreign media have disclosed a large number of auditors ' audit failure cases for fraud report , the auditor can choose the audit opinion in the way of management fraud control , but it has no good performance in management of fraud control .

Chapter 6 : An empirical test of the correlation between fraud control and auditing quality . An empirical test of management fraud control and accounting robustness is provided .

Chapter 7 , conclusions , limitations and follow - up suggestions . This chapter summarizes the main conclusions of this paper and points out the limitations of the research , and puts forward some suggestions for the follow - up study . The author has made some attempts and efforts on the basis of the existing research , and the possible improvement and innovation of the paper are as follows :

Firstly , according to the research practice , the paper selects the non - compliance company from the perspective of government supervision as the management fraud sample , and also selects the sample which can manage the fraud risk through the accounting statement fraud identification and earnings management measurement , and expands the scope of the management fraud research .

Secondly , the author introduces the piecewise linear regression model of Ball and Shivour mar ( 2005 ) by introducing the control variable of management fraud ( risk ) , and makes an empirical study on it . The result shows that the auditor has the ability to identify the accounting robustness difference between listed companies . This provides a new perspective for the users of accounting information to speculate the accounting robustness of listed companies .

Third , this paper makes a non - parametric test on the basis of the profit ( DA ) as an alternative to the quality of audit . The results show that the profit of the control of the sample set is lower than that of the sample group without control management fraud ( risk ) . It is shown that the report earnings of the listed company are the result of the common action between the management authority and the auditor ; the auditor controls the management of fraud ( risk ) , helps to reduce the " manipulation " component of the report surplus of the client company , helps to improve the earnings quality for the control management fraud ( risk ) , and further improves the quality of the audit and provides strong data support .

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：F239.2;F233

【引证文献】