基于审计契约安排的独立性互动机制研究

发布时间：2018-05-15 23:32

本文选题：审计契约 + 独立性　；参考：《暨南大学》2008年博士论文

【摘要】： 本研究主要从审计契约的本质和结构、非正式契约的执行机制、市场力量以及政府角色四个层次提出核心观点:独立性反映了审计者在不同力量制衡下的利益倾向性,审计的契约安排为独立性提供了制度保障,声誉机制和独立性的互动效应蕴含着审计制度的生机。以此为基础,构建了一个以审计者为中心、基于审计契约安排的独立性互动分析框架。从本质上看,契约的不完备性引发了对审计的需求,而利益主体在人格化上的分化则使得外部审计契约采用了正式契约和非正式契约两种形式。正式契约影响着审计者的即时经济收益,决定了审计者不可能超然独立于特定的相对人;非正式契约影响着审计者的未来经济收益,它为审计者的独立性在制度安排上提供了一种救济。审计契约的本质就是不同利益主体对利益协调机制进行集体选择的结果,利益主体的力量对比必然会通过审计契约规定的秩序影响到审计结果,审计者的独立性就反映了他在各方利益主体力量制衡下的利益倾向性。声誉是非正式契约的自履行机制,也是审计者独立性的重要保障。从表面上看,审计者的即时经济利益来源于他与特定相对人的正式契约规定,实际上则是来源于他所承诺的独立性;同样,审计者的未来经济利益表面上来源于他与不特定相对人之间的非正式契约安排,实际上则是来源于他实质上的独立性。独立性带来的声誉能为审计者带来即时的经济回报;良好声誉带来的持续收益,也促使审计者不仅有对他的独立性作出承诺的激励,而且还有保持实质上独立性的激励。由此形成了审计者声誉与独立性相互作用的互动机制。市场力量在这种互动机制中的作用方式就是通过声誉机制来约束审计者的行为、提高独立性,帮助利益主体通过契约安排来选择审计者、提高交易效率;一个良好的声誉机制包括信誉体系和司法救济两个方面,政府的作用就是推动信誉体系的建设和提供完善的司法救济,使得个人从中获取的收益大于他们付出的成本,从而建立起一个稳定的秩序构架。根据理论分析的结论,本研究构建了独立性和声誉互动的递归分析模型和审计者声誉的市场反应模型,利用非线性混合方程法和混合线性方程法,从不同的方面得到了以下相似的结论: (1)审计者的独立性受到来自包括上市公司、中小股东和市场力量等外界各方压力的系统性影响,只要契约各方的力量对比发生了变化,独立性就会改变。这就是审计者与上市公司之间的关系表现出强势、弱势和势均力敌三种形态,并且时时变化的原因。由此证明:独立性就是审计者利益倾向的状态。 (2)声誉机制对独立性的促进作用在实证结果中得到了证实,优质客户有优质审计的需求。不仅是审计者在选择客户,客户也在选择审计者,这就形成了审计者保持高质量和高独立性的一种动力。但是这种需求在不同的客户中表现出差异。虽然独立性对声誉的作用被证明是积极性的,但是在当前的制度背景下,它没有能够发挥显著的影响。原因是声誉的传递渠道是不畅通的,投资者没有接收到关于审计者声誉变化的确切信息,这些信息也就不足以改变他们的投资预期。统计结果显示出投资者更认同国际四大的品牌,信赖它们的审计质量。投资者更直接感触到的不是审计者声誉的改变,而是审计者长期累积的声誉——品牌。 (3)本研究也证实了非标准审计意见的信息含量,这至少说明了投资市场仍然对审计质量存在期望。优质客户需要优质审计的部分原因就是因为非标准审计意见会带来异常回报的经济后果,而且优质客户优质审计的组合在市场上确实被观察到获得了更高的市场回报。但是,有关证据并不支持将这一结论推广到所有的审计意见类型。 (4)市场力量的作用表现为信息披露的程度。市场发育程度越高,越有利于审计者声誉的累积;政府的干预程度越小、与市场的协调性越好,它的监管作用就越能取得良好的效果;法制的约束力加大了审计者的风险意识,使他们不仅要挑选客户,同时也要被客户挑选。中国证监会的意见在投资者心目中是非常有威信的,处罚公告除了引起投资者的强烈反应之外,还使得被处罚公司的个股回报显著地低于市场平均水平。但是由于监管机构对上市公司和审计者的指责存在不及时和披露不充分的现象,因此没有能够对审计者的声誉造成显著影响,再次说明了声誉形成的信息传递渠道不畅通。
[Abstract]:This study is mainly from the essence and structure of audit contract, the implementation mechanism of informal contract, market force and the four levels of government role. Independence reflects the interest tendency of the auditor under the balance of different forces. The audit contract arrangement provides the system guarantee for independence, the interaction of reputation mechanism and independence. The effect implies the vitality of audit system. On this basis, an independent interaction analysis framework based on auditors and based on audit contract arrangement is constructed.
In essence, the incompleteness of the contract causes the demand for the audit, and the differentiation of the personalization of the stakeholders makes the external audit contract adopt two forms of formal contract and informal contract. The formal contract affects the immediate economic income of the auditor, and determines that the auditor can not be detached from the specific relative person; The formal contract affects the future economic income of the auditor. It provides a relief for the auditor's independence in the system arrangement. The essence of the audit contract is the result of the collective choice of the interests coordination mechanism by the different stakeholders. The strength contrast of the stakeholders will inevitably affect the audit through the order stipulated in the audit contract. As a result, auditor independence reflects his interest tendency under the balance of interests of all parties.
Reputation is the self performance mechanism of informal contract and an important guarantee for the independence of auditors. On the surface, the immediate economic benefit of the auditor derives from the formal contract between him and the specific person. In fact, the independence of the auditor is derived from his commitment; also, the future economic interests of the auditor originate from him and not on the surface. The informal contract arrangement between the relative persons, in fact, is derived from his substantive independence. The reputation of independence brings immediate economic returns to the auditor; the continuing benefits of a good reputation also encourage the auditor not only to make a commitment to his independence, but also to maintain its substantive independence. Incentive. Thus, the interaction mechanism of auditor reputation and independence is formed. The role of market forces in this interactive mechanism is to restrict auditors' behavior through reputation mechanism, improve independence, help the stakeholders to choose auditors through contractual arrangements, and improve transaction efficiency; a good reputation mechanism. Including two aspects of credit system and judicial relief, the role of the government is to promote the construction of the credit system and provide perfect judicial relief, which makes the individual gain more than the cost they pay, thus establishing a stable framework of order.
According to the conclusion of the theoretical analysis, this study constructs the recursive analysis model of independence and reputation interaction and the market reaction model of the auditor's reputation. By using the nonlinear mixed equation method and the mixed linear equation method, the following conclusions are obtained from different aspects.
(1) the independence of the auditor is influenced by the pressure of the outside parties, including the listed companies, the small shareholders and the market forces. As long as the strength of the parties in the contract changes, the independence will change. This is the strong, weak and equal three forms of the relations between the auditors and the listed companies. The reasons for this change are: independence is the state of interest tendency of auditors.
(2) the promotion of reputation mechanism to independence has been confirmed in the empirical results. High quality customers have the demand of high quality audit. Not only is the auditor choosing the customer, but also the customer is choosing the auditor. This has formed a driving force for the auditor to maintain high quality and high independence. However, this demand shows differences among different customers. Although the role of independence on reputation is proved to be positive, it has not been able to play a significant role in the current institutional context. The reason is that the channels of reputation transfer are unimpeded, and investors have not received the exact information about the changes in the reputation of the auditors, and this information is not enough to change their investment expectations. The results show that investors are more likely to identify with the four largest brands in the world and rely on their audit quality. Investors are more directly affected than the changes in the auditor's reputation, but the reputation of the auditors for a long time - the brand.
(3) this study also confirms the information content of non standard audit opinion, which at least indicates that the investment market still has the expectation of audit quality. The reason for high quality audit is partly because of the economic consequences of abnormal returns, and the combination of high quality audit of high quality customers is true in the market. A higher market return was observed. However, the evidence does not support this conclusion to all audit opinion types.
(4) the role of market force is shown as the degree of information disclosure. The higher the market development, the more beneficial to the buildup of auditors' reputation; the smaller the level of the government's intervention, the better the coordination with the market, the better the effect of its regulatory role; the binding force of the legal system increases the risk awareness of the auditors and makes them not only selected. The comments of the CSRC are very prestigious in the minds of the investors, and the penalty announcement, in addition to the strong reaction of the investors, also makes the shares of the penalized company significantly lower than the market average. But because the regulators' accusations to the listed companies and auditors are not. The lack of timely and inadequate disclosure has not significantly affected auditors' reputation, which once again shows that the information transmission channel of reputation formation is not smooth.

【学位授予单位】：暨南大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F239.4;F224

【引证文献】