政府审计监督能抑制盈余管理吗——基于央企控股上市公司的经验数据

发布时间：2018-05-19 07:20

本文选题：政府审计 + 应计盈余管理　；参考：《会计之友》2017年01期

【摘要】：文章基于审计署公布的中央企业集团年度财务收支审计结果公告,以2010—2014年央企控股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了政府审计监督对央企控股上市公司盈余管理行为的作用。研究结果表明,政府审计监督能够抑制央企控股上市公司的真实盈余管理行为,但这种监督作用并不对公司的应计盈余管理行为产生影响。政府审计在发挥其监督职能的过程中存在一定的滞后性,研究发现这种抑制效果将会持续到政府审计公告年度。
[Abstract]:Based on the announcement of the audit results of the annual financial revenue and expenditure of the central enterprise group published by the Audit Office, this paper takes the state-owned enterprises holding listed companies as the research objects from 2010 to 2014. The effect of government audit supervision on earnings management behavior of listed companies controlled by central enterprises is tested empirically. The research results show that the government audit supervision can restrain the real earnings management behavior of the listed companies controlled by central enterprises, but this kind of supervision has no effect on the accrual earnings management behavior of the companies. There is a lag in the process of government audit in performing its supervisory function. The research finds that the restraining effect will last until the public announcement year of government audit.
【作者单位】：郑州航空工业管理学院;
【基金】：2017年度河南省科技厅软科学研究计划(一般项目)“国家审计推进国家治理体系和治理效率的功能及作用机制研究”
【分类号】：F239.44;F276.1

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