基于利益关系人博弈的国家审计体制选择

发布时间：2018-06-14 17:18

本文选题：利益关系人 + 博弈　；参考：《湖南大学》2008年硕士论文

【摘要】： 目前我国审计体制属于行政型审计体制,围绕着现阶段审计体制,学术界展开了激烈的讨论,主要有“立法论”,“升格论”,“垂直论”,“独立论”和“双轨制”等几种观点。本文基于国家审计中存在的多重委托代理关系,从受托责任理论的角度得出选择国家审计体制的标准为国家公民利益的最大化。由于国家公民利益难以衡量,我们用政府受托经营管理者违规的概率大小来衡量。在委托代理理论、公共选择理论、制度变迁理论的指引下,运用博弈论,分析了国家审计中涉及的各方利益关系人的博弈,在此基础上重点分析了影响审计体制选择的两个利益关系人在行政型审计体制和立法型体制下的博弈,即审计机关和政府受托经营管理者之间的博弈。通过两种体制的关系人博弈,结合我国特殊的背景比较两者的效果得出,现阶段立法型审计体制并不一定比行政型审计体制更能保障国家公民的利益,通过提高审计报告的概率、加大对审计机关的激励收益、提升审计组织和审计人员的地位,降低政府受托经营管理者影响审计人员的能力,即降低审计人员合谋的概率,行政型审计体制下政府受托经营管理者的违规概率将小于现阶段变革的立法型审计体制。行政型审计体制目前仍然是我国审计体制的最优选择,但随着国家公民民主意识的提高,立法模式下政府受托经营管理者的违规概率将显著小于行政型审计模式,我国审计体制最终应向立法模式转变。
[Abstract]:At present, the audit system of our country belongs to the administrative audit system. The academic circles have launched intense discussions around the current audit system, including "legislation theory", "upgrade theory", "vertical theory", etc. Several viewpoints, such as "independence theory" and "dual track system", etc. Based on the multi-principal-agent relationship in the state audit, this paper concludes that the criterion of choosing the national audit system is the maximization of the national citizen's interests from the perspective of the fiduciary responsibility theory. Because the national civil interest is difficult to measure, we measure it by the probability that the government's fiduciary managers violate the rules. Under the guidance of principal-agent theory, public choice theory and institutional change theory, the game theory is used to analyze the game of the stakeholders involved in the state audit. On this basis, the paper analyzes the game between the two stakeholders who influence the choice of audit system under the administrative audit system and the legislative system, that is, the game between the audit institution and the government entrusted management manager. Through the game between the two systems and the special background of our country, it is concluded that the current legislative audit system is not necessarily better than the administrative audit system to protect the interests of national citizens. By increasing the probability of audit reports, increasing the incentive income to audit institutions, improving the status of audit organizations and auditors, reducing the ability of government entrusted managers to influence auditors, that is, reducing the probability of auditors colluding. Under the administrative audit system, the probability of violation by the government entrusted managers will be less than that of the legislative audit system. At present, the administrative audit system is still the best choice of our country's audit system, but with the improvement of national citizen's democratic consciousness, the probability of violation of regulations of the government entrusted management manager under the legislative mode will be significantly smaller than that of the administrative audit mode. The audit system of our country should change to the legislative mode.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F239.4;F224.32

【引证文献】