基于三方博弈的我国民间审计独立性缺失问题研究

发布时间：2018-06-18 23:56

本文选题：民间审计 + 审计独立性　；参考：《哈尔滨工程大学》2008年硕士论文

【摘要】： 审计的产生源于所有权与经营权的分离,这种所有权与经营权的分离导致了所有者与经营者之间信息的不对称,为了减少这种信息的不对称,企业的所有者开始聘请注册会计师对经营者受托责任的履行情况进行监督和检查。因此,注册会计师应该以独立的第三方身份对经营者的经营业绩进行评价,客观公正的发表审计意见。然而,在我国审计市场上,由于真正的审计委托人缺位,企业的经营者成了实际的委托人,形成了经营者自己雇人审计自己的局面。因此,近些年来,审计合谋现象不断发生,审计独立性受到了严重的损害,引起了社会大众的广泛关注,人们开始对注册会计师行业产生怀疑。独立性是审计的灵魂,没有独立性,审计就没有存在的价值,它是注册会计师职业赖以生存和发展的根本。因此,注册会计师职业要想健康长足的发展下去,必须首先解决审计独立性缺失的问题。鉴于此,本文选择了一个新的视角——博弈,对我国民间审计独立性缺失问题进行了探讨。首先,在对我国民间审计现状分析的基础上,建立了经营者、注册会计师和监管机构三者之间博弈的模型,并对该模型进行了定性分析,同时还通过案例对模型进行了检验。通过分析得出了各变量的变化对审计独立性的影响,其中有些变量的变化对审计独立性的影响是直接的,有些变量的变化对审计独立性的影响是间接的,而有些变量的变化对审计独立性有着直接和间接双重的影响,从而对各变量的变化对审计独立性的影响程度有了更深一步的了解。其次,通过对模型的分析与检验,并结合我国民间审计的现状,从直接和间接两方面对我国民间审计独立性缺失的原因进行了剖析。最后,针对我国民间审计独立性缺失的原因,并根据对模型的分析结果,提出了相应的提高我国民间审计独立性的对策。
[Abstract]:The origin of audit is the separation of ownership and right of management. The separation of ownership and management leads to the asymmetry of information between owners and operators. In order to reduce the asymmetry of this information, the owner of the enterprise began to employ CPA to supervise and inspect the performance of the manager's trustee. As an independent third party, the accountant should evaluate the operating performance of the operator and publish the audit opinion objectively and impartially. However, in China's audit market, because of the absence of the real auditor, the business operator has become a practical client, forming a situation for the operators to hire themselves to audit their own situation. Therefore, in recent years, The phenomenon of audit collusion continues to occur, and the independence of audit has been seriously damaged, which has aroused widespread concern of the public, and people have begun to doubt the industry of certified public accountants.
Independence is the soul of audit. Without independence, audit has no value. It is the basis for the existence and development of certified public accountants. Therefore, in order to develop the certified public accountants healthfully and rapidly, the problem of audit independence must be solved first. In view of this, this paper chooses a new perspective - game. The problem of the lack of independence of civil audit in China is discussed. First, on the basis of the analysis of the current situation of civil audit in China, the model of game between the operators, the CPA and the three regulators is established, and the qualitative analysis of the model is carried out. At the same time, the model has been tested through the case. The change of variables affects the independence of audit, some of which have a direct influence on the independence of audit, and the change of some variables is indirect, while the change of some variables has a direct and indirect effect on the independence of audit, and the change of the variables to the independence of the audit. The influence degree has a deeper understanding. Secondly, through the analysis and inspection of the model and the current situation of the civil audit in China, the reasons for the lack of the independence of the civil audit in China are analyzed from two aspects directly and indirectly. Finally, the reasons for the lack of the independence of the civil audit in China, and the results of the analysis of the model are proposed. The corresponding countermeasures to improve the independence of China's folk audit are put forward.
【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨工程大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F239.4;F224.32

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