基于博弈视角的国家审计风险分析

发布时间：2018-06-19 18:32

本文选题：国家审计风险 + 信息不对称　；参考：《审计研究》2015年06期

【摘要】：国家审计是受托经营管理者、审计人员、审计机关和审计委托方四方博弈的过程,其间审计风险的产生根源就是信息不对称。本文以信息不对称为基础,通过构建这四个局中人的多阶段动态博弈模型,分析了国家审计各参与方的行为选择和影响因素,及各决策策略对应的收益成本。在此基础上建立了博弈决策树,进而计算分析了受托经营管理者采取合规经营、审计人员采取合规审计、审计机关实施高质量管理、审计委托方实施高质量监督的博弈策略条件,以及影响策略选择的关键因素。根据博弈结果分析,提出了提高国家审计质量、控制审计风险的主要措施:加大对受托经营管理者违规的惩罚力度,强化对审计人员的监督考核,改进审计方式方法,加强审计信息的公开和监督等。
[Abstract]:State audit is the process of four-party game among entrusted managers, auditors, audit institutions and audit principals, in which the source of audit risk is asymmetric information. On the basis of asymmetric information, this paper constructs a multi-stage dynamic game model of the participants in the four bureaus, and analyzes the behavioral choices and influencing factors of each participant in the national audit, and the corresponding profit and cost of each decision-making strategy. On this basis, the game decision tree is established, and then the compliance management of entrusted managers, the compliance audit of auditors and the high quality management of audit institutions are calculated and analyzed. The game strategy conditions and the key factors that influence the choice of the audit entrustment implement high-quality supervision. According to the analysis of the game result, the paper puts forward the main measures to improve the quality of national audit and control the audit risk: to increase the punishment of the fiduciary managers, to strengthen the supervision and assessment of the auditors, and to improve the auditing methods and methods. Strengthen the disclosure and supervision of audit information.
【作者单位】：天津大学管理与经济学部;审计署企业审计司;
【分类号】：F239.44

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