公司治理强度、审计力度与审计质量

发布时间：2018-06-28 00:45

本文选题：公司治理强度 + 审计力度　；参考：《南开管理评论》2009年02期

【摘要】：自安然事件以来,公司治理和外部审计的重要性得到了前所未有的重视。本文构建了一个公司所有者与外部审计师之间的博弈理论模型,以分析均衡状态下公司治理强度、审计力度与审计质量之间的关系,并讨论所有者和审计师赔偿责任对博弈均衡的影响。我们特别引入了公司治理成本函数和审计成本函数,并同时考虑了公司所有者和审计师的赔偿责任。在本模型中,公司所有者对公司治理强度的决策和外部审计师对审计力度的决策共同影响审计报告对外部投资者的信息有用性(即审计质量),并最终影响了公司的成交价格。研究得到的主要结论是:(1)均衡状态下公司治理强度的增加有助于提升审计力度和审计质量;(2)所有者赔偿责任的增加只会提高公司成交价格,但不会影响博弈均衡和均衡状态下的审计质量;(3)审计师赔偿责任的增加并不一定导致所有者降低公司治理强度,且只有在特定情况下才能提升审计力度和审计质量。
[Abstract]:Since the Enron incident, the importance of corporate governance and external audit has received unprecedented attention. In this paper, a game theory model between the owner and external auditor is constructed to analyze the relationship between corporate governance intensity, audit intensity and audit quality under equilibrium. The influence of the liability of owner and auditor on game equilibrium is also discussed. In particular, we introduce the corporate governance cost function and audit cost function, and consider the liability of the owner and auditor at the same time. In this model, the corporate owner's decision on the corporate governance intensity and the external auditor's decision on the audit intensity jointly affect the information usefulness (i.e. audit quality) of the audit report to the external investors, and ultimately affect the transaction price of the company. The main conclusions of the study are as follows: (1) the increase of corporate governance intensity in equilibrium state will help to improve the audit strength and audit quality; (2) the increase of owner's liability will only increase the transaction price of the company. But it will not affect the audit quality under game equilibrium and equilibrium; (3) the increase of auditor liability does not necessarily lead the owner to reduce the corporate governance intensity, and only under certain circumstances can the audit strength and audit quality be improved.
【作者单位】：西安交通大学管理学院;
【基金】：教育部博士点基金项目(20070698047)资助
【分类号】：F272;F239.4;F224

【参考文献】