利用审计师“囚徒困境”阻止合谋的博弈分析
发布时间：2018-08-03 08:24
【摘要】：本文提出一种新的阻止合谋的策略,即同时派出两个审计师审计,让他们陷入"囚徒困境",以保证其提交的审计报告真实,却发现这一策略由于成本过高而无法实行。所以笔者分析能否以一定概率派出第二个审计师—这一低成本方式,来阻止审计合谋。研究表明:以ξ∈(0,1)的概率派出第二个审计师、强化刚性法律的"硬约束"和完善审计师的激励机制,可以阻止审计合谋。同时还得出,审计师的道德约束、风险厌恶有助于防止审计合谋,国有企业监管者在阻止审计合谋中,可以发挥同企业真实所有者一样的作用。这为国资局对国有企业实行审计公开招标和抽查复审提供了理论支持。
[Abstract]:In this paper, a new strategy to prevent collusion is proposed, in which two auditors are sent to audit at the same time to make them fall into "prisoner's dilemma" to ensure that the audit report submitted by them is true. However, it is found that this strategy cannot be carried out because of the high cost. Therefore, the author analyzes whether the second auditor can be sent with a certain probability-a low-cost way to prevent audit collusion. The study shows that the second auditor can be sent out with the probability of 尉 鈭，
本文编号：2161168
[Abstract]:In this paper, a new strategy to prevent collusion is proposed, in which two auditors are sent to audit at the same time to make them fall into "prisoner's dilemma" to ensure that the audit report submitted by them is true. However, it is found that this strategy cannot be carried out because of the high cost. Therefore, the author analyzes whether the second auditor can be sent with a certain probability-a low-cost way to prevent audit collusion. The study shows that the second auditor can be sent out with the probability of 尉 鈭，
本文编号：2161168
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