不同动机盈余管理与审计意见
发布时间：2018-08-17 11:02
【摘要】：作为公司盈余调节的经常性行为,盈余管理一直颇受学术界的关注,相关研究领域的文章也是百花齐放。纵观国内外盈余管理的相关文献,可以发现如今涉及盈余管理的课题大都偏向对机会主义主义动机的研究,却极少将注意力放在可能会有助于企业发展的其他盈余管理动机上。管理者会为了向市场传递公司利好的消息而运用盈余管理手段来美化公司的经营业绩,当然在这个过程中,少不了管理层自利行为性质的盈余管理。那么,管理层以自身利益放在第一位,进而可能给公司及利益相关方造成损失的机会主义盈余管理,以及与企业价值最大化目标一致的非机会主义盈余管理,对审计意见是否存在差异化影响呢?考虑到涉及盈余管理的两种动机分类的文献并未深入研究两种动机的区分,因此本文在探究不同动机盈余管理与审计意见关系之前,首先引入了企业价值这一变量对两种动机的盈余管理进行分析对比。管理者可以基于自利动机(投机主义)投机操纵应计项目,以实现自身利益,自利行为下的盈余管理的程度越强,企业价值越小,是一种“坏”的盈余管理动机。盈余管理对企业价值的影响,也可以通过应计项目向市场传递企业信息来实现,在这种“好”的盈余管理动机下,盈余管理的程度越强,企业价值越大。伴随着相关审计法律法规的完善及资本市场的发展,对审计师的要求愈发严格,风险导向型审计促使审计师更加关注执业过程中的各种风险,对盈余管理活动愈加关注。盈余管理与审计意见的关系是学术界较为常见的研究课题,然而对于二者之间的关系,至今也没有较为准确的结论。本文从机会主义和非机会主义两种不同动机盈余管理出发,分别探究其与审计意见的相关性,实证研究结果表明:机会主义动机的盈余管理更容易被出具非标准审计报告,而另一方面,审计意见的出具与非机会主义动机盈余管理之间并不存在显著的相关性。
[Abstract]:As a regular behavior of earnings regulation, earnings management has been paid much attention by academic circles. Looking at the relevant literature of earnings management at home and abroad, we can find that most of the topics involved in earnings management nowadays tend to focus on opportunistic motivation, but very little attention is paid to other earnings management motives that may be helpful to the development of enterprises. In order to convey the good news to the market, managers will use earnings management to beautify the business performance of the company, of course, in this process, the management of self-interest behavior of earnings management. Then, the management takes the self-interest as the first, and then the opportunistic earnings management, which may cause losses to the company and its stakeholders, and the non-opportunistic earnings management, which is consistent with the goal of maximizing the value of the enterprise. Is there any difference in the audit opinion? In view of the fact that the literature on the classification of the two motivations involved in earnings management has not thoroughly studied the distinction between the two motivations, this paper explores the relationship between earnings management with different motivations and the audit opinion. Firstly, this paper introduces the variable of enterprise value to analyze and compare the earnings management of two kinds of motivation. Managers can manipulate accrual items on the basis of self-profit motive (opportunism) in order to realize their own interests. The stronger the degree of earnings management under self-interest behavior, the smaller the enterprise value is, which is a "bad" earnings management motivation. The influence of earnings management on enterprise value can also be realized by transferring enterprise information to the market by accrual items. Under this kind of "good" earnings management motivation, the stronger the degree of earnings management is, the greater the enterprise value is. With the improvement of relevant audit laws and regulations and the development of the capital market, the requirements of auditors become more stringent. Risk-oriented audit urges auditors to pay more attention to various risks in the practice process, and pay more attention to earnings management activities. The relationship between earnings management and audit opinion is a common research topic in academic circles. However, there is no more accurate conclusion on the relationship between them. Starting from two different motivational earnings management of opportunism and non-opportunism, this paper probes into the correlation between earnings management and audit opinions. The empirical results show that earnings management with opportunistic motivation is more likely to be issued a non-standard audit report. On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between audit opinion and non-opportunistic motivation earnings management.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F239.4
本文编号：2187397
[Abstract]:As a regular behavior of earnings regulation, earnings management has been paid much attention by academic circles. Looking at the relevant literature of earnings management at home and abroad, we can find that most of the topics involved in earnings management nowadays tend to focus on opportunistic motivation, but very little attention is paid to other earnings management motives that may be helpful to the development of enterprises. In order to convey the good news to the market, managers will use earnings management to beautify the business performance of the company, of course, in this process, the management of self-interest behavior of earnings management. Then, the management takes the self-interest as the first, and then the opportunistic earnings management, which may cause losses to the company and its stakeholders, and the non-opportunistic earnings management, which is consistent with the goal of maximizing the value of the enterprise. Is there any difference in the audit opinion? In view of the fact that the literature on the classification of the two motivations involved in earnings management has not thoroughly studied the distinction between the two motivations, this paper explores the relationship between earnings management with different motivations and the audit opinion. Firstly, this paper introduces the variable of enterprise value to analyze and compare the earnings management of two kinds of motivation. Managers can manipulate accrual items on the basis of self-profit motive (opportunism) in order to realize their own interests. The stronger the degree of earnings management under self-interest behavior, the smaller the enterprise value is, which is a "bad" earnings management motivation. The influence of earnings management on enterprise value can also be realized by transferring enterprise information to the market by accrual items. Under this kind of "good" earnings management motivation, the stronger the degree of earnings management is, the greater the enterprise value is. With the improvement of relevant audit laws and regulations and the development of the capital market, the requirements of auditors become more stringent. Risk-oriented audit urges auditors to pay more attention to various risks in the practice process, and pay more attention to earnings management activities. The relationship between earnings management and audit opinion is a common research topic in academic circles. However, there is no more accurate conclusion on the relationship between them. Starting from two different motivational earnings management of opportunism and non-opportunism, this paper probes into the correlation between earnings management and audit opinions. The empirical results show that earnings management with opportunistic motivation is more likely to be issued a non-standard audit report. On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between audit opinion and non-opportunistic motivation earnings management.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F239.4
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