外部审计、产权性质与成本费用粘性
发布时间：2018-08-23 19:20
【摘要】：我国上市公司普遍存在成本费用粘性,近年来更是成为学者们研究的热点。成本费用粘性是指成本费用随着业务量上升时的变化幅度大于随着业务量下降时的变化幅度,即成本费用呈现“易涨难跌”的非对称现象。成本费用粘性的存在降低了管理层的决策行为和成本控制效率,严重制约着企业的进一步发展。在我国特殊的产权性质下,企业成本费用粘性程度存在差异,因此了解我国不同产权性质企业存在的成本费用粘性以及如何抑制企业存在的成本费用粘性,已经成为缓解企业代理问题,提高经营管理的重中之重。通过文献的阅读和梳理,我们发现关于成本费用粘性的研究,国内外学者主要集中在成本费用粘性的特征、成因及影响因素和经济后果等方面,很少从外部治理机制这一视角出发进行研究,而文章结合我国特殊的产权性质,考察外部审计作为有效的外部公司治理能够在一定程度缓解管理层与股东的代理冲突,降低管理层机会主义动机,从而抑制企业的成本费用粘性。文章从最为流行和最受学者认同的委托代理理论引起的成本费用粘性展开论述,然后从外部审计作为外部治理机制发挥的治理效应探讨外部审计如何抑制成本费用粘性,以及将不同类型的成本费用作为被解释变量进行实证检验,通过研究设计将2007-2015年沪深两市A股上市公司按照实际控制人不同划分为国有企业和非国有企业,并进一步将国有企业细分为中央国企和地方国企,考察外部审计对不同产权性质企业成本费用粘性的作用后得出以下结论:(1)外部审计对于成本费用粘性具有抑制作用,且外部审计质量越高,抑制作用更强。对于不同类型成本费用粘性,外部审计发挥的抑制作用存在差异。其中外部审计对于管理费用粘性抑制作用最强,销售费用次之,营业成本最弱。(2)我国上市公司普遍存在成本粘性,国有企业的成本粘性高于非国有企业;在国有企业中,中央国企的费用粘性高于地方国企。(3)对于不同产权性质的上市公司,外部审计的抑制作用存在差异,相对于非国有企业而言,外部审计对国有企业的成本费用粘性抑制作用更强;相对于地方国企,中央国企的外部审计对成本费用粘性发挥的作用更强。根据文章的研究,在文章的最后部分对不同产权性质企业如何抑制成本费用粘性提出政策建议:(1)缓解不同产权性质企业代理问题,完善成本费用管理制度;(2)加强外部审计的治理效应,与内部治理机制形成协同作用;(3)规范事务所审计收费,提升会计师事务所的审计质量。
[Abstract]:Cost-cost stickiness is common in listed companies in China, and it has become a hot topic for scholars in recent years. The stickiness of cost means that the change range of cost with the increase of business volume is greater than that with the decline of business volume, that is, the cost presents the asymmetric phenomenon of "easy to rise and not to fall". The existence of cost-cost stickiness reduces the decision-making behavior and cost control efficiency of management and seriously restricts the further development of enterprises. Under the special property right of our country, there are differences in the stickiness degree of cost and expense of enterprises, so we can understand the stickiness of cost and cost of enterprises with different property rights in our country and how to restrain the stickiness of cost and expense of enterprises. It has become the most important to alleviate the agency problem and improve the management. Through the reading and combing of the literature, we find that the researches on the stickiness of cost and expense mainly focus on the characteristics, causes, influencing factors and economic consequences of the stickiness of cost and expense. Few studies are carried out from the perspective of external governance mechanism, and the article, combined with the special property right nature of our country, investigates that external audit, as an effective external corporate governance, can alleviate the agency conflict between management and shareholders to a certain extent. Reduce the management opportunism motive, thus restrain the cost-expense stickiness of the enterprise. This paper discusses the cost-cost stickiness caused by the principal-agent theory, which is the most popular and accepted by the most scholars, and then discusses how the external audit can restrain the cost-cost stickiness from the governance effect of external audit as an external governance mechanism. As well as taking different types of cost and expenses as explanatory variables to carry out empirical tests, the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2015 are divided into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises according to the actual controllers. Furthermore, the state-owned enterprises are divided into central state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises. After investigating the effect of external audit on the cost and cost stickiness of enterprises with different property rights, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) external audit can restrain the cost and expense stickiness. And the higher the quality of external audit, the stronger the inhibition. For different types of cost-cost stickiness, the inhibitory effect of external audit is different. Among them, external audit has the strongest restraining effect on management cost viscosity, sales cost is second, and operating cost is the weakest. (2) the cost viscosity of state-owned enterprises is higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises, and the cost viscosity of state-owned enterprises is higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises. The cost stickiness of central state-owned enterprises is higher than that of local state-owned enterprises. (3) for listed companies with different property rights, the inhibitory effect of external audit is different, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, The external audit has a stronger restraining effect on the cost and cost stickiness of the state-owned enterprises, and the external audit of the central state-owned enterprise has a stronger effect on the cost stickiness than that of the local state-owned enterprise. According to the research of this paper, in the last part of the article, some suggestions on how to restrain the stickiness of cost and expense among enterprises with different property rights are put forward: (1) to alleviate the agency problem of enterprises with different property rights. Improve the cost and expense management system; (2) strengthen the governance effect of external audit and form a synergy with the internal governance mechanism; (3) standardize the audit fees, improve the audit quality of accounting firms.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F239.4;F271
本文编号：2199668
[Abstract]:Cost-cost stickiness is common in listed companies in China, and it has become a hot topic for scholars in recent years. The stickiness of cost means that the change range of cost with the increase of business volume is greater than that with the decline of business volume, that is, the cost presents the asymmetric phenomenon of "easy to rise and not to fall". The existence of cost-cost stickiness reduces the decision-making behavior and cost control efficiency of management and seriously restricts the further development of enterprises. Under the special property right of our country, there are differences in the stickiness degree of cost and expense of enterprises, so we can understand the stickiness of cost and cost of enterprises with different property rights in our country and how to restrain the stickiness of cost and expense of enterprises. It has become the most important to alleviate the agency problem and improve the management. Through the reading and combing of the literature, we find that the researches on the stickiness of cost and expense mainly focus on the characteristics, causes, influencing factors and economic consequences of the stickiness of cost and expense. Few studies are carried out from the perspective of external governance mechanism, and the article, combined with the special property right nature of our country, investigates that external audit, as an effective external corporate governance, can alleviate the agency conflict between management and shareholders to a certain extent. Reduce the management opportunism motive, thus restrain the cost-expense stickiness of the enterprise. This paper discusses the cost-cost stickiness caused by the principal-agent theory, which is the most popular and accepted by the most scholars, and then discusses how the external audit can restrain the cost-cost stickiness from the governance effect of external audit as an external governance mechanism. As well as taking different types of cost and expenses as explanatory variables to carry out empirical tests, the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2015 are divided into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises according to the actual controllers. Furthermore, the state-owned enterprises are divided into central state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises. After investigating the effect of external audit on the cost and cost stickiness of enterprises with different property rights, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) external audit can restrain the cost and expense stickiness. And the higher the quality of external audit, the stronger the inhibition. For different types of cost-cost stickiness, the inhibitory effect of external audit is different. Among them, external audit has the strongest restraining effect on management cost viscosity, sales cost is second, and operating cost is the weakest. (2) the cost viscosity of state-owned enterprises is higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises, and the cost viscosity of state-owned enterprises is higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises. The cost stickiness of central state-owned enterprises is higher than that of local state-owned enterprises. (3) for listed companies with different property rights, the inhibitory effect of external audit is different, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, The external audit has a stronger restraining effect on the cost and cost stickiness of the state-owned enterprises, and the external audit of the central state-owned enterprise has a stronger effect on the cost stickiness than that of the local state-owned enterprise. According to the research of this paper, in the last part of the article, some suggestions on how to restrain the stickiness of cost and expense among enterprises with different property rights are put forward: (1) to alleviate the agency problem of enterprises with different property rights. Improve the cost and expense management system; (2) strengthen the governance effect of external audit and form a synergy with the internal governance mechanism; (3) standardize the audit fees, improve the audit quality of accounting firms.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F239.4;F271
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