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上市公司审计委员会设立与效率研究

发布时间:2018-08-25 15:28
【摘要】: 审计委员会是董事会下属的具有独立地位的专门委员会,其职责是通过评价公司内部财务控制和风险管理体系、监控公司财务报告体系的运行和内、外部审计过程,以提高财务信息披露质量,全面确保公司受托责任的履行和解除。审计委员会制度历经发展,在英美等国上市公司中,已成为公司内部有效保护股东利益的一种制度安排。进入21世纪以来,在美国和欧洲发生的一系列财务舞弊和审计失败案,使审计委员会的作用得到社会各界的进一步重视。美国和英国的证券监管机构相继颁布法案,提升审计委员会在公司治理框架中的地位,并完善审计委员会制度的内容,以适应经济环境的变化。审计委员会制度在国际范围内的发展,也受到我国证券监管层、会计职业界、公司管理层和学者们的广泛关注,审计委员会制度逐步在我国上市公司董事会中建立。但是,审计委员会制度在我国产生和逐步建立的经济环境与英美国家存在很大的不同。在英美等国,审计委员会的产生和发展是基于公司股权分散所导致的股东与公司管理层的代理冲突,而在我国,上市公司表现出高度集中的股权结构。同时,目前审计委员会在我国仍处于自愿设立阶段。本文基于我国上市公司股权结构特征的分析,对影响上市公司设立审计委员会的因素及其效率进行研究。 本文的主要内容分为两大部分,第一大部主要从控股股东与中小股东之间代理冲突的角度,对影响我国上市公司设立审计委员会的因素进行经验研究。研究结果表明,制衡性股权结构有利公司监督机制的完善,非控股股东持股比例越高,公司设立审计委员会的可能性更大,其中,第二大股东起主导作用;第一大股东对公司实现绝对控股时,出于对中小股东利益“掠夺”的需要,公司自愿设立审计委员会的可能性显著下降。此外,在研究过程中还发现,股权性质也会影响审计委员会的设立。对于非国有股控股公司,其控股股东加强了对公司的控制,公司设立审计委员会的可能性较低。 第二大部分是关于审计委员会效率的研究,从盈余管理、审计师变更和审计收费的角度为审计委员会的效率提供经验证据。研究结果表明:(1)从审计委员会与盈余管理的关系看,设立审计委员会的公司其盈余管理水平显著低于未设立之公司,首次为审计委员会的有效性提供了经验证据。此外,审计委员会规模与其控制盈余管理的有效性负相关;(2)从审计委员会与外部审计师变更关系看,设立审计委员会的公司,外部审计师发生变更的可能性显著降低,这表明审计委员会能有效缓解管理层与外部审计师之间就如何运用公认会计原则产生的分歧,并在相互的冲突中向外部审计师提供支持;(3)从审计委员会与年报审计收费变化之间的关系看,公司设立审计委员会都与审计收费变化显著负相关,这为审计委员会能够改善内部控制环境,降低外部审计的控制风险提供了间接证据。 本文基于控股股东与中小股东代理冲突的分析,利用经验研究方法,首次发现影响我国审计委员会设立的因素,丰富了股权结构与公司治理相关理论的内容,这有助于认识和研究股权结构如何具体影响公司治理行为等问题。同时,利用现有可行资料,既从运行结果,也从运行过程对审计委员会的效率进行了全面和系统的研究,分别从盈余管理、外部审计师变更和审计收费的角度,首次为中国上市公司审计委员会的有效性提供了经验证据。
[Abstract]:Audit committee is a special committee with independent status under the board of directors. Its responsibility is to monitor the operation and internal and external audit process of the company's financial reporting system by evaluating the company's internal financial control and risk management system so as to improve the quality of financial information disclosure and ensure the performance and dissolution of the company's fiduciary responsibilities. Since the beginning of the 21st century, a series of financial fraud and auditing failure cases have occurred in the United States and Europe, which have made the role of the Audit Committee more important. Securities regulatory agencies have enacted bills to upgrade the status of the audit committee in the corporate governance framework and improve the content of the audit committee system to adapt to changes in the economic environment. The audit committee system is gradually established in the board of directors of Listed Companies in China. However, the economic environment in which the audit committee system was created and gradually established in China is quite different from that in the United Kingdom and the United States. At the same time, the audit committee is still in the stage of voluntary establishment in China. Based on the analysis of the equity structure characteristics of Listed Companies in China, this paper studies the factors affecting the establishment of audit committee and its efficiency.
The main content of this paper is divided into two parts. The first part is mainly from the angle of agency conflict between controlling shareholders and small and medium shareholders to study the factors that affect the establishment of Audit Committee of Listed Companies in China. The second largest shareholder plays a leading role; the first largest shareholder takes absolute control of the company, out of the need to "plunder" the interests of small and medium shareholders, the possibility of voluntary establishment of audit committees declines significantly. In addition, in the course of the study, it is also found that the nature of equity will also affect. Establishment of audit committee. For non-state-owned stock holding companies, the controlling shareholders have strengthened their control over the company, and the possibility of establishing audit committee is lower.
The second part is about the efficiency of audit committee, which provides empirical evidence for the efficiency of audit committee from the perspective of earnings management, auditor change and audit fees. The company, for the first time, provides empirical evidence for the effectiveness of the audit committee. In addition, the size of the audit committee is negatively correlated with the effectiveness of controlling earnings management. (2) From the perspective of the relationship between the audit committee and external auditors, the possibility of change of external auditors in the company with audit committee is significantly reduced, which indicates that the auditor Committee has changed. It can effectively alleviate the disagreement between management and external auditors on how to apply GAAP and provide support to external auditors in mutual conflicts. (3) From the relationship between Audit Committee and annual report audit fee changes, the establishment of audit committee is significantly negatively related to the change of audit fee, which is an audit. The committee can provide indirect evidence for improving the internal control environment and reducing the control risk of external audit.
Based on the analysis of agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, this paper finds out the factors that affect the establishment of Audit Committee for the first time by empirical research method, enriches the content of related theories of ownership structure and corporate governance, which is helpful to understand and study how ownership structure affects corporate governance behavior. Existing feasible data, from the operating results, but also from the operating process of the audit committee efficiency of a comprehensive and systematic study, respectively, from the perspective of earnings management, external auditor changes and audit fees, for the first time to provide empirical evidence for the effectiveness of the audit committee of Listed Companies in China.
【学位授予单位】:厦门大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2007
【分类号】:F276.6;F239.4

【引证文献】

相关博士学位论文 前1条

1 蒋基路;特定应计项的盈余管理研究[D];暨南大学;2009年

相关硕士学位论文 前3条

1 戴金钏;上市公司审计委员会治理有效性研究[D];东北财经大学;2010年

2 谌嘉席;审计委员会治理功能与银行债权人权益保护研究[D];西南财经大学;2010年

3 庄薇;我国上市公司审计委员会的设立动机及其治理有效性研究[D];西南财经大学;2010年



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