非效率投资、政府审计与腐败曝光——基于央企控股上市公司的经验证据

发布时间：2018-11-02 07:10

【摘要】：本文以2009~2014年接受政府审计的中央控股上市公司为样本,以企业投资为着力点,从腐败曝光视角分析非效率投资产生的社会后果,并进一步考察政府审计是否能促进非效率投资企业的腐败曝光。研究结果发现:央企控股上市公司非效率投资程度与腐败被曝光的概率之间呈显著正相关关系,其中过度投资企业的腐败曝光概率更高;政府审计能够提高非效率投资企业的腐败被曝光概率,进一步研究发现中央实施的一系列严厉反腐行动能够提高政府审计作用,尤其能够提高投资不足企业的腐败曝光概率。研究表明,非效率投资暗含着腐败行为,政府审计能够提高非效率投资企业的腐败被曝光的概率,此外政府审计是作为中央反腐行动的配合手段发挥作用。
[Abstract]:This paper takes the central holding listed companies audited by the government from 2009 to 2014 as a sample, focuses on enterprise investment, and analyzes the social consequences of inefficient investment from the perspective of corruption exposure. And further study whether the government audit can promote the corruption exposure of inefficient investment enterprises. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the degree of inefficient investment and the probability of exposure of corruption in the listed companies, and the exposure probability of corruption of overinvested enterprises is higher; Government audit can improve the exposure probability of corruption of inefficient investment enterprises. Further research shows that a series of severe anti-corruption actions implemented by the central government can improve the role of government auditing especially the exposure probability of corruption of underinvested enterprises. The research shows that the inefficient investment implies corrupt behavior, and the government audit can increase the probability of exposure of the corruption of the inefficient investment enterprises. In addition, the government audit plays a role as the cooperative means of the central anti-corruption action.
【作者单位】：四川农业大学管理学院;中国政府审计研究中心;西南交通大学经济管理学院;西南财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:71702153)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F239.4;F276.1

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